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Introduction to the thesis.
In this chapter, I give a brief introduction to the main body of this thesis.
In Section 1.1, I introduce a common theme to the three pieces of work that
comprise this thesis. In Section 1.2, I introduce the first topic, primality
testing, and very briefly discuss its historical context. In Section 1.3 I give
some of the background, both historical and informational, necessary for
the understanding the cryptography portion of the thesis. In Section 1.4
I introduce the second topic of this thesis, secure two-party computation,
and gives its historical context. In Section 1.5 I briefly discuss the third
topic of this thesis, multi-prover interactive proof systems. The reader may
note-some repetition in material between this introduction, and the chapter
material. The intent here is not to strive for added length, but to make the
introduction more self-contained.
1.1 How many theses have I written?
This thesis covers a wide span of material, ranging from algorithms to secure
protocols to zero-knowledge proof systems. Such a mishmash seems to pre-
clude any unifying theme, and one might naturally suspect that this thesis
is, in reality, three theses bundled together. One might, with no meanness
of spirit, charge that the sole unifying force behind these works is a staple.
One might be right.
But then, one might be wrong. In putting these disparate papers side
by side, one sees that there is in fact a common general theme. All three
- difto- - - __ - __
areas of work are, in their own way, giving answers to the question, "What can
randomness do for me?". In the first area, randomness is applied to solve and
illuminate some longstanding questions in the field of algebraic algorithms.
In the second, I examine a simple, randomized mechanism for destroying
information, and show how to use it to implement certain types of secure
protocols. Finally, in the third area, I delve into the curious connections
between information and belief afforded by randomized generalizations of
the usual notions of proof.
Also common to these three works is a propensity for using complicated
arguments to illuminate the power of very simple mechanisms. In the first
area, this mechanism is a random bit generator, or, more colloquially, a
common coin. In the second, this mechanism is a communication channel
that transmits each bit sent through it with probability }. In the third area,
I consider the more abstract mechanism of separation, examining the power
obtained by blocking all communication between two parties.
An apology made, then rescinded.
I sometimes feel I should apologize for the tedious intricacies of some of
the work described in this thesis. A quick perusal through even the most
monstrous chapter' reveals that nothing particularly ingenious is going on.
Rather, there is page after page of grungy argumentation, whose sole purpose
is to keep the thesis above some minimal level of rigor.
However, this complexity is often the price one must pay if one is to
create new tools. The reduction from complicated algorithms and protocols
to simple mechanisms or methodologies is often painful, but is productive
in the long run. Particularly in the cryptography sections, I hope that by
proving the strongest theorems I can, in a reasonably rigorous fashion, I may
facilitate any subsequent work in these areas.
'Chapter 3, for the bold.
1.2 Part One: Primality Testing.
1.2.1 Introduction.
Chapter 2 of this thesis relates some work of Goldwasser and myself [GK]
on the problem of distinguishing prime numbers from composites. Since
this is a fairly well-known problem in the area of algebraic algorithms, and
the chapter's introduction is already fairly long, this introduction will be
brief. In this section, we will primarily discuss the changes in mathematical
technology, and the shift in focus that made our results possible.
Prerequisite background for reading this chapter.
Since our algorithm makes use of some deep results from the theory of elliptic
curves, a strong background in algebraic geometry is recommended for read-
ing this chapter of the thesis. Of course, a strong background in algebraic
geometry was recommended for writing this chapter, but turned out not to
be necessary. Thus someone with some undergraduate background in algebra
should not lose hope.
I have attempted to suppress as much as possible the advanced mathe-
matics behind this chapter, and to concentrate it into as small a space as
possible. Indeed, the exposition of our basic methodology uses only elemen-
tary group theory, making no mention at all of elliptic curves. When I discuss
the application of our methodology to the study of elliptic curves, I try to
use their properties as abstract "black boxes." In Section 2.3, I give a quick
introduction to the mathematics behind elliptic curves. This section gives
only a taste of a very rich field, and frequently references classical theorems
without giving any proofs or even an idea for why they should be true. How-
ever, this section will prove sufficient for an understanding of our algorithm,
if not the mathematics behind it.
1.2.2 Historical context.
Historically, the work of Professor Goldwasser and myself, in the latter half
of 1985, was part of a trend in developing algorithms using results from
algebraic geometry. To give some context, we mention other work that also
followed this trend.
Schoof [Sch] used the theory of elliptic curves to develop the first deter-
ministic polynomial time algorithm for computing the square root of x E Z,,
where x is a small quadratic residue mod p.2 This algorithm is less efficient
than the probabilistic algorithms for this problem (e.g., [AMM]), and much
more limited in the values of x that it is fast on. However, the previous
approaches to this problem all require randomization in lieu of some some
unproven assumption, such as the Extended Riemann Hypothesis. More im-
portantly, he developed an algorithm for computing the order of an elliptic
curve, an algorithm which proves crucial to our work.
Lenstra [L] showed how to use elliptic curves to efficiently factor num-
bers using almost constant memory. Unlike most of the faster algorithms,
Lenstra's technique works particularly well on numbers which have small
prime factors, hence its practical importance. This work was particularly
important to the development of our work; theorems he proved for the anal-
ysis of his algorithm are instrumental for the analysis of ours.
Finally, some earlier work by Bosma [Bo], and Chudnovsky-Chudnovsky
[CC], while not directly influencing our work, also applied elliptic curves to
primality testing.
1.2.3 A shift in focus.
While our work would not have been possible without the recent advances in
elliptic curve techniques, we equally benefitted from a shift in focus. Previous
primality testing algorithms ([M],[R],[SS]) worked by efficiently recognizing
composite numbers. Given a number, they would attempt to find a short
proof that the number was composite. If they succeeded, they would output
"composite." If they failed to find a proof of primality, they would output
"probably prime."
Such an approach is eminently reasonable if one can manage to always
find a proof of compositeness for a composite number, n. In such a case, fail-
ing to find a proof of compositeness for n is in itself a proof that n is prime.
However, all the provably fast strategies for proving a number composite use
randomization, 3 which causes them to fail with nonzero probability. In prac-
2 To better understand the meaning of "small" in this context, we note that the running
time of the algorithm is polynomial in x and |p|, as opposed to Ixt and |pl.
3 An algorithm of Miller [M] uses a deterministic strategy, but its analysis relies on an
unproven assumption.
tice, the difference between always succeeding and almost always succeeding
is not crucial. However, this nonzero chance of failure means that failing to
prove n composite does not imply that n is prime.
We used a different strategy altogether. Instead of attempting to prove a
number composite in a more efficient manner, we worked on directly proving
a number prime. We developed a general methodology for proving a number
prime, which can be used to formulate a primality criterion based on elliptic
curves. The development, use, and analysis of this criterion, is worked out
in the main body of the thesis.
1.3 Introduction to modern cryptography.
The other two areas discussed in this thesis, comprising the bulk of this thesis,
are in the area of cryptography. Papers in modern cryptography frequently
have a few simple conceptual ideas, with long arguments to show that these
ideas do indeed work.4 For better, or for worse, this paper is no exception.
To facilitate the reading of these sections, we first give a general intro-
duction to the field, briefly discussing the dominant issues we address, and
the general proof techniques we use.
1.3.1 Trends in modern cryptography.
Cryptography has gone through many changes in its history, which is un-
derstandable given that the field is at least two or three thousand years old.
Even in the "modern" era of the cryptography, which began in the seventies,5,
there has been a substantial change in focus. We have always been interested
in privacy, but the types of privacy we consider are now much more sophis-
ticated.
The traditional goal of cryptography has been to achieve private commu-
nication in public settings. In the standard scenario, we have two parties,
Alice and Bob, who wish to have a private conversation, and an eavesdrop-
per, Eve, who wishes to listen in on the conversation. We assume that Eve
is allowed to listen to every message sent between Alice and Bob, but is not
4Actually, a cryptography paper is doing well if it manages to fit in all the proofs.
'The beginning of the modern era is typically tied to seminal paper, New Directions in
Cryptography, by Diffie and Hellman [DH].
allowed to perform arbitrarily difficult computations. The bread and butter
problem cryptographers work on is to find ways in which Alice and Bob can
scramble their messages to prevent Eve from learning anything about what
they are saying. Interestingly, this goal was not fully reached until the middle
70's, with the public key cryptosystems of [RSA] and [Mc].
Nothing presented in this thesis is directly applicable to private communi-
cation. Instead, we focus on issues that first reached prominence in the 80's:
zero-knowledge proofs and secure protocols. Zero-knowledge proofs attempt
to realize the distinction between the transfer of confidence and the transfer
of knowledge. In secure protocols, each party possesses some information
that they wish to keep private. The parties interact so as to compute some
function of their private inputs, while keeping this data as private as possible.
We discuss these concepts in more detail below.
1.3.2 Zero-knowledge proofs.
Chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis devote themselves almost entirely to the
subject of zero-knowledge proofs. We should therefore give a rough idea of
just what we mean by zero-knowledge proofs.' This concept was introduced
by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR), and in fact comprises two distinct
conceptual advances.
Interactive proof systems.
First, there is the notion of an interactive proof system, a randomized gener-
alization of the classical notion of proof. We consider assertions of the form
"String x is in language L." Interactive proofs generalize ordinary proofs in
the following three ways:
1. In ordinary proof systems, the prover sends a single message to the
verifier, who then deterministically evaluates this message without any
'further interaction with the prover. In an interactive proof system, the
prover and the verifier may send messages back and forth to each other.
Both the prover and the verifier are allowed to base their messages on
6The introduction and definitions section of Chapter 6 gives a more extensive and tech-
nical treatment of this subject. We point the more sophisticated reader in this direction.
the outcome of random coin tosses, i.e. both entities are probabilis-
tic. The verifier makes his evaluation based on the transcript of the
protocol, and his set of random coin tosses.
2. Suppose that x E L. With an ordinary proof system, the verifier is
guaranteed to accept a correct proof with probability 1. With an in-
teractive proof system, we require only that the verifier accepts with
probability close to 1 at the end of the protocol. We are being admit-
tedly vague about how close to 1 this probability should be, for reasons
that will be made clearer later.
3. Suppose that x g L. With an ordinary proof system, the verifier is
guaranteed to reject a false proof with probability 1. With an interac-
tive proof system, we require only that the verifier rejects with proba-
bility close to 1 at the end of the protocol, regardless of the malicious
prover's strategy.
Now to clean up some details. By "close to 1,"' we turn out to have a lot of
leeway. Whether "close to 1" means greater than .99, or greater than .50001,
the set of assertions that may be interactively proven usually remains the
same.7 We also require that the number of messages and the size of the
messages remains polynomial in the size of the assertion to be proven. Thus,
interactive proof systems are better thought of as generalizations of NP.
Finally, when we refer to arbitrary strategies on the part of the malicious
provers, we allow the prover to compute arbitrary functions and realize ar-
bitrary distributions,' but we don't allow the prover access to the random
coin tosses of the verifier.9
Zero-knowledge proof systems.
Second, there is the notion of zero-knowledge. Informally, a zero-knowledge
proof system is one in which the verifier receives no information other than
'This is true in nearly all the models considered in the literature, as well as in this
thesis.
8Alternative models, such as the Brassard-Crdpeau model [BC], only allow for a much
more limited class of prover strategies, though they are able to prove much stronger zero-
knowledge results.
9Another model, proposed by Babai[Bab], makes all of the verifier's coin tosses public.
the fact that the statement in question is true. The difficulty lies in precisely
defining what it means for someone to have learned nothing. This is done by
using the notion of simulation. First, we precisely define what we are trying
to simulate. If some party, A, takes part in a protocol, we can define its view
to be equal to the sequence of messages sent to it, along with its sequence of
random coin tosses. For the case of interactive proof systems, we denote by
VIEWV(x) the distribution of views verifier V obtains during the proof that
x E L.
Now, suppose that some entity, S, called a simulator, can output a dis-
tribution that is "indistinguishable" from party A's view of the protocol.
Then, it seems intuitively plausible that A obtains no more information by
running the protocol than he could obtain with the information and resources
available to S. We say that an interactive proof system is zero-knowledge
if for any "reasonably powerful" verifier V (possibly malicious), there exists
a "weak" simulator, MV, such that MV(x) computes a distribution that is
"indistinguishable" from VIEWg(x).
Notions of indistinguishability.
While this is the correct intuition, we still have a lot of blanks to fill in before
we can start making well-defined definitions. In the GMR model, the simu-
lators and verifiers are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines, and
the distributions of Mv(x) and VIEWV(x) are computationally indistinguish-
able by any probabilistic polynomial-time judge. That is, any probabilistic




for any constant c. This scenario is technically very difficult to work in, but it
does allow for some nontrivial theorems to be proven in the standard domain.
this notion of zero-knowledge is known as computational zero-knowledge.
In our thesis, we actually work with a much stronger notion of indistin-
guishability, called statistical indistinguishability. We consider two families
of "distributions, D1(k) and D2(k). Here, k is some parameter known as the
security parameter. We consider judges that are allowed to observe only kc
samples from the two distributions, for some constant c, but are otherwise
computationally unbounded. We say that D1 (k) and D 2(k) are statistically
indistinguishable if any such judge cannot distinguish D 1(k) and D 2(k) with
probability greater than
1 1
for any constant c', as k grows sufficiently large. We can think of k as a
measure of how much security we want from our protocols. Virtually all
of our protocols will have a security parameter. For our interactive proof
systems, we will often implicitly use a security parameter k that is equal to
|xi.
The notion of zero-knowledge we will use is known as statistical zero-
knowledge. In statistical zero-knowledge, we require that the distributions of
Mg(x) and VIEwv(x) be statistically indistinguishable. That is, no judge
that is allowed to take IxlV samples can distinguish Mg(x) from VIEWg(x)
with probability greater than
1 1
2 +|x -c''
for any fixed c and c', as lxI grows sufficiently large.
1.3.3 Secure Protocols.
Another explosive area in modern cryptography has been that of secure pro-
tocols. In the most general scenario, we consider n parties, P1,..., P, where
Pi has some secret, which we denote by si. We also have functions F1,..., Fn,
each of which take i, ... , s, as arguments. The goal of secure multi-party
computation is to allow Player Pi to learn F(s 1 , sn), and nothing else.
A much simpler scenario, which is all we consider in this thesis, is secure
two-party computation, first introduced by Yao[Y]. In this scenario, we have
two players, P1 and P2 , With secrets si and s2, and a single function F. Our
goal is for P2 to learn the value of F(s1, S2), and nothing else, and for P1 to
learn nothing. Conceptually, we can consider the following physical solution:
We have a trusted servant, who is known for discretion and computational
ability. The two players give their secrets to the servant, who then computes
F(s 1, 82). The servant whispers this value to P2, who then shoots the servant
dead. Our goal is to simulate this physical scenario without bloodshed.
Surprisingly, more progress has been made for the general problem than
for the specific one. Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson [GMW] developed a cryp-
tographic solution for the multi-party problem, under the assumption that
the majority of the participants obey the protocol and don't collude after-
wards. A series of papers by Ben- Or-Goldwasser-Wigderson[BGW], Chaum-
Cr6peau-Damgard[CCD], and Ben-Or-Rabin[BR] culminated in a noncryp-
tographic protocol that worked if a majority of the players were honest. Un-
fortunately, these results say little about the two-party case. They require
that less than Ln/2] of the participants are trying to get illicit information,
which is 0 for the case of n = 2. As we will see, there are fundamental reasons
for why these solutions break down in this case.
Bounding knowledge with simulations.
Before we discuss solutions to the two-party problem, we should say precisely
what a "solution" is. We wish to satisfy a set of constraints as to what
information each party should or should not receive. It is reasonably clear
what it means to learn a value of a function, but less clear is what it means
to learn "nothing else." To state this precisely, we fall back on the notion of
simulation we used in our discussion of zero-knowledge proofs.
Our notion of what it means for P1 to learn nothing is the same as with
zero-knowledge proofs. In fact, with our protocols, Pi's view of the conversa-
tion will be easily simulated in probabilistic polynomial time. The difficulty
in all our protocols will be in showing that P2 learns nothing.
Suppose that player P1 obeys the protocol, using secret 31, and a possibly
malicious second player, P2, disobeys the protocol. We can then speak of the
malicious player's view of the conversation, which we denote by
VIEWp2 (si).
Now, we can consider a simulator, S, who runs in probabilistic polynomial
time. We would like for S to simulate an indistinguishable approximation of
VIEWp2 (si).
In the zero-knowledge scenario, we only allowed S to know the val.ue of
x, the string that was in the language. In this scenario, we want to ensure
that S has access to only the information that P2 could have obtained by
running the ideal protocol. To make this formal, we describe our simulator
as talking to P2 , and running the ideal protocol with P1. At some point in
its conversation with P2, S is allowed to input some value, S2, to the ideal
protocol, and receive the value of F(s1, 2). Based on this value, S must
then finish the conversation with the verifier. We ask that P2's view of his
conversation with S be indistinguishable from his view of his conversation
with P1. In the main body of this thesis, I give players P1 and P2 the names
Alice and Bob, respectively. As well as instilling a modicum of humanity to
a rather dry field, it also allows us to use gender based pronouns without any
ambiguity.
Solutions to the two-party problem.
The first solution to the two-party problem is due to Yao [Y]. This solu-
tion was based on the assumption that factoring is hard. It worked for
all functions F which are computable by polynomial-sized circuits. This is
essentially as general as one can get, since otherwise it would be hard to
compute F(s 1 , .2) regardless of the privacy constraints. For reasons which
will be perhaps clearer after reading this thesis, I prefer the term oblivious
circuit evaluation. This term better calls to mind the fact that a circuit is
being evaluated. I use the word oblivious to emphasize an important link
this problem has to a protocol known as oblivious transfer, as will be made
clear later in the introduction.
Yao's notion of indistinguishability was computational. Metaphorically,
Alice and Bob could get information they weren't supposed to get, but it
would be so scrambled, that any probabilistic, polynomially bounded Turing
machine would be unable to distinguish this encrypted information from
encrypted noise.
The assumption that factoring is hard was subsequently weakened by
Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson [GMW] (based on ideas from [EGL]), to the
existence of trapdoor permutations. One might naively hope that even this
weakened intractability assumption might be eliminated entirely, as in the
multi-party case. However, it is a fairly easy exercise to show that no mental,
purely information theoretic solution exists. If we allow our parties to have
unbounded computational resources, and only allow them to talk over the
telephone, then it is impossible to insure that the two players learn precisely
what they are supposed to learn, and nothing else.
1.4 Reducing two-party protocols to oblivi-
ous transfer.
The second part of my thesis describes a round efficient reduction from two-
party protocols, as defined above, to a simple two-party protocol known
as oblivious transfer. Oblivious transfer, which we abbreviate as OT, can
be described as follows. Alice inputs some bit b to the oblivious transfer
protocol. With probability I, bit b is sent to Bob. Otherwise, Bob receives
some null value, which we denote by #.
1.4.1 A brief history of oblivious transfer.
Some history behind oblivious transfer is in order. Oblivious transfer was
first developed by Rabin [R2]. Rabin gave an implementation for oblivious
transfer, based on the assumption that factoring was hard, and that neither
party would violate the protocol. In this protocol, Bob would always get
information about b, but half the time this information would be scrambled
in such a way that the only way Bob could recover b would be to factor a
large product of two primes.
Fischer-Micali-Rackoff-Tompa-Wittenberg [FMRTW] were able to elim-
inate Rabin's assumption that both parties obey the protocol. They use the
same complexity assumption as does Rabin, namely that factoring is hard.
Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [EGL] finally reduced the complexity as-
sumption from the intractability of factoring to the existence of trap-door
permutations. Their protocol actually allowed them to implement a some-
what stronger protocol, known as "1 out of 2" oblivious transfer (we abbre-
viate this as }-OT). In this protocol, Alice has two bits, bo and b1 . Bob is
allowed to select one of these bits, be, and learn its value. However, Bob is
not allowed to learn b_,, and Alice is not allowed to learn x. It is a simple
exercise to implement ordinary OT with }-OT.
This thesis continues a long line of research into application of oblivious
transfer. Blum [Bl] applied oblivious transfer to coin flipping over the phone,
secret-key exchange, and certified electronic mail. Even, Goldreich, and Lem-
pel applied i-OT to contract signing. Brassard, Cr6peau, and Robert [BCR]
showed that a multi-bit version of i-OT, where Alice has strings So and Si in-
stead of bits bo and bi, could be reduced to }-OT oblivious transfer. Crepeau
[C] later reduced }-OT to ordinary OT.
Oblivious transfer also appears prominently in the implementation of se-
cure two-party protocols. Both of the above protocols for oblivious circuit
evaluation use the multi-bit version of }-OT, which can be reduced to sim-
ple OT. Unfortunately, these protocols did not constitute a reduction to OT;
cryptographic protocols are used to augment the power of OT.
In some very interesting independent work, Goldreich and Vainish [GV]
reduced oblivious circuit evaluation to OT, for the case where both parties
are honest, i.e., where both players agree to abide by the protocol. Their
reduction is extremely simple, and very efficient in the total amount of com-
munication used. There is a catch here, namely that a malicious player
can easily steal extra information by violating the protocol. Whereas I go
through some difficulties in order to make my protocols robust against active
attacks, Goldreich and Vainish use cryptographic mechanisms to strengthen
their protocol's security. By using this combination of cryptographic tricks
with a weak reduction to OT, they were able to improve on the efficiency of
the cryptography based solutions.
1.4.2 The results of Chapters 3-5.
The work on oblivious transfer that has been presented in this thesis com-
prises two main areas. In Chapter 3, we show how to commit and decommit
bits, using oblivious transfer, and how to prove zero-knowledge proofs about
these committed bits. The novelty of these schemes is that they are extremely
round efficient. In order for Alice to commit or decommit a set of bits to
Bob, along with a zero-knowledge proof of some assertion about these bits,
it is only necessary for her to send a single message to Bob. Furthermore,
Bob doesn't have to send any messages to Alice.
This result is of technical interest, since it is not immediately obvious how
to do this. However, the reason I like this result is philosophical and literary.
The process of proving a statement is not inherently interactive, but some
interaction (albeit very bounded) is needed to give a zero-knowledge proof
of virtually an nontrivial statement. The introduction of some interaction
seems inherently necessary in the usual model for zero-knowledge. I find it
interestingithat a simple source of entropy can replace this need for interac-
tion. A process that randomly destroys bits of a message can obliterate all of
the information for why a theorem is true, yet still leave a cheshire-cat grin
that is a zero-knowledge proof.
From the literary angle, there has got to be a science fiction story here. A
long dead race of beings can leave in their rubble clear proof that they were
great mathematicians, possessing proofs of Fermat's last theorem, ERH, and
the like. Yet because of all the decay, all their delicate arguments have been
obliterated. Our credit-greedy hero marches off into the double sunset, in
a futile quest for understandable, plagiarizable fragments of these awesome
proofs. Maybe not an Omni story line, but Isaac Asimov's magazine might
be sold on it.
In Chapter 4, I reduce oblivious circuit evaluation to OT, for the special
case where F is computable by an NC' circuit. This solution only uses a
constant number of rounds of communication. I find this special case very
interesting because I can't do it for the general case. For arbitrary circuits, we
can still use only a constant number of rounds, but the size of our messages
will then be exponential. It is still open whether the general problem can be
efficiently solved.
In Chapter 5, I use the results of Chapter 4 to give a reasonably round
efficient solution to the general problem of oblivious circuit evaluation. To
do this, I develop techniques for chaining together a series of computations
in a secure manner. These techniques have proven of independent value in
the study of multi-prover interactive proof systems (Chapter 6), and in some
more recent work of myself and others on secure protocols.
1.4.3 Why all the pain?
Chapter 3 is undoubtably the most tortuous chapter in this thesis. It com-
prises about 60 pages, much of it very technical. Chapters 4 and 5 are much
more palatable, yet still are rather dense. It is, in retrospect, rather amazing
how long it took to write out the details of a few simple ideas. I attribute
this to two main causes: the desire for rigor, and the lust for power.
I have attempted to write rigorous proofs for these results. This has been
hampered by a blind spot in the cryptography community. Too little effort
has gone into how to rigorously prove zero-knowledge results. The most basic
protocols, describable in a few minutes, require fairly long and messy proofs.
The more intricate protocols have thus far been based on appeals to intuition
rather than any rigorous foundation. This thesis is, I feel only typical of the
messiness that our current state of the art in proof technology requires. This
messiness will probably be seen again and again, as results make their way
from the conference room to the journal paper. Those that don't die along
the way, that is.
I have also been excessively neurotic in proving as much as I can prove,
regardless of the cost in proof complexity. It is in fact possible to prove
somewhat weaker results in a less complicated fashion. Nevertheless, I have
for the most part tried to prove the strongest results I know, regardless of
the complexity of the machinery involved.' 0 I feel that techniques are often
more interesting than theorems, so I am showcasing my strongest techniques.
So, to the reader, I give my most sincere sympathy. It is hard to read; it
was damn hard to write.
1.5 Multi-party interactive proof systems.
The final topic I consider is the study of a variant on interactive proof sys-
tems. This work was done by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, and myself
[BGKW]. As with the chapter on primality testing, I have been able to in-
clude most of the introductory material in the chapter itself. Hence, this
introduction will also be brief, dwelling on some of the philosophical oddities
and amusements I find in this area of study. -
The notion of interactive proofs addresses the very notion of what it
means to be convinced that an assertion is true. In real life, we believe
in something either because we observe it empirically, or because we have
"reasoned out" that such and such must be true. Mathematicians have long
eschewed the former mechanism, and emphasized purely mental inference."
This is not due to intellectual elitism so much as a genuine desire not to be
hoodwinked. For instance, if one tests some number-theoretic identity on
random examples, and determines that it indeed holds on these examples,
one really can't say that it holds for all integers. It might well fail on-a very
sparse set of numbers, a set that is nearly impossible to hit at random. Thus,
'OA notable exception is in the zero-knowledge results for Chapter .6, where I use a
simple argument that proves about 90% of what one can prove using unbounded pages.
"This is not entirely accurate, since mathematicians will frequently gather empirical
evidence, such as working out small examples or looking at special cases, to formulate
their conjectures. However, such vulgarities can be easily excised from the final papers,
and usually are.
a mathematician would wisely be unimpressed by such empirical evidence.
The development of randomized decision procedures brought empirical
observations back into the picture. With the standard probabilistic tests
for primality, one essentially reasons, "If the number I'm testing was not
prime, then I would have been extremely likely to have observed a certain
phenomenon. However, I didn't observe this phenomenon, so I'm willing
to bet that the number I'm testing is prime." . This is indeed a case of
reasoning based on empirical observations, despite the fact that the observed
phenomenon isn't physical.
To drive home the difference between this type of reasoning and normal
mathematical discourse, consider the following point. In order to be rigor-
ous about such reasoning, one must make sure that ones random number
generator is functioning properly, just as any other scientist must check out
his set of laboratory instruments. When one reads a standard mathematical
argument, one does not worry that a fly may have flown into the mathemati-
cian's computer when the paper was being written. However, in the type of
argument discussed above, flies in the equipment are a perfectly legitimate
concern.
Interactive proof systems also bring empiricism back into the picture.
The verifier is essentially reasoning that, "If the statement being proven
was not true, then in my conversation with the prover, I would have been
extremely likely to have observed a certain phenomenon. However, I didn't
observe this phenomenon, so I'm willing to bet that the statement is true."
As with randomized algorithms, one is placing trust in ones random number
generator.
One might argue that we are just saying something familiar in a new way.
We can certainly cast a standard proof in this framework. The phenomenon
that is observed in the above scenario would simply be the prover sending
anything but a correct proof of the statement in question. Still, when we
consider the standard interactive proof for graph nonisomorphism, for in-
stance, it is clear that something fundamentally different is going on. There
is often no apparent mapping from the reasoning the verifier goes through in
the interactive proof to any normal mechanism for proof verification.
I think this point is brought home most clearly by the existence of sta-
tistically zero-knowledge proofs. At the end of the protocol, the verifier has
no information that he didn't have before. Thus, the proof could not have
heped the verifier make any verification based on purely mental inference.
The entire reason the verifier has any confidence that the theorem is being
proved is due to reasoning about empirical observations.
I don't think we can honestly say the same about computational zero-
knowledge proofs. Typically, these proofs do give a great deal of information
about why the statement in question is true, albeit in encrypted form. Given
that the set of statements that can be proven in statistical zero-knowledge
seems to be a very small subset of what can be proven interactively, it seems
that giving actual information is necessary for many interactive proofs. One
might conjecture that in any reasonable type of probabilistic proof system,
there are assertions which can be "proven" only by giving a lot of information
to the verifier.
What we were able to show in our multi-prover model model was a sce-
nario in which anything provable could be provable without transferring any
factual information whatsoever. The verifier simply asks questions of the
provers, observes their reactions, and check to see if certain phenomena oc-
curs. The provers' answers have nothing to do with why the statement in
question is true, but somehow convince the verifier to believe the statement
just the same. Whenever the provers seem to need to the verifier some solid
information that it could not compute by itself, we can mechanically trans-
form the protocol into one in which this information is no longer given.
On a higher level, the reason we can argue that the transformed protocol
makes any sense has something to do with the fact that the original pro-
tocol transferred a lot of information. Yet somehow, we are able to argue
that information laden behavior on the part of the provers can be replaced
by information free behavior. But what has all the information been trans-
formed into? I can push around lemmas and theorems all day, but on some
fundamental level, I don't really know.
Chapter 2
New Techniques in Primality
Testing.
2.1 Introduction.
2.1.1 Historical overview, and a brief review of pre-
vious work.
The study of prime numbers is one of the oldest fields in mathematics. To
put our work in context, we give an admittedly incomplete history of the
field.
The early days of primality testing.
The problem of distinguishing prime numbers from composites has been with
us for well over two thousand years. Eratosthenes[E] came up with the first
recorded algorithm for primality testing, in the 3rd century BC. He showing
how to efficiently generate the set of primes from 1 to N in O(N In ln N)
arithmetic steps. This is exceedingly fast, since an average of only O(In ln N)
arithmetic operations are used to test each number for primality. Indeed, this
bound is exponentially better than all of the algorithms I will discuss in this
chapter, and I do not know of any algorithm that is substantially faster than
his. Eratosthenes' paper represents the golden age of primality testing.
Of course, Eratosthenes was cheating a little bit. Given the first N num-
bers, it is easy to eliminate approximately N/2 of them as candidates for
primality, namely the even numbers greater than 2. These numbers may be
eliminated in a total of O(n) steps, for an average of 0(1) computations per
number. Likewise, one can also cross of multiples of 3, 5, 7, 11,... in a rela-
tively efficient manner. Thus it should really be no surprise that the average
amount of computations can be so low; only a very sparse set of numbers
require many calculations to be revealed as composite.
There are two ways natural problems related to Eratosthenes' problem of
generating the primes from 1 to N. First, how can one efficiently determine
if a single N is prime? Second, how quickly can one generate a large prime
number? The subtlety of these problems becomes clear when one considers
values of N which are 100 digits long. If you were to try the elementary
school algorithm, namely dividing N by all numbers in the range [2, Vs],
you would die.
Eratosthenes no doubt proposed these problems to his graduate students,
and would have cheerfully signed their dissertations had any of them met with
any success. Unfortunately, none did, and the fragile chain of scholarship was
broken. The Roman Empire crumbled, and the dark ages set in.
The modern age of primality testing.
Finally, starting in the 1 7th century, mathematicians (Fermat, Euler, Legen-
dre, and Gauss, to name a few) began to study primality once more. Their
work laid the foundation for a new age in primality testing, which began in
the 1970's. Using elementary results from number theory, specifically results
on quadratic residuosity and the structure of Z*, Miller, Solovay-Strassen,
and Rabin developed the first efficient algorithms for these problems.
Solovay-Strassen [SS] came up with the first practical primality test.
Their algorithm is randomized, i.e. on input N it will flip a series of coins,
and compute its answer based on N and this sequence of coin flips. If it is
given an input N, which is composite, it will with high probability output
a proof that N is composite. If it is given a value of N which is prime, it
will fail to come up with anything interesting at all, which is very interesting
indeed. The fact that it did not come up with a proof of compositeness gives
probabilistic support to the assertion that it is prime. Thus, on input N, the
Solovay-Strassen algorithm outputs either
. "N is composite, and here is the proof ... ," or,
* "N is prime, I think. If it's composite, then I've sure been unlucky."
Note that when the algorithm outputs declares a number composite, it is
definitely composite. It is only in declarations of primality that the algorithm
hems and haws.
Miller [M] developed a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for pri-
mality testing based on the Extended Riemann Hypothesis (ERH). On input
N, the algorithm searches for a proof that N is composite. If it finds one, it
stops and reports that N is composite, along with its proof of compositeness.
If it doesn't find a proof of compositeness, the algorithm reports that N is
prime. Miller showed that if ERH holds, then his algorithm would always
find a proof of compositeness for any composite number. Thus, the output
of this algorithm is of the general form,
* "N is composite, and here is the proof ... ," or,
* "If ERH is true, then N is prime."
As with the Solovay-Strassen tests, whenever Miller's test declares compos-
iteness, the statement is unconditional. When it states that a number is
prime, it still allows for the possibility of error. It does not blame a mistake
on bad luck, but to a violation of ERH. Unfortunately, while most mathe-
maticians believe that ERH is true, the proof of this fact may quite possibly
require 2 1 " century mathematics.
Rabin[R] analyzed a very natural probabilistic variant of Miller's algo-
rithm, and showed that this procedure had the same properties as described
for the Solovay-Strassen algorithm.
In this same mathematical vein, much more complicated deterministic al-
gorithms have been developed by Adleman-Pomerance-Rumely[APR], and
Cohen-Lenstra[CL]. These algorithms are deterministic, and do not rely on
any unproven assumptions. However, they are relatively slow, requiring
no("n") steps on an input N of length n. Furthermore, they do not -pro-
vide any succinct proof of the primality number of a number it declares
prime. Thus, one could not, after running their algorithm, quickly convince
someone else that the number was prime.
2.1.2 The problem of prime certification.
The probabilistic algorithms of Solovay-Strassen and Miller-Rabin share a
common deficiency. They are very good at proving that a number is com-
posite, but they have no capability for proving a number prime. This would
not be a handicap if they could always be guaranteed to prove composite-
ness on composite inputs. However, such a guarantee cannot be made for
any probabilistic algorithm. There is always a finite probability that, when-
ever the algorithm chooses a random bit, it will always get the value 0. If
the algorithm found proofs of compositeness all the time, it would do so in
this case. But then one could trivially make the algorithm deterministic by
replacing its random tape with all zeros.
Thus, the probabilistic algorithms which represent the previous state of
the art are inherently asymmetric. They are not so much primality testers as
compositeness provers. The natural question, then, is whether one can do for
prime numbers what one can do for composite numbers: Can one produce
short proofs of a number's primality that can be verified by a deterministic,
polynomial-time bounded Turing machine. We call such a short proof a
certificate of primality. We devote most of this chapter to this problem. A
very interesting subproblem is how to efficiently generate large primes which
have short certificates of primality. This we handle as a simple corollary of
our techniques.
Pratt's contribution: Short certificates exist.
Unlike the case with composite numbers, it is not at all obvious that short
certificates of primality even exist. Given a composite number, one can prove
that it is composite by exhibiting one of its nontrivial divisors. Such a proof
may be very hard to come by, but it is short and easily verified as correct.
Thus, composites are in NP. However, this seems to give little insight in
how one can, even with infinite power at ones dispcsal, come up with a short
proof that no such divisor exists.
Somewhat surprisingly, Pratt [Pr] has shown that such a short certificate
of primality always exists (i.e. primes are in NP). His proof relies on the fact
that a number n is prime iff there exists an element a E Z,* of order n - 1.
This is a simple fact by the standards of modern number theory, but is vastly
more subtle than the corresponding fact needed to show that composites are
in NP. While the simple proof that a number is composite gives no insight
into how to efficiently prove a number composite, it turns out that Pratt's
ideas are of use in efficient prime certification, albeit in substantially more
general form.
2.1.3 The results of this chapter.
In this chapter, we present a new, simple methodology for applying group
theory to the problem of prime certification. We use this methodology, in
conjunction with the theory of elliptic curves, to develop an algorithm for
prime certification. This algorithm has the following three properties.
1. Given:inputs of length k, our algorithm produces certificates of primal-
ity that are of length 0(k2 ), and which require 0(k4) steps to verify.
2. Our algorithm terminates in expected polynomial time on every prime
number if the following conjecture is true:
(3c1, c2 > 0)?r(x + Vx) - 7r(x), >! C2 ,VlogCl x,
for x sufficiently large. Here, ir(n) denotes the number of prime num-
bers which are less than n. This conjecture is very believable, for
reasons which will be discussed later.
3. Suppose that the algorithm is run on inputs of length k. There exists a
constants c1 , c2 such that for all k sufficiently large, the algorithm will
terminate in expected c1k" time for all but at most,
of the inputs. In other words, the algorithm can be proved to run
quickly on all but a vanishingly small fraction of the prime numbers.
This result has two major corollaries. First, a previously long-standing
open question in primality testing is whether there exists an infinite set of
primes which can be recognized as prime in polynomial time. Our algorithm
shows that not only infinitely many, but most primes can be recognized in
expected polynomial time.
Second, we solve the problem of efficiently generating large certified
primes. Previous to our work, no method was known which provably pro-
duced more than a finite number of certified primes. Since we can certify
most primes as prime, we can use the following simple algorithm to generate
a k-bit prime.
1. Uniformly generate a random k-bit integer, n. Using a standard prob-
abilistic test, attempt to prove it composite. If the attempt succeeds,
repeat Step 1.
2. Using our test, attempt to quickly (using only kc steps, for some con-
stant c) find a certificate of primality. If this succeeds, output n with
its certificate. Otherwise, go to Step 1.
In other words, we can simply keep on trying numbers until we find one we
can quickly certify. The fact that we can certify nearly all primes in expected
polynomial time, and the fact that a random k-bit number will be prime
with probability 0(1/k) (the prime-number theorem), ensures that the above
algorithm will terminate in expected polynomial time. This distribution will
be statistically very close to the uniform distribution.
2.1.4 Techniques used.
Our methodology, in its most general form, is very simple. We will in fact
give an exposition of our technique which only uses elementary number the-
ory. However, in order to make efficient algorithms that are amenable to
rigorous analysis, we rely on a strong foundation of results and techniques
from computer science and number theory. We cite below some of the work
that made ours possible.
Previous primality tests.
We use the previous state of the art in primality testing, both the randomized
algorithms, the deterministic algorithms, and Pratt's proof that primes have
short certificates. These three results are used in quite different ways.
Pratt gave a technique whereby given an element a E Z,* of order p - 1,
one could reduce the problem of proving p prime to that of proving q prime,
for all qlp - 1. We use this same approach in our methodology. We show
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how, using a group G which is somehow associated with p, and an element
a E G of order q, one can reduce the problem of proving p prime to that of
proving q prime. Our algorithm uses this trick to make a series of reductions,
at each step reducing the number to be proven prime by at least a constant.
Our reduction technique will spit out assertions of the form "p is prime
if q is." Most of these assertions will be trivially vacuous, since for most of
these assertions, q will not be prime. In order to figure out what assertions
are useful, it is necessary to be able to rapidly determine if q is prime. To do
this, we use the probabilistic tests of Solovay-Strassen and Miller-Rabin.
Finally, in order to prove stronger results about our algorithm, we will
make use of the deterministic algorithms of Adleman-Pomerance-Rumely
and Cohen-Lenstra. Essentially, this allows us to stop when the number
we need to prove prime is sufficiently small compared to the original number
we wished to prove prime.
The theory of elliptic curves.
Given a prime p > 5 and a pair (A, B) where A, B E Z, and 4A 3 + 27B 2 # 0
mod p, we consider solutions (x, y) to the equation
y2  X3 + Ax + B modp.
These sets of ordered pairs, when augmented by a extra point I, are the points
of an elliptic curve over GF(p). There is a natural addition operation, under
which the points of an elliptic curve form an abelian group. Elliptic curves
have been studied extensively from the standpoint of pure mathematics, and
have been recently used in the development of algebraic algorithms.
Schoof [Sc] uses elliptic curves in an algorithm for computing square roots
of small integers x mod p. His algorithm is polynomial in x and |pl. As part
of this work, he shows how to compute the order of a group generated by an
elliptic curve over GF(p), in deterministic polynomial time. This algorithm
is crucial to our primality test.
Lenstra [L] uses elliptic curves to obtain an integer factorization algo-
rithm which uses nearly constant memory, and whose running time is a
function of the size of the smallest prime divisor of the integer to be fac-
tored. The running time analysis of Lenstra's algorithm depends on a very
plausible assumption concerning the distribution of smooth numbers in small
intervals, and requires no unproven assumptions about elliptic curves. This
independence is due to a useful result he obtains concerning the distribution
of the orders of elliptic curves. We use his distribution result to eliminate
any unproven assumptions about elliptic curves from the the analysis of our
algorithm's running time.
Results on the density of primes in small intervals.
The running-time analysis of our algorithm depends on the frequency of
primes in intervals of the form [x, x+Vl], i.e., on the value of 7r(x+Vxt)-r(x).
We use results on the asymptotic distribution of prime numbers to bolster
our belief in our conjecture, and to allow us to prove our algorithm fast on
most inputs.
We recall the conjecture under which our algorithm will work for all
primes:
(3ci, C2 > 0)r(x + VW) - r(x) > lg X,log 1 x'
for all x sufficiently large. The Prime Number Theorem states that for suffi-
ciently large x, ir(x) will approach x/ln x. This suggests that our conjecture
might be true, with c1 = 1. However, this theorem does not directly imply
anything about the behavior of ir(x) over small intervals. A famous, widely
believed conjecture of Cramer states that for sufficiently large x,
7r(x+1n2 x)-7(x)>0.
This directly implies our. conjecture, with c1 = 2.
While no one has been able to prove our conjecture for all numbers, Heath-
Brown [HB] have shown that our conjecture is true most most intervals. One
of their technical lemmas implies the following result (communicated to us
by Maier and Pomerance [MP]).
Theorem 2.1 [Heath-Brown] Call an integer y sparse if there are less than
Vy/2 Lln yJ primes in the interval [y, y + Lv ]]. Then there exist a constant
a such that for sufficiently large x,
y : y E [x, 2x], y is sparse}| < x5 /6 ln" x.
Heath-Brown's theorem is crucial to the analysis of our algorithm on
uniformly distributed input.
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2.1.5 Subsequent research using our methodology.
Our methodology has been used in two more recent algorithms. First, and
foremost, Adleman and Huang [AH] have developed an algorithm that is
guaranteed to find short certificates for all prime numbers. To do this, they
first sharpen our work with groups generated by elliptic curves. They bound
above the fraction of "bad" k-bit primes, which the elliptic curve based al-
gorithms could not quickly certify, down to 2 -(k)*. This by itself is not of
great interest, but turns out to be crucial to their next, much larger step.
They then apply our methodology to a different class of groups, those gen-
erated by hyperelliptic curves.1 This yields an algorithm which allows them
to reduce the proof of primality for a prime p to a proof of primality for a
sufficiently randomized prime q. They can then run the sharpened version of
our algorithm to show that q is prime. It can be shown that q is sufficiently
random so that it will be certifiable with high probability.
Unfortunately, both our algorithm and the more sophisticated algorithm
of Adleman-Huang are incredibly slow in practice. Our algorithm takes
0(n") expected time on most primes, and their algorithm is even worse.
However, Atkin [At] has a variant of our method, also using groups generated
by elliptic curves, that runs much quicker in practice. Using this algorithm,
primes with hundreds of digits can be routinely certified. Unfortunately,
the mathematically sophisticated modification necessary to improve the al-
gorithm's running time has frustrated attempts at rigorous analysis. An
algorithm which is provably fast (in the practical sense of the word) still
eludes us.
Outline of the Chapter.
In Section 2.2, we develop our methodology for primality proving. In Sec-
tion 2.3 we give a quick introduction to elliptic curves, their algebraic struc-
ture over Z and Z,, and show how they fit into our methodology. In Sec-
tion 2.4, we give our primality proving algorithm. In Section 2.5, we show
that our algorithm produces certificates for all primes in expected polynomial
'So easy to say, so hard to do. This application involved some of the most impressive
algebraic algorithms work that I have ever seen. Whereas we could make use of a large
body of theorems and algorithms, they had to build much of their machinery largely from
scratch.
time, modulo a number-theoretic conjecture. We then extend this argument
to show that our algorithm produces certificates for almost all primes in
expected polynomial time. This last theorem depends on no unproven as-
sumptions.
2.2 Our primality proving methodology.
In this section, we present our primality proving methodology. Essentially, it
generalizes a very simple, easily proved primality criterion. We first give the
easy criterion, and then show how to extend to more abstract structures.
2.2.1 A primality criterion from elementary number
theory.
Our methodology starts with the well-known fact that if pin, then Z* has
a natural projection to Z*, namely that obtained by taking the element of
Z * modulo p in the obvious way. This projection, which we denote by p,
Z* -+ Z*, preserves multiplication. That is, if a, b, c E Z,*, and c = ab, then
p,"(c) = p,"(a)p,"(b). For example, if n = 15 and p = 5, then 11 = 8.7 mod 15
implies that 1 = 3 - 2 mod 5. As a corollary, the projection also preserves
the identity element, i.e. p,(1) = 1. For notational convenience, we adopt
the convention of denoting p,(x) by x,, and p,(Xj) by x,, whenever n is
understood.
We can use the above fact, along with the fact that IZ*I < p, to derive a
simple primality criterion.
Theorem 2.2 Suppose that for some a E Z*, and integer q > i%/_, we have
(a - 1, n) = 1, and a' = 1 mod n. Then if q is prime, n is also prime.
Proof: Our proof is by contradiction. Suppose that some prime p < V/
divides n. Then, since our projection preserves multiplication, we have
a, 1 mod p.
Clearly, the order of a, divides q. If q is prime, then the order of a, is either 1
or q. However, the order of a, is clearly at most p - 1 < q, so the order of a,
must be 1. Thus, a, = 1 mod p. Since a = a, mod p, we have a = 1 mod p.
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We now show that a # 1 mod p. This follows from the fact that a - 1
and n are relatively prime. If a 1 mod p, then pla - 1, so pl(a - 1, n),
which is a contradiction. I
An example.
Here is an example of how we might use our primality criterion to show that
a large number was prime.
Let us show that 179 is prime. We first observe that
989 = 1 mod 179
,and (8,159) = 1. The first fact can be confirmed by the standard "repeated
squaring" algorithm for modular exponentiation. The second fact can be
checked by Euclid's algorithm. Finally, 89 > VTi9 = 13.37.... Thus, by our
primality criterion, 179 is prime if 89 is prime. We have reduced our problem
to showing that 89 is prime.
Now we wish to show that 89 is prime. We observe that
45" 1 mod 89,
(44,89) = 1, and 11 > v 85 = 9.43. . .. Thus, if 11 is prime, then 89 must be
prime. But everyone knows that 11 is prime, so we have shown that 179 is
prime.
Of course, the above toy theorem is of little practical use in prime certi-
fication. The example has been cooked up to work, and in fact would have
failed miserably if we had tried to reduce 13 to a smaller prime.
2.2.2 The general scenario.
We now show how to generalize this approach to more abstract structures.
Let us step back a bit, and see what we really needed to prove the above
primality criterion. Essentially, we needed the following three facts.
e The structure of Z,* is such that we can guarantee that if pin, there
is a multiplication preserving projection from Z* to Z,*. We can make
this guarantee without having any information about the factors of n,
or even whether n is prime.
* In our structure associated with n, we can guarantee that our element
a does not project to the identity element of the group associated with
p. In other words, we can guarantee that
a, # 1 mod p.
* Our value of q is guaranteed to be greater than the size of Z,* for
Given these facts, the theorem goes through in a straightforward manner.
Now, let us see where we can start generalizing our assumptions. First,
we never used the fact that Z* is always guaranteed to be a group. All we
used was the fact that there is always a multiplication preserving projection
from Z* to Z*. We did not even use the fact that the multiplication operation
was always defined. Second, we did not use any special facts about Z*. We
only used the fact that Z* was a group whose size had a known upper bound
as a function of p. Thus, we can work with much more general algebraic
structures.
The other main generalization we will use is that it is not necessary to
associate a single structure, Z* with n, and a single group, Z*, with each
prime p. Instead, we can just as well associate an arbitrary set of structures
with n and an arbitrary set of groups with p. Before, we guaranteed that
our structure associated with n had a multiplication preserving projection
to the group associated with any prime divisor of n. Now, we require that
a structure associated with n must project to at least one of the groups
associated with each prime divisor p of n.
With these thoughts in mind, we now give the definitions and primality
criterion that underlie our methodology.
Simple structures with multiplication.
We wish to formalize what it means for one of our simple algebraic structures,
which will serve an analogous role to Z*, to project to a group. First, we
must precisely define our simple structures.
Definition 2.1 We define a weak structure to be a triple W = (S, Is, 0),
where S is a set, Is is some distinguished element of S, and 0 is a partial
function from S x S to S.
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In other words, we have a set of elements, with a multiplication operation
and a distinguished "identity" element. The multiplication operation need
not have any special properties, or even be defined for all pairs of elements
in S. As with groups, we will use the notation a E W to mean a E S.
We wish to speak about exponentiation in this scenario. The meaning of
exponentiation is not obvious, since weak structures do not even guarantee
that multiplication is well-defined, let alone associative. Hence, it may be,
for example, that computing a6 = a 3 a3 will give a different answer than
computing a6 = a -a5 . Hence, we must define formally what we mean when
we say aq. For integers q > 0, we define aq by
a for q = 1,
a = (a 0 a)q/2 for q even,
a 0 aq- 1  for q odd.
If any of the multiplications or exponentiations given by the definition of
a are undefined, then we say that aq is undefined. This is just the "repeated
squaring" algorithm for exponentiation. By using this algorithmic definition,
we are mathematically precise, and ensure that computing aq will take only
O(log q) multiplications.
Projections from weak structures to groups.
We now define what it means for a weak structure to project to a group.
Definition 2.2 Let W = (S, Is, E) be a weak structure, and let G be a
group with identity element IG. We say that a function - : S -- G projects
W to G if
(Vx, y, z E W)z = x & y ==> r(z) = r(x)r(y) and,
r(Is) = IG-
Note that a function which maps all the elements of W to the identity
element IG is a legitimate projection. It will be useful to be able to say that
a projection does not map an element to the identity.
Definition 2.3 Let W be a weak structure, G be a group, and let r be a
projection from W to G. For a E W, we say that r preserves a if r(a) :# IG.
The following lemma illustrates the usefulness of projections. It will prove
very useful in the proof of our main theorem.
Lemma 2.1 Let W = (S, Is, D) be a weak structure, G be a group with
identity element jc, and r be a projection from W to G. Let a E W and q
be a positive integer such that aq is defined. Then r(a)q = r(aq).
Proof: Our proof is by total induction on q. For q = 1 the statement is
clearly true. For q even, we have aq = (a 0 a)q/ 2 , and hence
r (a) = r ((a (a)/2)
=r ((a(& a)) y1,
by our inductive hypothesis (note that all these quantities must be defined,
since otherwise aq would not be defined). Since r preserves multiplication,
we have r(a ® a) = r(a)r(a) = r(a)2. Combining this with the equation
above yields
r ((a 0 a)),/ = (r(a)2)q/ = r(a)q.
Similarly, if q is odd, we have
r (a) = r (ae 0aq-1)
= r(a)r (aq-1) (by definition of r)
= r(a)r(a)-l (by inductive hypothesis)
= r(a)q I
We actually use the following corollary of Lemma 2.1, which follows triv-
ially from the lemma, and the fact that r(Is) = IG.
Corollary 2.2 Let W, G, r, a, q be as in Lemma 2.1. If aq = Is then r(a)q =
IC. I
Generalizing Z,* via group assignments.
For our generalization, we wish to be able to associate an arbitrary number
of groups to a given prime p. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.4 we define a group assignment to be a function -y that maps
prime numbers to sets of finite groups.
For example, one legal group assignment -/ is defined by
y(2) = {Z*, Z*}
-y(3) = {}
-(5) = {Z* x Z*, S,, (for n > 1000)}
Note that the sets we define may be infinite or empty, and the groups we use
may be nonabelian.
In our methodology, we need to bound the sizes of groups assigned to
primes of a given size. Precisely, we will need to bound, for a given n, the
size of the largest group assigned to a prime p <; Vn. We thus define the
function S(ny) by
S (n, -)= max max |G,
p:5/n GE-Y(p)
where we adopt the convention that maxGEY(P) Gl = 0 if y(p) = {}.
Generalizing Z*, a via (n, a)-projecting weak structures.
We now wish to generalize the role of Z* and element a in our primality
criterion. We do so through the notion of (n, a) projection.
Definition 2.5 Let ^y be a group assignment, and let W be a weak structure.
Let a E W, and let n be some positive integer. We say that W (n, a)-projects
if, for all prime p such that pin, there exists a group G, E 7(p) and a mapping
irp that projects W to G, while preserving a.
In other words, a weak structure W has a natural projection to a group
associated with every prime divisor of n. These projections are not degener-
ate at a; they project a to something other than the identity.
2.2.3 The general primality criterion.
Using the above terminology, we can succinctly give our general primality
criterion.
Theorem 2.3 Let -y be a group assignment, and let W = (S, Is, E) be a
weak structure. Suppose the following two conditions hold.
1. There exists an element a E W, and an integer q such that aq = IS,
and q > S(n, y).
2. W (n, a)-projects.
Then if q is prime, n will also be prime.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2.3 follows the proof of Theorem 2.2. We
use proof by contradiction. Suppose that n was composite. Let p be a prime
such that p n, p <; V. By the conditions of the theorem, and the definition
of (n, a) projection, there must be a group G E 7(p), and a mapping r that
projects W to G while preserving a. Furthermore, by Corollary 2.2, we have
r(a)q = IG, where IG is the identity element for G.
We now derive a contradiction from r(a)q = IG. By elementary group
theory, the order of r(a) must divide q. Since q is prime, the order of r(a)
must therefore be either 1 or q. If the order of r(a) was 1, then we would
have r(a) = IG, which contradicts the fact that r preserves a. However, since
q > S(n,y), we have, in particular, q > 1G1. Therefore, the order of r(a)
cannot be q, since the order of a group element can't be larger than the size
of the group. The theorem follows. I
It is instructive to see how the elementary primality criterion is a special
case of Theorem 2.3. First we let group assignment -y be defined by
Y(p) = {Z,*}.
Since IZ*I = p-1, we have S(n,-y) < v, so our q > s,/ condition translates
into q > S(n, -y). Next, we let our weak structure W be Z*,. The condition
that (a - 1, n) = 1 implies that a # 1 mod p for pin. This implies that W
will (n, a)-project, using the trivial mapping from Z,* to Z*. Thus, we can
easily fit the old primality criterion into the new framework.
2.2.4 Translating notation from multiplicative to ad-
ditive groups.
The arguments of this section use the multiplicative rather than the additive
notation for groups. This was motivated by our example, since Z*, Z*, are
multiplicative groups. However, for other groups, particularly the groups we
will focus on, the additive notation is used. This is a matter of convention,
and is of no mathematical consequence; whether one calls the group operation
multiplication, addition, or funny-op, it is still just a group operation. Thus,
our notions of projection, and our various theorems all make sense in the
additive notation.
It is fairly easy to make the notational transition between this section
and the next. First, wherever the above theorems refer to multiplication, one
simply translates them to refer to addition. Thus, ab would translate to a+b.
Second, wherever exponentiation is used, simple replace by multiplication.
Thus, aq translates to qa.
2.3 Applying our methodology to elliptic
curves.
In this section, we show how to apply our methodology to the groups gener-
ated by the points on elliptic curves. This will allow us to, using our general
primality criterion, formulate a primality criterion based on elliptic curves.
For those unfamiliar with the basic theory of elliptic curves, we present
a brief introduction to this field. To get a more complete background on
this subject, we refer the reader to a textbook on the subject by Silverman
[Si], and a survey paper by Tate [T]. The "classical" results discussed in this
chapter may all be found in these references. 2
2.3.1 What is an elliptic curve?
First, let us define an elliptic curve, represented in Weierstrauss normal form.
Definition 2.6 Let F be a field whose characteristic is not 2 or 3.3 An
elliptic curve is an ordered pair (A, B), where A, B E F, and 4A 3 +27B 2 # 0.
2The more technically sophisticated reader is also encouraged to read A. Lenstra and
H. Lenstra's manuscript on factoring and primality testing [LL]. We are deeply indebted to
this exposition for clarify the subject to us, and substantially contributing to the exposition
in this chapter.
3 That is, 2, 3 $ 0 in the field. this will hold for all the fields we will consider in this
chapter.
This definition is formally correct, but not very revealing. To give an
idea of what we mean by an elliptic curve, we define the points on an elliptic
curve.
Definition 2.7 Let F be a field whose characteristic is not 2 or 3, and let
(A, B) be an elliptic curve over 7. We define the points of (A, B) to be the
set of ordered pairs (x, y) such that y2 = x3 + Ax + B, and an additional
element, I. We denote these points by EA,B(F). If F = Z,, we use the
abbreviation EA,B(P) to denote EA,B(ZP). 4
The additional element I is often called "the point at infinity." It will
serve as the identity element when we impose a group structure on the points
of an elliptic curve. It may seem cumbersome to have a point whose form
is completely different from all the other points, and indeed there exist no-
tations for elliptic curves which are more uniform. However, it turns out
that I will play a very important role in our future discussions, and thus the
notation we choose is very convenient.
2.3.2 The group structure of points on an elliptic
curve.
There exists a natural way of defining addition for the points on an elliptic
curve. First, we make I the identity, by defining a + I = I + a = a. For
the rest of this discussion, we assume that the points we wish to add can be
written as L = (x1 , y1 ) and M = (X 2, Y2 ).
When our base field consists of the reals, then we can interpret our ad-
dition operation as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Given two distinct points, L
and M, we first consider the line connecting L and M, and locate the third
intersection point of the line with the points on curve (A, B). We then reflect
this third point over the x-axis, and define the resulting point as L + M.
We must address a few technical points. First, if L = M, we can't talk
about the unique line going through L and M. We therefore define the line
we use as the point tangent to the elliptic curve at point L. If L and M are
4 The more precise reader may object to our usage of Z, instead of GF(p) to denote the
finite field with p elements. We abuse the notation to make more explicit the connections
with later sections, which will deal with arithmetic over the ring of integers mod n. This
structure we will denote by Zn, again a slight abuse of terminology.
on a vertical line, the line clearly won't hit the curve at any other point. In
this case, we define L + M to be equal to I. Even if L and M aren't on a
vertical line, it still may be the case that the line through L and M doesn't
intersect the curve at any other point. In this case, it can be shown that
the line will be tangent to the curve at one of the two points of intersection.
We treat this tangency as a double point of intersection, and use it as the
"third" point.
For obvious reasons, this pictorial algorithm for adding two points is called
the "tangent and chord" method. While intuitively appealing, we require a
computational algorithm for adding points, and we also need to generalize the
addition operation to arbitrary fields. Fortunately, the geometric operations
required for the tangent and chord method can be expressed algebraically.
The resulting algorithm is given in Figure 2.2. This algorithm works for
arbitrary fields such that 2,3 # 0.
ALGORITHM ADD((Xj,y1),(x 2,Y2),(AB))
if X1 = X2 and y1 = Y2 then return(I)
if X1 = X2 then A = 3x2+A2 y,
else A = Y2-Y1X2 -XI
=yi - Ax,
x. -A 2 _x,-X 2
Ys = -(Ax. +#3)
return((x,, Ys))
Figure 2.2: Algorithm for adding two points on an elliptic curve.
2.3.3 The group structure of curves over Z,
For our algorithm, we use some classical results about curves over Z,, as
well as some more recent results. First, the set of points of the elliptic curve
(A, B) over Z, form an abelian group, where the group addition operation is
defined as above. This group is isomorphic to Zmi X Zm2 for some m1 , m2,
where m1 Im2 . Here, Zmi denotes the cyclic additive group of integers mod
mi. For notational convenience, we will also use Z, to denote the ring of
integers mod n. We will explicitly state whenever we mean for Z,, to be
viewed as a cyclic additive group.
For our purposes, we will need to know a great deal about the sizes of
groups formed by elliptic curves over Z,. For ease of notation, we make the
following definition.
Definition 2.8 Given an elliptic curve (A, B), we denote by #,(A, B) the
number of points on (A, B).
A great deal is known about the sizes of groups over Z,. First, there is
the classical result, known as the Riemann Hypothesis for Finite Fields. This
result implies that
p + 1 - 2Vp #,(A, B) p + I + 2V/,
for all curves (A, B) over Z,, and all p: 2,3.
This theorem is very useful to us, since we will need to bound the sizes
of groups to use our methodology. However, in order to analyze our algo-
rithms, it is also necessary to have some understanding of the distribution of
#p(A, B) when (A, B) is uniformly distributed. The following theorem, due
to Lenstra[L], proves crucial to our attack.
Theorem 2.4 [Lenstra] Let p > 5 be a prime. Let
S c [P + 1 - L ]P_ P + 1 + [ 4]].
If curve (A, B) over Z, is chosen uniformly, then
c |S|-2
prob(#,(A, B) E S) >
In p 2[Lv5] + 1
where c is some fixed constant.
This theorem relates the probability of finding randomly selecting a curve
of a "good" order to the probability of randomly selecting a "good" integer,
where "good" can be arbitrarily defined. If one uniformly picks a number
fromi the interval [p + 1 - [,VJ, p + 1 + LVP] ] the probability that it will be
in S is exactly |S|
2[5]T + l'
Essentially, the size of a random group is at most 0(1/ ln p) times less likely
to have a particular property as a randomly selected integer in
[p + 1T -lj, p + 1 + [V4]] ,
provided that |S| > 2.
Finally, we also use an algorithm due to Schoof[Sc] which, when given
a curve (A, B) over Z,, will deterministically compute #,(A, B) in O(|ple)
steps. Schoof's original implementation, c = 9. Lenstra has since improved
the algorithm's exponent to 8.
2.3.4 The structure of elliptic curves over Z, for com-
posite n.
Given a value of n, we can consider elliptic curves over Z,, and add points
according to our algorithm. However, if n is composite, then the structure
we get will not be a group.5 Indeed, the addition operation will not even be
defined, since the inverse elements required by our algorithm may not exist.
While we lose a some algebraic structure by considering elliptic curves
over Z, for arbitrary n, some useful properties remain. We can treat these
structures as weak structures which project down to elliptic curves over Z,
for p~n. This will allow us use the abstract machinery of the last section to
generate a new primality criterion.
Formal definitions.
We formally define elliptic curves over Z, and the basic operations on the
points of these curves, as follows.
Definition 2.9 Let n be an integer not divisible by 2 or 3. An elliptic
curve over Z, is defined as an ordered pair (A, B), where A, B E Z,, and
(4A 3 +27B 2 , n) = 1. The points on (A, B) are defined to be the set of ordered
pairs (x, y) such that y2 = x 3 + Ax + B mod n, along with an additional
element I,. We denote this set of points by EA,B(n). The addition operation
for two points L, M E EA,B(n) is defined by In + M = M + I, = M,
if applicable, and otherwise by result of algorithm ADD(L, M, (A, B)). If
ADD(L, M, (A, B)) ever needs to compute an inverse which is not defined
over Z,, then L + M is undefined.
We also define scalar multiplication of points on these curves. We define
qL, for q > 0 and L E EA,B(n), as we defined exponentiation in Section 2.2.2,
replacing multiplication with addition. Thus, we have
L forq=1,
qL = (L + L)qI 2  for q even,
L + (q - 1)L for q odd.
The reader can verify that this is a purely syntactic transformation from
multiplicative to additive notation.
It should be pointed out that the definitions and operations described
here are perfectly compatible with the definitions given for curves over Z,.
Thus, if n happens to be prime, everything we will say in this section will
still hold.
'Lenstra has pointed out that there is a relatively natural addition operation for which
the points over Z, do form a group. However, we do not use it in this exposition.
A projection from curves over Z,, to curves over Z,.
Given an elliptic curve (A, B) over Z, and a prime p > 3 that divides n,
there is a natural projection from (A, B) to an elliptic curve over Z,. First,
we recall our notation for projections: Given an element x E Z,, we define
xP to be equal to the element in Z, obtained by taking x mod p. We define
our projection,
r," : EA,B(n) -+ EAp,Bp(P),
as follows. First, we define r,"(In) = I,, where I, is the identity for EAp,Bp(P).
Otherwise, we define r,"((x, y)) = (XP, yp).
To see that this projection makes sense, we use the fact that the mapping
from x to x, preserves both addition and multiplication. We first note that
if 4A + 27B 2 - 0 mod p, then 4A 3 + 27B 2 = 0 mod p. Since this would
imply pl(4A 3 + 27B 2 , n), and (4A 3 + 27B 2 , n)= 1, we have
4A + 27B2 # 0 mod p.
Thus, (A,, B,) will indeed be an elliptic curve over Z,. Second, if
y2 =x3 + Ax + B mod n, then,
2= x + Ax, + B, mod p.
Thus, the mapping r," projects points of (A, B) to points of (A,, B,).
In the following lemma, we show that this projection preserves addition
of points.
Lemma 2.3 Let n be an integer that is not divisible by 2 or 3, and let p be a
prime that divides n. Let (A, B) be a curve over Zn, and let L, M E EA,B(n).
Then if L + M is defined, we have
r,"(L + M) = r,"(L) + r,"(M).
Proof: The proof of this lemma follows straightforwardly from a simple
case analysis on the rules for adding two points on an elliptic curve. These
rules may be summarized as:
1. I+M=M+I=M,
2. (x, y) + (x, -y) = Z,
3. For y # 0,
(X1 Y + (, Y (P(x, y, A, B) P2(x, y, A, B)(x, y) +(x, y) = ,
2y 2y
4. For x1 # X2,
(X1 iY2) (X2 Y2) Q1(X1, 7Y1, X1, Y2, A, B) IQ2(X1, Y1, X1, Y2, A, B)
Here, P1, P2, Q1, Q2 are fixed polynomials. For our proof, we do not need any
further information about these polynomials. Rather, we use the following el-
ementary fact from number theory: Let R(a, b, c,...) be a rational function6 .
If x = R(a, b, c,...) is well-defined for a particular assignment of a, b, c,...
over Z,, then R(ap, b,, c,,...) will be well-defined over Z,, and will be equal
to x,. In other words, the trivial projection from Z to Z, is preserves addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, and divisions that are well-defined (i.e. do
not require inverses which do not exist) over Zn.
We now go through the above four cases, and show that the lemma holds
for each of them.
In the first case, we note that if L or M is equal to In (the identity of
EA,B(n)), the lemma holds trivially. For the rest of the analysis, we can thus
assume that L, M # I., and hence that r,(L),,r,"(M) # I, (Here, I, is the
identity of EA,B,,(p)).
In the second case, we note that if a+b = 0 mod n then a,+b, = 0 mod p.
Therefore, if L, M are of the form
L = (x, y), M = (x, -y),
then r,"(L), r,"(M) will be of the form
r,"(L) = (x,, y,), r,(M) = (x,, -yp).
Thus, L + M = In and r,"(L) + r,"(M) = I,, so the lemma holds.
In the third case, we have L = M = (x, y), where y # 0. By the definition
of r,", we have r,"(L) = r,"(M) = (xp, yp). Thus, when we add rn(L)+r,"(M),
'i.e. a ratio of two polynomials
we use Rule 2 when y, = 0, and Rule 3 otherwise. If yp = 0, we have ply,
which implies that (2y)- 1 does not exist in Z,. However, Rule 3 implies that
L + M is defined iff (2y)- 1 exists in Z,. Therefore, r7 (L) and r,"(M) must
also be added using Rule 3. Thus, we have,
L+M = ~P1(x, y, A, B) IP2(x, y, A, B) adL +M = , and,
2y 2y
,rpn L) +rpn M) {P1(x,, y,, A,, B,) IP2 (x,, y,, A,, B,))
r,(L +r,(M =2y, 2y, p
Using the result about projections of rational functions, we therefore have
r,"(L + M) = r,"(L) + r,"(M).
In the fourth case, we have L = (x 1 , yi) and M = (x 2 , y2), where x1 # x2.
This case is virtually identical to the third case. By the definition of r,", we
have r,"(L) = (x1,, y1,) and r,(M) = (x 2,, y2,). If
1Jp =X2pi
then plx1 - x2 , and thus (x 1 - x 2)- 1 will have no inverse mod n. However,
by Rule 4, L + M will be defined iff (x1 - x2)-' exists, so
X1p 0 X2p mod p.
Therefore, r,"(L) and r,"(M) are also added using Rule 4. Hence, we have,
L + QM = '(X1,Y XY2, A, B) Q2(xi, Yi, x 1, Y2, A, B) and,
\ X1 ~ X2 X1 ~ X2 /
r"(L) + r,"(M) = 2, A,, B,) Q2, 1,, X1, 2i A, B,)
Again using the result about projections of rational functions, we have r,"(L+
M) = r,"(L) + r,"(M). I
2.3.5 A primality criterion using elliptic curves.
Lemma 2.3 is the key result we need to apply our general methodology to
elliptic curves. We give resulting primality criterion below.
Theorem 2.5 Let n be an integer, not divisible by 2 or 3. Let (A, B) be
an elliptic curve over Z, and let L E EA,B(n), with L # I,. Suppose that
qL = I, for some q > n1/ 2 + 2n1/4 + 1. Then if q is prime, n will be prime.
Proof: We make a direct appeal to our general primality criterion. Let
our group assignment y be defined as follows. First, if p = 2 or 3, then we
define -y(p) = {}. Otherwise, we define -y(p) to be equal to the set of groups
generated by elliptic curves over Z,. Since for any elliptic curve (Q, R) over
Z,,I
#,(Q, R) p + 2v + 1,
we have
S(ny) n1 / 2 + 2n1/4 + 1.
Thus, q > S(n, -).
By Lemma 2.3, EA,B(n) will (n, L)-project for n not divisible by 2 or
3, and L # I. Note that by definition, r,"(L) # I, if L # In. Hence, by
Theorem 2.3, if q is prime, n will be prime. I
2.4 Our primality proving algorithm.
Given the primality criterion developed in the last section, it is now a fairly
simple matter to create a primality proving algorithm. On the highest level,
we will use our primality criterion to reduce the primality of a prime p to the
primality of a prime q, where q = p/2 + o(p). We then recursively prove that
q is prime. For technical reasons, we eventually stop when the number to
be proven prime is sufficiently small that it may be deterministically verified
as prime. If too much time passes, the algorithm times out, and starts from
scratch.
In this section, we first outline our main reduction step, i.e. how we
reduce the primality of p to the primality of q. Then we show how this step
is used in the complete algorithm.
2.4.1 Implementing the main step of the algorithm.
The main step of our algorithm is as follows: Given a prime p, we will
construct a curve over Z,, and a point on this curve with a large prime
order, q. This will reduce the problem of proving p prime to the problem of
proving q prime. The value of q will be substantially less than the value of
p, so quantifiable progress will be made by such a reduction.
We find a curve along with a point of high prime order in two randomized
stages. First, we find a curve (A, B) that we know has a large number of
points of prime order q. Then we randomly pick points L E EA,B(P) until we
find one such that L # I and qL = I.
Picking a good curve.
The first step of this procedure is accomplished using Schoof's algorithm
for computing the number of points on an elliptic curve. We first uniformly
choose A, B such that (4A 3 +27B 2, p) = 1. We do this by uniformly choosing
a pair (A, B), and throwing it out if (4A 3 + 27B 2 ,p) > 1. For prime p,
and for any value of A, there are at most two values of B, ± -4A 3 /27
(computed over Z,) which will yield a bad pair. Thus, with overwhelming
probability, a randomly chosen (A, B) will constitute an elliptic curve. Once
we have a curve, (A, B), we compute its order using Schoof's algorithm. If
#,(A, B) = 2q, where q is a prime, then we stop. Otherwise, we pick a new
pair (A, B), and start the process over again.
The alert reader will ask, "How do you tell if q is prime?" We in fact
use a probabilistic primality test, run 21p times so that the probability of
mistaking a composite q as prime is less than 1/p. This introduces a small
probability of error into our algorithm. However, as we will see later, it will
be possible to correct such errors before they can cause an incorrect output.
We give the curve generation algorithm in Figure 2.3.
We now compute the expected running time of this step. Our procedure
for finding a curve (A, B) of order 2q will take expected time equal to the
expected time necessary to generate and test a single curve, multiplied by the
expected number of curves it must try. The time necessary to test a curve is
dominated by Schoof's algorithm, which takes O(Ipl) steps. The expected
time necessary to generate a curve, and to run the probabilistic primality
tests are lower order polynomials in |p|.
We cannot give such a nice, closed form formula for the number of curves
we must test before coming up with one whose order is twice a prime. How-
ever, we can use Lenstra's theorem to relate this number to the size of the
Algorithm Generate-C urve(p)
1: Uniformly generate (A, B) until (4A 3 + 27B 2,p) 1.
2: Compute #,(A, B) using Schoof's algorithm. If this number is odd,
go to Step 1. Otherwise, set q = #,(A, B)/2.
3: Run the probabilistic test of [SS] on q for 21p| trials. If one of the
trials ever outputs "composite", go to Step 1. If 2, 31q, go to Step 1.
4: Return((A, B), q)
Figure 2.3: Algorithm for generating a curve of order 2q, where q is
prime.
set S(p) defined by
S(p) {q E 2 L VJ P1LVJ, q prime.}.
Lemma 2.4 Let p > 5 be a prime, and let (A, B) be chosen uniformly from
curves over Z,. Let S(p) be defined as above. Then
c |S( p)| - 2prob(#,(A, B) is twice a prime) > - - ,
lg p 2L-] + 1
where c is some fixed constant.
Proof: - There is a trivial bijection between numbers in the interval
[p + 1 - [J,p + 1+ [jI
which are twice a prime, and elements of S(p). Applying Lenstra's theoriem
immediately gives the desired bound. I
We will not be interested in the lower-order terms of the above formula,
which only come into play when S(p) is far too small to be of any use. We
therefore state the following simple corollary to Lemma. 2.4, which follows
by a simple calculation.
Corollary 2.5 Let p > 5 be prime, and that S(p) = O(yf/ lgC p). Then
algorithm GENERATE-CURVE(p) will select at most expected O(Iplc+1) curves,
running for expected O(Iplc+9 ) steps before it terminates. I
Picking a point on a curve.
Once. we have a curve (A, B) of order 2q, where q is prime, it is a simple
matter to find a point of order q on (A, B). Recall that group EA,B(P) is
isomorphic to a product of cyclic additive groups, Zm, x Zmi, where m1 |m2.
Since EA,B(P) is of size 2q, we have mim 2 = 2q, and hence mi = 1, M2 = 2q,
for q > 2. Thus EA,B(P) will in fact be isomorphic to Z2q- It is a simple
exercise to verify that Z2q has q - 1 points of order q, and thus, by our
isomorphism, so must EA,B(p).
Since almost half the points of EAB(P) will have the desired property,
we merely have to show how to efficiently generate points L at random on
(A, B), and how to efficiently determine if qL = I.
To generate a point on (A, B), we simply generate a point x E Z,, and
check if x3 + Ax + B is a quadratic residue. This naively takes O(|p13) time.
If not, we repeat the process. Otherwise, we compute y = vx 3 + Ax + B,
using the algorithm of Adleman, Manders, and Miller [AMM] to take square
roots modulo a prime, and randomly choose which of the square roots to
take. Clearly, the curve can have at most 2 points with a given x coordinate,
and hence there must be 0(p) different x coordinates such that x3 + Ax + B
is a quadratic residue. Thus, we will have to test an expected 0(1) values of
x before being able to pick the value of y. Taking square roots takes O(|p13)
expected time, so the total algorithm naively takes O(p13) time. This time,
is negligible compared to the O(1pj9+c) time required by the first part of the
main step (which is why we were not concerned about getting the smallest
exponent possible).
We have cheated here, but only infinitesimally. A point of the form (x, 0)
will be chosen twice as often as any other point, since both square roots of
0 are the same. Also, the identity is never chosen by this method, which
is actually what we want. This deviation from the uniform distribution is
exponentially small, and thus insignificant. If the earth were to explode
whenever a point of the form (x, 0) were chosen, we would hardly ever notice
it.
Algorithm Select-Point(p, q, (A, B))
1: Choose x uniformly from Z,, and set z = x3 + Ax + B.
2: Test if z is a quadratic residue. If it is not, then go to Step 1.
3: Compute y = VE, uniformly choosing which square root of z to
take. Set L = (x, y).
4: Compute qL. If qL # I,, then go to Step 1. Otherwise, return(L).
Figure 2.4: Algorithm for choosing a point on (A, B) of order q.
Algorithm Main-Step(p)
1: Make the following computations:
(AB),q <- GENERATE - CURVE(p),
L <- SELECT - POINT(p,q,(A, B))
Return((A, B), L, q).
Figure 2.5: Main reduction step of the primality-proving algorithm.
Checking if qL = I is straightforward, given our implicit algorithm for
point addition, and the "repeated doubling" trick for exponentiation, dis-
cussed in the previous two sections. It naively requires O(|p12) steps to add
two points, and O(lg q) = O(IpI) total additions to multiply a point by q.
Thus, at most O(|p13 ) steps are naively required. This bound can certainly
be improved, but is already negligible compared to the first part of the main
step.
For future reference, we give the our point selection algorithm in Fig-
ure 2.4, and the full algorithm for the main step in Figure 2.5.
2.4.2 Incorporating the main reduction step in the
primality proving algorithm.
Given the main step shown in the previous section, we now can give the full
primality-proving algorithm. The full algorithm essentially iterates the main
reduction algorithm until the prime to be proven is so small that it may be
verified prime in time polynomial in |p|, the size of the original prime number
to be certified. We also have an abort condition, so that the algorithm will
restart after sufficiently many steps have taken place. This mechanism is to
handle exponentially rare circumstances, caused by the use of a probabilistic
primality test, in which the algorithm will get caught in an infinite loop.
We give the complete algorithm in Figure 2.6. For the exposition of this
algorithm, we let constant C to be defined as a positive constant such that
the Cohen-Lenstra primality test takes O(|pI) time on inputs of size,
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It is easily verified that such a positive constant does exist.
We now show that the output of PROVE-PRIME(p) constitutes a certifi-
cate of p's primality, that can be deterministically checked in time O(|p14).
Our deterministic checker works as follows. On input
p, ((Ao, Bo), Lo, p1), .. ,((A;_1, B;_1), L;_1, pi),
the algorithm first checks that pi is small enough to be rapidly verified prime,
and aborts if this is not the case. It then verifies that p; is prime, and aborts
if it is not the case. Then, for j = 1,... , i - 1, it verifies that
* p3 is not divisible by 2 or 3,
* (A3, B3 ) is a curve over Z,,
e Pj+1 > p + 2p' + 1, and
* L =/ I,,, q L = Ip,.
We give this algorithm in Figure 2.7.
The following theorem shows that the output of our primality prover is
indeed a certificate of primality.
Algorithm Prove-Prime(p)
1: Let
lowerbound = max (209 P) , 37)
where c is a suitably small constant. Let i = 0, and po = p.
2: While p; > lowerbound, do
(Aj, B;), L,pi+1 +-- MAIN-ST EP(p;),
and set i = i + 1. For each pi, check if it is divisible by 2 or 3, and
go to Step 1 if this is the case.
3: Using the deterministic algorithm of Cohen-Lenstra, check if pi is
prime. If p; is not prime, then go to Step 1. Otherwise,
Output((Ao, Bo), Lo, pi),... , ((A- 1 , B._ 1), L_ 1 , pi)
*: If, since starting Step 1, more than Jpjl1IPI steps have been run,
abort and go to Step 1.
Figure 2.6: Why Joe Kilian should get his doctorate.
Algorithm Check (p, ((Ao, Bo), Lo, pi),. .. , ((A;_1, Bi_1), Li_1, pi))
1: If
p > max (2(IsP)"/l'''''',937) ,
then abort. Otherwise, test pi for primality, using the Cohen-
Lenstra algorithm.
2: Define po = p. For j E [0, i - 1], check that
* pi is not divisible by 2 or 3,
* (4Aq + 27B?,pj) = 1,
e pj+1 > p + 2p3 + 1, and
* Lj # I,,,pj+1 Lj = I, .
If any of these conditions do not hold, abort. Otherwise, accept p
as prime.
Figure 2.7: Algorithm for checking certificates of primality.
Theorem 2.6 If algorithm CHECK(p, certificate) accepts, then p is prime.
For a prime p, let certificate be an output of algorithm PRIME-PROVE(p).
Then CHECK(p, certificate) will accept in O(|p|4) deterministic time.
Note that this theorem makes no guarantee as to how quickly, if ever,
PRIME-PROVER will output a certificate for p, merely that such a certificate
will be valid.
Proof: Suppose that CHECK accepts an input of the form
p, ((Ao, Bo), Lo, p1), .. ., ((A;_1, Bi_1), L;_1, pi).
Then clearly, p; must be prime. Furthermore, by Theorem 2.5, the checks
made for each value of j ensures that if pj+1 prime, then p3 is prime. Thus,
if CHECK accepts, then
pi prime ==> p;-1 prime ==> - - po = p prime.
Thus, p must be prime.
We now show that CHECK will always accept a certificate, of the above
form, presented to it by PRIME-PROVER. We first note that by the definition
of PROVE-PRIME, pi will be prime. By the definition of GENERATE-CURVE,
we have (4A + 27B?,p) = 1. From the definition of GENERATE-CURVE,
and the fact that #p,(A, B3 ) > pi + 1 - 2 y-, we have
pj+1 pj + 1 - 2 v/5
> Pi + 2pj + 1,
for p, > 37. By the definition of PROVE-PRIME, p, > 37, unless p < 37,
in which case it is easily verified that the output of PROVE-PRIME will be
accepted by CHECK. Finally, by the definition of SELECT-POINT, Lj :# In,,
and pj+1Lj = IP,. Therefore, check will accept.
To compute how many steps are required, we first note that pj+1 = p1/ 2 +
o(p,), and therefore i = O(lgp). For each value of j the checking procedure
must perform a constant number of simple arithmetic operations, a single
GCD computation, an must multiply a point Lj by an integer qj. This all
can be done in O(jpj3), so the total running time of the checking algorithm
is O(|p13) . O(lgp) = O(Ip14) steps. I
2.5 Analysis of the primality proving algo-
rithm.
In the previous section, we exhibited our primality proving algorithm, and
demonstrated that it produced legitimate certificates of primality. We also
gave the running-time analysis of the main step of the algorithm, as a function
of the number of primes in certain intervals.
In this section, we analyze how long it takes for this algorithm to produce
proofs of primality. We show that, modulo a conjecture on the distribution of
prime numbers, the algorithm will always halt in expected polynomial time.
We then extend this argument to show that the algorithm will produce proofs
of primality, in expected polynomial time, for all but a vanishing fraction of
the prime numbers. This latter theorem does not depend on any conjectures.
2.5.1 Analysis based on a conjecture.
Using the machinery of the previous sections, it is straightforward to analyze
the running time of our algorithm under the assumption that all the small
intervals we need consider have sufficiently many primes.
Theorem 2.7 Suppose that
(3ci, c2 > 0)7r(x + VY) - ir(x) >_ le xlogC X,
then algorithm PROVE-PRIME(p) will terminate in expected time O(IpIc1+10).
Proof: It is not hard to see that the bulk of steps of PROVE-PRIME oc-
cur within algorithm MAIN-STEP. Since in our primality-proving algorithm,
pj+1 = Pj/ 2 + o(pj), only O(Inp) iterations of MAIN-STEP are invoked. The
expected time taken by algorithm MAIN-STEP is equal to the expected time
taken by algorithm GENERATE-CURVE, plus the expected time of algorithm
SELECT-POINT. Algorithm SELECT-POINT is easily seen to take o(|pi'0) time,
provided that in the output, ((A, B), q) of GENERATE-CURVE, q is indeed
prime. We therefore have only to bound the total expected running time of
the O(Inp) iterations of GENERATE-CURVE.
First, let us assume for simplicity that each input pj to GENERATE-CURVE
is prime, and that the time-out procedure is never invoked. Recall that S(p3 )
is defined by
S (3={q 'pi+1 - (p~J p +1+LV(fp I.j
S(p)=2 ' 2 j,q prime..
We first simplify this expression. Setting x = (p, + 1 - [vj)/2, and y =
(p3 + 1 + [vpJ)/2, we have have
S(p3 ) = {q E [x, y] , q prime.}.
For p > 37 (37 is the smallest value of p3 we need consider), we can easily
verify that y > x+ fi. Thus, there must be O( V) primes in S(p3 ) There-
fore, by Corollary 2.5, GENERATE-CURVE(p 3 ) will take expected O(Iplcl+ 9)
steps. Thus, the total running time of the algorithm will, in this optimistic
scenario, take O(|plc 1+10) steps.
In actuality, we cannot always guarantee that the numbers which are
supposed to be prime will actually be prime. This is because the probabilistic
primality test we used could conceivably label a composite number as prime.
In this case, we cannot bound the amount of time any of the subroutines will
take. Thus, whenever a primality test is invoked, we have the possibility of
going into an infinite loop should the test make a mistake.
We now show that mistakes in probabilistic primality testing will not be
frequent enough or costly enough to increase the expected running time of
the algorithm. We have set the probability of the probabilistic primality test
failing to be at most
- < 2 (np)C/nlnp< 2-('nP)c "
pi
Our time-out feature causes us to rerun the algorithm whenever Ipi' II steps
have elapsed. Thus, all a mistake could cost us in the worst case is to spend
|plIPI steps, and have to start over from scratch. First, we observe that the
penalty caused by spending |p|MiPl steps is unimportant. Whenever we have
a primality test, we have an expected penalty of at most,
|p|MI1PI - 2-(lnp)C/nnn = o00),
steps run due to possible infinite loops, which is negligible. We may therefore
assume, without affecting the analysis, that as soon as a primality testing
mistake is made, the algorithm simply starts over from scratch.
A
We now need only to bound the cost of having to start over whenever a
primality test makes a mistake, or whenever the algorithm times-out after
|pl"IPI steps have occurred. By the above analysis, we have at least a nonzero
constant probability that no more than O(|pjc1+10) steps will be run before
the completion of the algorithm, provided that no primality-testing mistakes
are made. In this case, the time-out feature will not be invoked, and, since
at most O(|pjc1+10) primality tests could conceivably be run (this is a terrible
overestimate, but sufficient for our purposes), there will be at most a
O(jplc1+ 1 0) - 2-1"p)c/nn" = o(1)
chance that of a testing mistake occurring. Therefore, even in the nonideal
scenario, there will be a nonzero constant probability that the algorithm goes
from start (or restart) to completion, without being restarted by primality
testing mistakes or time-outs. Thus, the expected running time (ERT(p))
of the algorithm will obey the recurrence,
ERT(p) = c -O(pc1+10) + (1 - c)ERT(p),
which clearly implies that ERT(p) = O(|plc1+10). I
We again note that the only danger from a primality test failing is in the
running-time of the algorithm, not the correctness of its output.
2.5.2 Proving our algorithm fast for most primes.
The scenario in the previous section is optimistic. .t assumes that whenever
one is attempting to show a number p prime, there-will always be sufficiently
many primes in the interval
p + 1 -1 ]p + 1 + L A
2 ' 2
That is, S(p) is assumed to be sufficiently large. This is almost certainly the
case for all primes, but it is currently beyond our ability to prove this fact.
However, it has been shown that intervals which contain a sparse number of
primes are rare. We have the following result, which is implied by a technical
lemma of Heath-Brown[HB]. 7
7 Our deepest thanks to Maier and Pomerance for pointing out this implication of
Heath-Brown's work.
Theorem 2.8 [Heath-Brown] Call an integer y sparse if there are less than
Vy/2 [ln yj primes in the interval [y, y + [yJ]. Then there exist a constant
a such that for sufficiently large x,
y : y E [x, 2x], y is sparse}| <X 5/6 In x.
We can use this result to show that our algorithm is fast for most prime
numbers. Specifically, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.9 Let k be sufficiently large. There exist constants c1, c2 such
that the number of k-bit primes that algorithm PROVE-PRIME(p) will not
halt in expected c1 k" steps is at most
2 k /-c2/1sgsk
Proof: Given a prime p, we denote by P(p) the set of all intermediate
primes that can be generated in step i of the algorithm. In other words, Pj(p)
consists of all primes that could conceivably be equal to pi in the certificate
generated for p. Thus, for instance,
A(p) P}P() p + 1 - L2VJ p + 1 + L2V .]2 2
These are the only primes that need be considered for proving p prime. If
it is the case that S(pi) is O(Vf/lnpi) for pi E P(p), then by the same
analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2.7, PROVE-PRIME(p) will terminate in
expected time 0(k"). The rest of this proof consists of showing that this
will be true for most primes.
Our proof proceeds in three stages. First, we establish a simple property
about how spread out P(p) is, and use this property to derive a simple
criterion which implies that S(pi) is large for pi E P(p). Next, we use a
result of Heath-Brown, and a simple combinatoric argument, to show that
our criterion will fail for only a relatively small number of values of P(p).
Finally, we use this result to bound the number of primes for which our
algorithm is slow.
Characterizing P(p).
We note that for every certificate, pi+i = p1/2 + o(pi). This would
suggestP(p) should be clustered around p/2'. We now show that such is
the case.
Lemma 2.6 Let p be a prime, and let p/2' be sufficiently large. Then any
element of P1(p) lies in the range
(P - 7 , + 7 V ).2i 21'- 21 2
Remark: The value of 7 which we obtain can be improved on. However, we
only need to establish that some constant exists.
Proof: Our proof is by induction on i. For i = 0 , the lemma clearly holds.
We can bound the largest and smallest elements of P(p) in terms of the
largest and smallest elements of P_.1 (p). Specifically, we have
max (Pi (p)) < max(Pi(p)) + 1 + 2/max(P1.(p))
ma(ip)52 , and,
min(P1 (p)) > min(P_(p)) + 1 - 2/min(P-(p))2
By inductive hypothesis, we have
4-r + 7 +1+2 Er+7
max(P(p)) 2 2
We can simplify the above expression considerably. We note that
x + 7v/x< (1 + o(1))x,
for x sufficiently large,
(p/2'-1)/2 =p/2,
and
Vp/2i-1 = /2- Vp/7i.
These simplifications yield,
max (Pi (p)) < + ( 7+ 12 + o(1)) + 1
< P+ 7,
2i
For p/2' sufficiently large. The lower bound is similarly established. I
A condition under which S(pi) will be large.
We can use Lemma 2.6 to give a simple condition under which we can guar-
antee that S(p) will be large for all pi E P(p). To facilitate the discussion,
we introduce the following terminology.
Definition 2.10 Let I(p) denote the set of intervals of the form
P;+ - (&~) pi + 1+ (Qi)
2 ' 2'
where pi E Pi(p).
In other words, I;(p) consists of the set of intervals which are important
in our primality proving algorithm's search for Pi+1- If we can show that
every interval in It (p) has a large number of primes, then we are guaranteed
that our algorithm will always be able to quickly generate pi+1.' We would
like to reduce statements about all the intervals in I(p) to a statement about
a relatively small number of intervals, for reasons which will become clear as
our discussidn progresses. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.11 Let Si be a set of intervals. We say that a set of intervals
S2 is an inclusion set for S1 if
(V[x, y] E S1 )(3[x', y'] E S2)x < x' < y' < y.
8 The alert reader may ask why the V term is not 2V in the definition of It(p). This
is due to our definition of S(pi), and indirectly due to fact that Lenstra's result only holds
for the smaller interval.
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In other words, S 2 is an inclusion set for S1 if every interval in Si has a
subinterval that appears in S2. The utility of this definition comes from the
following simple observation: If every interval in S2 has at least n primes,
then every interval in S1 will have at least n primes. We now show that I2(p)
has a small inclusion set which consists of large intervals.
Definition 2.12 Let Cj(p) be defined as the set of intervals
[x, x + LV] : x = + , k E [-22 22I .
Remark: For our application, the value of 22 can probably be reduced, but
we only need the fact that some constant exists.
Lemma 2.7 Let p be a prime, and let p/2' be sufficiently large. Then Cj(p)
is an inclusion set for I2(p).
Proof: First, let us characterize intervals [x, y] E I(p). By the definition
of I;(p), and elementary algebra, we have,
y = X + (V2 + o(1)) vlx.
By the same argument as in Lemma 2.6, we have,
P+ 7 V 2 x 2 
- 7 $TSiT1 2i1- - 2i+1 V 2:
Thus, there exist x 1, x 2 such that x1 x < x 2, and
[X1, X1 + LV1J~], [x2, X2 + [ViJ] E Ci(p).
Without loss of generality, we assume that x1, x2 are the largest and smallest
numbers satisfying the above conditions.
We now argue that [x, y] must contain [x2, X2 + Lv]]. First, we note
that
V/X = (1 + o(1)) p/ 2 i+1,
f/X2 = (1 + o(1)) p/2i+1, and,
Vzi = (1+ 0(1))> .
By elementary algebra, we have
X2 - X1 +O(1)
which implies that
X2 - x < + o(1) , which implies,
X2 X + + o(1) y '.
Thus, we have,
X2 + Ly/zxij 5 x + (
for p/2'+1 sufficiently large. I
A further property of Cj(p).
Lemma 2.7 is crucial to our analysis. Now, instead of having to show that
IZT(p)| = 0 (p/2+1),
intervals all have sufficiently many primes in them, we only have to show
that
|Ci(p)| = 0(1),
intervals have sufficiently many primes. We have paid a price for this, since
the intervals in C(p) are smaller than the intervals in I;(p), but this turns
out not to be a problem. To facilitate later arguments, we extend our notion
of sparseness to C(p).
Definition 2.13 Let p be a prime. We say that Cj(p) is sparse if any of the
intervals in C1(p) is sparse.
We need one more property before we use the theorem of Heath-Brown
to complete the proof of Theorem 2.9. Our intuition is as follows. If any
of the intervals in I;(p) do not contain enough primes, we will be unable to
show that our algorithm runs fast on p. Heath-Brown show that only a van-
ishing fraction of the intervals of the form [x, x + LVJ]] will not have enough
primes. But what if these "bad" intervals appear in most of the Ci(p)'s?
Conceivably, the bad intervals could destroy a disproportionate number of
primes. Fortunately, the following lemma shows that this is not the case.
Lemma 2.8 Let x be sufficiently large. Then an interval of the form,
[x, x + [7]],
can be in Cj(p) for at most c -2' different values of p, where c is a constant.
Proof: It suffices to show that there are, for each value of k E [-22, 22],
only O( 2i) values of p which satisfy the equation Lfk(p)J = x, where
p k p ~i
fA(P) = + - +.
We first eliminate eliminate the integer rounding by noting that
LzJ = x ==> x - 1 < z < x + 1.
We therefore have to show that there only Q(2') integers p which satisfy
X - 1 < fk(P) x + 1.
Therefore, if [x, x + [x. ]] is in Ci(p) and C (p'), then If(p') - f(p)I < 2. We
will use this fact to show that p and p' must be near to each other in value,
which will in turn give us the desired bound. For the rest of the proof, we
assume without loss of generality that p < p'.
Let us consider f in the continuous domain. For all p > 0, the derivative
f'(p) is at least 2 -(i+). Since f is clearly monotone increasing, we have
f(p') - f(p) 2. By elementary calculus, we have
f(p') - f(p -P2i+1'
from which we can derive,
p- p < 2 .
This clearly implies that only c -2' solutions exist, for some constant c. I
The final calculation.
We now give the final calculations for bounding the number of primes for
which our algorithm will fail. First, we argue that the number of k-bit
primes p such that Ci(p) will be sparse will be small, where c is a positive
constant.
Lemma 2.9 Let 2 k-i be sufficiently large. Then there will be at most
2 k
21/5(k-i)
k-bit primes p such that Ci(p) is sparse.
Remark: Here, 1/5 may be replaced by any number less than 1/6.
Proof: First, we note that if [x, x+ Lv-J] is in Cj(p) for p E [2 k-1, 2k], then
x E [2 k-i-2, 2 k-i+1]. This follows from the definition of Ci(p) and the bounds
on p. We now use Heath-Brown's theorem on the intervals [2 k-i-2 2 k-i-1j,
[2 k-i-1, 2 k-i], and [2 k-i, 2 k-i+1], and sum the results. This bounds the number





2 5/6(k-i-j) log" 2k-i- j < cl 2 5/6(k-i) loga 2 k-i
7=0
for some constant c1 . By Lemma 2.8, each sparse interval of this form is in
Cj(p) for at most c22' different values of p, where c2 is some constant. Thus,
at most
(C2 - 2') (c1 . 2 5/6(k-i) loga 2 k-') = 
c1c2 2 k loge 2 k-i
z 2 1 /6(k-i)
21/5(k-i)
for 2 k-i sufficiently large. I
We can now upper-bound the number of k-bit primes that PROVE-PRIME
will not quickly certify as prime. In order for a prime p to not be quickly
certified, as per the analysis of Theorem 2.7, it must be the case that Ci(p)
is sparse for some value of i. Furthermore, the value of i must be sufficiently
small that PROVE-PRIME(p) could, with nonzero probability, proceed for i
steps without pi being so small as to be verified deterministically. We denote
by ik the greatest number of reduction steps the algorithm could possibly go
through on a k-bit prime. Using Lemma 2.9, we bound the number of k-bit
primes that could conceivably not be quickly certified by
ik g
|{p E [2k-1 2 k], p isn't quickly certified} 5 21/5(k-i)'
c -2k
21/5(k-i)'
for some constant c, by standard properties of geometric series.
We can use Lemma 2.6 to bound below the value of 2k-k. Suppose that,
on some k-bit prime p, the primality proving algorithm proceeded for ik
reductions before hitting its last prime, Pik. Recall that, for k sufficiently
large, the algorithm will stop as soon as
Pi (lgp)c/1gigig p
We also have,
p;k- _ 2 (i9,)c/'gigigp,
or the algorithm would have stopped after the (ik - 1)th reduction. Since,
Pik 5 pik-1/ 3 , for Pk-,1 sufficiently large (to give a very weak bound), we
have,
pp > - 2(lg P)c/'
-- 3
for k sufficiently large. Since Pi, = p/ 2'k + O(vp/2P(i)), by Lemma 2.6, and
k -1 < lgp < k, we have,
lgppi, < k - ik + 1,
for k sufficiently large. Hence, we have
2 k-ik > 1 , 20gpc/Ig
~-6
Since the right hand side of the equation is monotone increasing, we have
2k-i,> .2 (k-1)C/igig(h-1)
- 6
Using this inequality, we have
c - 2 c' - k g i(k-1)C1I9I9(k-1)
21/5(k-ik) <c 
2
< 2 k / 2 (k)C'/ g ig





In this chapter we discuss techniques for committing bits, and committing
bits with zero-knowledge proofs about these committed bits. These tech-
niques all make use of an ideal oblivious transfer channel. We begin by
giving some intuition for just what bit commital is, and why it is so useful
in protocol design.
What is bit commital?
The essence of bit commital can be understood by considering the following
story. Alice and Bob wanted to flip a fair coin, but had no physical coin
to flip. Alice offered a simple way of flipping a fair coin mentally. "First,
you think up a random bit, then I'll think up a random bit. We'll then
exclusive-or the two bits together." she suggested.
"But what if one of us doesn't flip a coin at random?" Bob asked.
"It doesn't matter. As long as one of the bits is truly random, the
exclusive-or of the bits should be truly random." Alice replied, and after
a moment's reflection, Bob agreed.
A short while later, Alice and Bob happened upon a book on artificial
intelligence, lying abandoned by the roadside. A good citizen, Alice said,
"One of us must pick this book up, and find a suitable waste receptacle."
Bob agreed, and suggested they use their coin-flipping protocol to determine
who would have to throw the book away.
"If the final bit is a 0, then you will pick the book up, and if it is a 1,
then I will." said Alice. "What is your bit?"
Bob replied, "1."
"Why, so is mine," said Alice, slyly, "I guess this isn't your lucky day."
Needless to say, this coin flipping protocol had a serious bug. While it
is true that a truly random bit, x, exclusive-ored with any independently
distributed bit, y, will yield a truly random bit, Alice's protocol did not
ensure that the two bits were distributed independently. In fact, it is not hard
to verify that no mental protocol can allow two infinitely powerful parties
to flip a fair coin. Alice and Bob were in a quandary, until they received a
letter from an obscure graduate student in cryptography. The information
in the letter was too theoretical to be of any earthly use to anyone, but the
envelope the letter came in was extremely handy.
The next time Alice and Bob wished to flip a coin, they played a modified
version of the original protocol. First, Bob decided on a bit, but instead of
announcing it immediately, he wrote it down on a piece of paper, and placed
the paper in the envelope. Next, Alice announced her bit. Finally, Alice and
Bob took Bob's bit out of the envelope, and computed the random bit. This
bit was indeed truly random whenever at least one of them played honestly.
Alice and Bob had a working protocol, the cryptographer's dream of social
relevance was fulfilled, and they all lived happily ever after.
In its simplest form, commital is nothing more than simulating the enve-
lope in the above story. Indeed, in much of our intuitive reasoning for why
protocols work, we will appeal directly to the envelope analogy.
Commital with zero-knowledge proofs.
In this thesis, we will actually use a much more powerful notion of commit-
ment, which we dub, "Commital with zero-knowledge proof." To illustrate
what .we mean by this, we consider the following Alice-Bob story.
One day, Bob was desperately trying to factor a 500 bit number, n which
he knew was a product of five 100 bit numbers. Alice walked by, and said,
"I happen to know one of the factors of n, which I'll gladly give to you for
$100." To show that she was serious, she took out one hundred envelopes,
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and proceeded to commit one hundred bits for Bob. Unfortunately, Bob had
only $25. Unwilling to cut her rates, Alice offered to sell Bob 25 bits of the
number she had committed.
"But how will I know that the number you committed is actually a factor
of n?" Bob asked. "If you would show me the number first, and let me verify
that it is a factor, I'll agree to your terms."
Naturally, Alice did not go for this deal. This was a serious quandary,
which even envelopes did not appear to solve. Alice could not convince Bob
her number was any good without revealing it, and Bob would not buy 25
bits of a number that might well be random garbage. Is there a way out of
this difficulty?
In this chapter we will show how, using oblivious transfer, one can commit
a set of bits, and somehow prove to the other party that these committed
bits has some special property.
3.1.1 Outline of the Chapter.
In Section 3.2, we give some very simple commital protocols based on obliv-
ious transfer, due to Crepeau. In Section 3.3, we show how to efficiently
commit elements of a finite group, along with a zero-knowledge proof that
these elements have a certain product. In Section 3.4, we extend this result
to allow us to commit a set of bits, along with a zero-knowledge proof of an
arbitrary NP assertion about these bits. In Section 3.5, we explicitly write
down all the simulators for our protocols, along with formal arguments of
their correctness. Finally, in Section 3.6, we observe that our schemes can
be strengthened by running them in parallel.
3.2 A simple commital protocol using obliv-
ious transfer.
In this section, we outline simple protocols, due to Cr6peau, for committing
and decommitting a bit using an oblivious transfer channel. We suppose
Alice wishes to commit a bit, b, to Bob, and then decommit it at a later
date. For convenience, we define the following two functions.
Protocol Simple-Commit(b,k) /* k is security parameter */
1: Alice chooses B = b1,..., bk E {0, 1} uniformly, subject to,
b = parity(B).
Alice sends b1,.. ., bk to Bob. We denote by b E {0,1,#} the bits
actually received by Bob.
Figure 3.1: Protocol for ordinary bit commital.
Protocol Simple-Decommit(bi,.. . b)
1: Alice sends Bob B = b1 ,...,bk. If for any i E [1,k], b E {, 1} and
b; 5 b , then Bob rejects. Otherwise, Bob reconstructs
b = parity(B).
Figure 3.2: Protocol for ordinary bit decommital.
Definition 3.1 Given a k-bit bit sequence B = b1 ,..., bk, we define
parity(B) = b1 e ... E bk.
Definition 3.2 We define majority(bi,..., bk) as equal to 1 iff
I{i : b; = 1}1 > |{i : b; = 0}1.
We now wish to argue that these protocols, given Figures 3.1 and 3.2,
give some of the same security guarantees as do physical envelopes, albeit in
a weaker form. Specifically, we wish to show that,
1. (Security) Suppose Bob has no a priori information about b. Then after
Alice has committed b, but before Alice has decommitted b, There is
only a 1/ 2k chance that Bob will be able to guess b with probability
greater than }.
2. (Confidence) The probability that Alice can trick Bob into reconstruct-
ing a bit different that the bit she originally committed is at most .
Lemma 3.1 [Security] At the end of SIMPLE-COMMIT(b, k), the probability
that Bob can predict b any better than before is 1/ 2k*.
Proof: With probability 1/ 2k, Bob receives b1,..., bk entirely. In other
words, b = bi for 1 < i < k. In this case, Bob can easily reconstruct
b = parity(B) = b' e ... E b'. Otherwise, bl = # for some i. By symmetry,
we consider only consider the case where i = k. We now argue that knowing
bi, ... , bI_1 gives no information about b. This follows from the fact that for
all possible values of b1 , ... , bk_1, and for either value of b, there is exactly
one value of bk that satisfies b = b1 E ... E bk. I
This argument is merely a recapitulation of the fact that knowing a proper
subset of a set of coin flips tells one nothing about the parity of the entire
set of coin flips.
Lemma 3.2 [Reliability] Suppose that Alice sends Bob the sequence B =
b1,..., bk. Let b = parity(B). For any strategy Alice may employ, the
probability that, at the end of SIMPLE-DECOMMIT, Bob reconstructs a bit
b' # b is at most .
Proof: Let B = b1,..., bk denote the string Alice sends Bob in protocol
SIMPLE-DECOMMIT(Where Alice is possibly cheating). If B = B, then Bob
will accept and reconstruct b. Otherwise, for some i, b; # b;. However, the
distribution of B is independent of the set received = {j : b' #} by
the obliviousness property of oblivious transfer' Thus, with probability },
b = bi # bi, and Bob will reject. I
3.2.1 Improving the Commital/Decommital Proto-
cols.
We must reconcile the nonideal behavior of the commital/decommital pro-
tocols outlined above with the ideal behavior we would like to simulate. In
'We assume in this proof that Bob does not give Alice any information about which
bits he has received. This will indeed be the case in all the larger protocols our commital
protocols are based on.
Protocol Secure-Simple-Commit(b, k) /* k is security parameter */
1: Alice chooses a sequence of bit sequences B = B1,... ,Bk E {0,1}k.
We denote the bits of these sequences by B' = b' ,...,b', where b'5 E
{0, 1}. The bit sequences B' are chosen uniformly, subject to b =
parity(B), for 1 < i < k. Alice transfers B1,... ,Bk to Bob over
an oblivious transfer channel. We define B' = B1',... , Bk', where
B' = b'1,... ,b 'k, and bi' E {0,1,#}, as the bits Bob actually
receives from Alice.
Figure 3.3: A strengthened bit commital protocol.
Protocol Secure-Simple-Decommit(B,k) /* B, B' are the same as in
the Commit Protocol */
1: Alice sends B to Bob over a clear channel. If for some i,j, b' 5 #
and bi' # b', then Bob rejects. Otherwise, Bob reconstructs b' =
b'(e,....D, b', for 1 < i < k. If all of the bi''s are the same, then
Bob reconstructs b' = bi.
Figure 3.4: Strengthened decommital protocol.
the physical model for envelopes, the probability that the recipient of a com-
mitted bit learns anything about it from the commital process is equal to 0,
compared to 1 / 2k in our implementation. With envelopes, the probability
that Alice can trick Bob into recovering an incorrect bit is likewise equal to
0, compared to 1/2 in our implementation. The former discrepancy is not
serious, since we consider exponentially small probabilities as being negligi-
ble. However, the latter discrepancy is more serious. For example, if the coin
flipping protocol described above uses our commital/decommital protocol,
then one party can control the output of the "fair" coin fully half the time.
Fortunately, we can fix our protocols by running them several times in
parallel, as follows.
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 are analogous to Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemma 3.3 At the end of SECURE-SIMPLE-COMMIT(B,K), the probability
that Bob can predict b any better than before is k(1/2k).
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines as the proof of Lemma .2.1.
The only circumstance in which Bob receives any information about b is
when he receives every bit of one of the bit sequences, B'. For any bit
sequence BI = b,. . ., bk, the probability that b"' = b, for all j E [1, k], is
1/ 2k*. By elementary probability, the probability that one of the k possible
bit sequences is completely received is bounded above by k(1/2'). I
Lemma 3.4 Suppose that Alice sends Bob the sequences B1 ,... , Bk, where
Bt = b., b, over an oblivious transfer channel. Define b' = parity(B),
and b = majority(bl,..., bk). For any strategy Alice may employ, the prob-
ability that, at the end of SECURE-SIMPLE-DECOMMIT, Bob reconstructs a
bit b' # b is at most 1/ 2k/2
Proof: Let B1,..., B denote the strings Alice sends Bob in protocol
SECURE- SIMPLE-DECOMMIT (Where Alice is possibly cheating). We write
2 = b,..., bk. By our definition of b, we have that for at least k/2 of the
i's in [1, k], b' = b. Now, if for any i, parity(fr) = b, then Bob will either
reject or recover ' = b. Therefore, the only way Bob can reconstruct b' # b
is if for at least k/2 of the i's in [1, k], B # B t . It then follows that there
exist [k/21 pairs, (ii,ji),.. .,(irk/21,irk/21), such that
for 1 < m < [k/21. Thus, by the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 3.2, the probability that Bob rejects is at least 1 - 2 rk/21. I
In general, our strategy for developing commital protocols is to ensure
that
1. With probability exponentially close to 1, the recipient of a committed
bit will not receive any information about the committed bit.
2. For some c, the probability of successful cheating(tricking someone into
recovering a different bit than what was originally committed to) is
bounded above by 1 - 1/kc.
We then strengthen the second condition by running the commital pro-
tocol in parallel.
3.3 Proving Assertions about Products of
Group Elements.
So far, we have shown how to commit and decommit bits using oblivious
transfer. This by itself is a very useful tool in protocol design, but in fact we
can do much better. In the rest of the chapter, we extend these techniques,
and implement a form of bit commitment which allows one to give zero-
knowledge proofs of assertions about the committed bits. These protocols
will form the foundation for many of our more complicated protocols.
In order to motivate and explain our zero-knowledge commitment scheme,
we first consider a seemingly much different problem. Suppose that Alice has
a sequence, A = a1,... , ak, of group elements for some group G. She is willing
to let Bob learn a small number of these elements, say log k or k1/4 of them,
and is also willing to let him learn their product, a = a1a2 - - -ak. However,
she doesn't want him to learn anything that cannot be inferred from knowing
this product and the values of a small subset of the elements.
We allow Alice to send group elements to Bob through a special group
element oblivious transfer channel. This channel takes as input a group
element g, and sends it to Bob with some probability p(otherwise, sending
the "not sent" symbol, '#'). The value of p is specified by the protocol being
executed. We adopt the convention that the first k elements Alice attempts
to send Bob through this channel define her values, a1,... , ak.
Alice would like to give Bob some confidence that the product a1 - ak is
indeed equal to a. Specifically, we want there to exist some constant, c, such
that if Alice were lying about the value of the group product, Bob would
catch her with probability at least 1/kc.
Finally, we do not allow Bob to communicate with Alice.
3.3.1 An incorrect solution.
To motivate our solution to this problem, we first give an incorrect solution,
which illustrates one of our main ideas. For ease of exposition, we assume
that k is a perfect power of 2, and write k = 2"'. We first make the following
definition.
Definition 3.3 We define a condenser tree, C, for A = a1 ... , ak, as follows.
We denote the elements of C by cj, where 1 < i < m, and 1 < j < 2"-*.
1. For 1 < * < k/2, ci,j = a 2 - 1a 2j.
2. For 2 < i < m and 1 < j < 2 m-i ciJ = ci-1,2j-1ci-1,2j.
By a trivial induction, we have the following invariance property.
Lemma 3.5 Let C = {ci} be the condenser tree for A = a1 ... , a. Then,
(Vi, 1 < i < m)I''c, = II 1aj. I
In particular, cm,1 = _1 ai.
Using the above lemma, we construct the protocol given in Figure 3.5. It
should be noted that the transfer probability, p = 1/ka, is arbitrarily chosen
to be small, but nonnegligible. Setting p = 1/kc for any c sufficiently large
would also suffice.
The following lemma demonstrates that some confidence about the value
of H1U1 a; is transferred to Bob.
Lemma 3.6 In protocol NAIVE-PROVE-PRODUCT(A, k), suppose that
k
a # f ai,
i=1
where a and the ai's are defined as in Step 1 of the protocol. Then, for any
value of C which Alice (possibly cheating) sends in Step 2 of the protocol,
the probability that Bob accepts is at most (1 - 1/k).
Proof: Suppose that C = {ciJ} is the condenser tree for A = a1,..., ak.
Then cm,1 = aia2...ak # a. With probability 1/k 3 , ci', 1 = Cm,1 # a, and
Bob will reject. If C is not a valid condenser tree for 'A, then one of the
following two conditions must hold.
1. (]i,j)ci,j # Ci-1, 2 j-iCi-1,2j.
2. (3j)cij # a23- 1 a2,.
In case 1, with probability 1/k,
c, ,c';_1,2-1ci-1,2 # and
c/, # -1,2j-ic'i-1,2j-
Protocol Naive- Prove- Product(A,k)
1: Let A = a1,...,ak. We set the transfer probability, p, of the group
element oblivious transfer channel, to 1/k. Alice transfers A to
Bob through the channel. We denote by A' = a',...,a' the ele-
ments Bob actually receives. She also sends a = a; to Bob
through a clear channel.
2: Let C = {cij} be the condenser tree for A. Alice transfers C to
Bob through the channel. We denote by C' = {c'} the elements
Bob actually receives.
Checking Step: Bob makes the following checks
* If c' c _1 ,2j- 1,cl_ 1 ,2j # #, and c, i c'- 1,2j-ici- 1,2j, then Bob
rejects.
SIf 2 # #, and c5 a'- 1a', then Bob rejects.
4Ifc', 1 # #, and c' 1 # a, then Bob rejects.
Figure 3.5: A naive scheme for proving assertions about permutation
products.
In case 2, with probability 1/k9 ,
cl,j , a'2j-1 , a'2/## and/, and
c'i # a2j-1a'
Thus, no matter what Alice does, Bob rejects with probability 1/k. I
Local Verifiability
The crux of the above proof is that if a tree is not a valid condenser tree,
one can prove that it is invalid by considering the values of only a constant
number of the tree's nodes. Conversely, one can verify that a condenser tree
is correct by executing a series of local checks, each of which only looks at
a constant number of nodes (in this case, three). We call this property local
verifiability. If a property can be verified through a series of local checks,
where each test looks at most k locations, then we say the property is k-
locally verifiable.
In general, if a structural property, P, is k-locally verifiable, then one can
transfer some confidence that P(X) holds for some structure X, without re-
vealing very much information about X. Suppose that one could obliviously
transfer each component of X to a verifier, and that verifier's chance of re-
ceiving each component is 1/nc. Then, if P(X) did not hold, there would be
a set of k components which, if received by the verifier, would demonstrate
this fact. Thus, the verifier can reject an invalid (with respect to P) structure
X with probability (1/nc)k = 1/nck. Conversely, if the verifier doesn't reject
X, then it has obtained a nonnegligible amount of confidence that P(X)
holds. Note that this transfer of confidence may occur even when with high
probability the verifier only receives a very small glimpse at the components
of X. This "paradox" makes our advanced commitment protocols possible.
Why doesn't this scheme work?
The above protocol transfers some confidence to Bob about the product
a1a2 ... ak. Furthermore, the probability that Bob receives any of the group
elements transferred in the entire protocol is O(1/k 2 ). Thus, most of the
time, Bob gets absolutely no information about A, other than its product.
The protocol we described above would seem to fit the bill. However, there is
a catch. With probability 1/k3 , Bob learns the value of cm-,1 = aia2 ... ak/2.
This information clearly cannot be derived from knowing just a few of the ai's
and the product of all the ai's. In some sense, our information is too tightly
coupled. Intuitively, information about the original set of group elements
is being compressed, through successive multiplications, into a smaller and
smaller set of group elements. The final group element contains information
about all of the original elements, so it is no surprise that some of the elements
before it also contain highly nonlocal information. To solve this problem, we
introduce a randomizing step, which we describe below.
3.3.2 Randomizing Tableaus.
Given a sequence, A = a1,... , ak, of group elements, we wish to, through a
sequence of local changes, create a new sequence, AR = a, , , such that
a1a2 . . ak = a a .. . ak.
To do this, we define a structure we call a randomizing tableau. We first
define a function, change(n, k), which will specify the locations of the local
changes we will make, and the notion of a randomization sequence.
Definition 3.4 We define the function change(k, n) by
change(k, n) = remainder(n, k - 1) + 1,
where remainder(m, n) is the smallest nonnegative number congruent to m
mod n.
Definition 3.5 Let G be a group. We formally define a randomizing se-
quence of length n to be a sequence r1, ... , rn, where ri E G.
Definition 3.6 Let G be a group, and let A = a1 , ... , ak, where a, E G. Let
R = r1,..., r, be a randomization sequence for G. An n-stage randomizing
tableau, T(A, R), is an n + 1 by k matrix, defined as follows. We write
T(A, R) = [ti,], where 0 < i < n and 1 < j < k.
1. toJ = ai.




change(i, k) + 1,
change(i, k), change(i, k) + 1.
Notation: As we hinted before, one can view the rows of a randomizing
tableau as a sequence of strings obtained by starting with string A, and
making a sequence of local changes. To support this viewpoint, we denote
by A'(T) the ith row of tableau T = T(A, R), i.e.,
A '(T) = ti,1, ... , ti,k.
We also define the final row, AR(T) to be AR(T). In cases where T is




Let our group G be
T(A, R) is equal to
Z3 . Let A = 1 2,0,1, and R = 2,1,0,2,2, 1.
0 0 2 2
0 0 0 1
0 2 1 1
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 1
2 1 0 1
1 2 0 1
We use slightly nonstandard notation
instead of increasing. Intuitively, we
and row n as the top of the tableau.
Then






by writing the rows in decreasing order
view row 0 as the base of the tableau,
3.3.3 Four Properties of Randomizers.
We now establish four key properties of randomizers. Two of these properties
demonstrate how one may use randomizing tableaus to transfer confidence
about certain facts, and the other two bound how much information is trans-
ferred under certain circumstances.
Transferring Confidence
The two properties possessed by randomizing tableaus which make them
amenable to confidence transfer are local verifiability and row-product in-
variance. As was the case with condenser trees, randomizing tableaus are
locally verifiable, as shown in Lemma 3.7. Row-product invariance refers to
the fact that the products of the rows of a randomizing tableau are all the
same. We prove this property in Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 3.7 [local verifiability] Given a sequence A and a matrix T, one can
prove that
(VR)T # T(A, R)
by considering only 4 elements of A U T.
Proof: We first prove an alternate criterion for when an R exists such that
T = T(A,R).
Lemma 3.8 Given a sequence A = a 1,..., ak and n + 1 by k matrix T =
[ti,j], there exists a randomizing sequence R = r1 , ... ,r, such that
T = T(A,R)
iff (Vi, 1 < i < n)(Vj, 1 < j k),
1. to,3 = a3 .
2. tij = t;_1,, for j # change(i, k), change(i, k) + 1.
3. ti,jti,+1 = ti-1,,ti-1,j+1, for j = change(i, k).
Proof: (4) If T = T(A, R) for some R, then conditions 1 and 2 follow
immediately from the definition of randomizing tableaus. For 1 < i < n, andj = change(i, k), we have
tij = ti, 1,jr1, and
ti,j+1 = riti-1,j+1-
But this implies that
ti,jti,+1 = (ti- 1 ,jrJ1)(rjtj-1,3+1)
= ti_ 1 ,jt(riri)ti-1,j+1
!! MP - - .
(=-) We prove this direction by explicitly constructing such an R. We
define R =r 1 ,..., by
ri = t7 t_15
where j = change(i, k). We now verify that,
1. tij = t,jri and,
2. ti,j+ 1 =iti-1j,
for 1 < i < n, and j = change(i, k). We have
ti_1,jr-1 = ti_1,5 (ti Jt,)
=ti, 3
Similarly, since ti,jt;,j+1 = ti-1,jti-1,j+1, for j = change(i, k), we have
ti,j+1 = 7 ig(ti_1jtj+1
(tgt _1,j)ti-1,j+1
= riti-1,j. I
To prove the main lemma, we simply note that our new criterion for when
(3R)T = T(A, R) may be written as a set of O(nk) conditions, each of which
refer to at most 4 locations in A and T. I
As was the case with condenser trees, the local verifiability of random-
izing tableaus makes them very useful building blocks in our protocols. By
transferring only a small expected number of entries in a purportedly valid
tableau, one can transfer some confidence that it is indeed valid.
Lemma 3.9 [row-product invariance] Let A = a1,..., ak be a sequence of
group elements, and R = r1 , ... , r,, be a randomization sequence. Writing
T(A, R)= [tij], we have for 0 < i < n,
k k
H ti,5 =I aj.
j=1 j=1
Proof: It suffices to prove the following two assertions.
1. f1J to,j = _ a.
2. j 1 ti,3 = . , for i > 0.
The first assertion follows immediately from the identity, toj = aj. The
second assertion follows almost as easily from our definition of T. Let m =
change(i, k). We can write AP, the ith row of T, as
Af = t_,, .. t_, -,t-, r/ ,rt-,+ ,ti-1,m+2, -- ti-1,k-
Thus, we have
k M-1 k
ti~j = ti-i~j (ti-1,mri ') riti-1,m+1) ti-1,j
j=1 j=1 (j=m+2
m-1 k





The lemma follows. I
Thus, if one possesses confidence that an n + 1 by k matrix T = [ti,j]
is a valid randomizing tableau for A, then one possesses confidence that, in
particular, nitn,2 ... n,k = aia 2 ... ak.
Bounding knowledge transfer.
We now show that randomizing tableaus have nice properties in regards to
how much information one obtains by seeing only a small number of tableau
elements. We first show that information about a set of columns in a tableau
provides information about only those elements of the base row which are
contained in these columns. We then show that if one picks a tableau ac-
cording to a certain distribution, rows which are far apart in the tableau are
only weakly correlated.
Our first lemma, which follows directly from the definition of randomizing
tableaus, demonstrates the property we call columnwise independence.
Lemma 3.10 [columnwise independence] Let A = a1,..., as, R =
r1 ,.. .,rn, T(A,R) = [ti], and I c [1,k]. Then the elements {tili E I}
are functions of R and the set of elements {aili E I}. I
Thus, having knowledge about the first, fourth, and fifth columns of T
gives one information about a1 , a4, a5 , but gives no information about aj for
i # 1, 4,5. As a consequence of columnwise independence, knowing m values
of T gives information about at most m values of A. This property is in
sharp contrast with condenser trees, where a single value of C could give
information about 0(k) elements of A.
Our second lemma demonstrates the property we call gap-randomization.
Essentially, it says that if two rows are separated by a sufficiently large gap in
a randomly chosen tableau, then they will be essentially independent. They
will both have the same row-product, but will otherwise have no correlation.
Before proving this lemma, we first prove a similar lemma which possesses
the heart of the proof of the main lemma.
Lemma 3.11 Fix A = a1 ,...,ak, where ai E G, and G is finite, and let
a = Hii ai. Let R = ri, ... , rh-1 be a uniformly chosen sequence of elements
of G. Let scrambleA(R) = A' = a',..., a' be defined by a' = air71 , a' =
rk_1ak, and a' = r_1airi, for 1 < i < k. Then A' is uniformly distributed
over all k element sequences whose product is a.
Proof: This follows from the following two assertions.
1. For any choice of R, a = 1-1 i af.
2. For any choice of A', and with A fixed, there is exactly one value of R
such that A' = scrambleA(R).
To prove assertion 1, we just write out HrL a as
k
la/ = (air-')(ria2r1). . (r-i)
i=1
= a1(r~1 r1)a 2(rj1r2 ) ... (r-j1irk_1)ak
= ala2.--ak
= a
To prove Assertion 2, we use a counting argument. Denote by Al the set
of k element sequences of group elements whose product is a. From our
definition, it is not hard to see that scrambleA is an injective mapping.
Specifically, if R and R' first disagree in their ith element, then scrambleA(R)
and scrambleA(R') will disagree in their ith element. By assertion 1, we have
that the range of scrambleA is in Ak. Clearly, IA'I = IGIk-1, since we can
choose the first k - 1 elements of the sequence arbitrarily, and solve for the
unique possible last element. Now, the range of scram bleA is also of size
IGIk-1, so the mapping is a bijection. This implies Assertion 2. I
We can now prove the main lemma.
Lemma 3.12 [gap-randomness] Let G, the base group, be finite. Let A -
ai, ... , ak, and let R = ri, ... , r, be chosen uniformly. Let a = [Ij aj. Then
for all i, the induced distribution on row A k-1 will be independent from
A,... , AP. That is, given the values of A ,..., Af (the 0th through ith
rows of T(A, R)), the conditional distribution of A k-1 will be uniform over
those k element sequences whose product is equal to a.
Proof: By our notation, Af = t,,1 ,.. ., t,k. Let x = change(k, i), and
m = i + k - 1. By a straightforward calculation, based on our definition of
a randomizing tableau, we can solve for the values of ti+k-1,j (1 < j k) in
terms of the values of R and the values of ti+k-1,j, as follows.









The exact indices of the various group elements aren't important. The key
observation to be made is that Ai+k-1 = scrambleAR(R'), where R' is a
subsequence of R that has been appropriately shifted with wraparound. The
sequence R' depends only on the values of r+ 1,... ,ri+k-1. These values
are independent of A R, and are uniformly distributed. Thus, we can apply
Lemma 3.11 to yield the desired uniformity condition on the distribution of
Ai+k-1-
Thus, one way to look at randomizing tableaus is to view them as random
walks among sequences with a given product. This random walk has the
property that no matter where one is located at some stage of the walk, after
k - 1 steps, one arrives at a completely random sequence. If, at some point
in the walk, someone puts on a blindfold and walks k - 1 steps, one will have
no idea where one is. This turns out to be crucial for our purposes.
Lazy generation of partial randomizing tableaus.
Suppose someone has some base row A = a1, ... , a1oo, and asks you to gener-
ate a 1,000,000-stage randomizing tableau. However, he also tells you that
he only wishes to receive rows 1-1000, and rows 999,001-1, 000,000 of the
tableau. Is there a method of generating these 2,000 rows according to the
correct distribution, without generating the other 998,000? In fact, this is
easily accomplished using the gap-randomization lemma. First, one gener-
ates rows 1-2, 000 in the usual manner. Second, one randomly generates row
999,001 uniformly from those whose row-product is equal to A's. Finally,
one generates the remaining rows 999 in the usual manner. Since the gap
between row 1000 and row 999,001 is at least 100 - 2 = 98, and no in-
formation is given about any of the intervening rows, the gap-randomness
property insures that the lazy method gives the correct distribution on the
rows it outputs.
3.3.4 Noninteractively proving product assertions.
We can now give a correct protocol for proving assertions about the product
of a sequence of elements of an arbitrary finite group. This protocol, given
in Figure 3.6, will with high probability reveal a small number of elements
from the sequence. As usual, we work in some finite group, G.
We wish to prove two properties about this protocol. First, we want to
establish that some confidence is transferred about the product of the group
Protocol Prove-Product(A,k)
1: Let A = al, ... , ak . We set the transfer probability, p, of the group
element oblivious transfer channel, to 1/k10 . Alice transfers A to
Bob through the channel. We denote by A' = a',..., a' the ele-
ments Bob actually receives. She also sends a = l a; to Bob
through a clear channel.
2: Alice picks a random sequence R = r1 ,..., rk2. Alice then sends
the rest of T(A, R) (row AR = A has already been sent in Step 1)
to Bob through the channel. Finally, Alice sends AR, the k2th row
of T(A, R), through a clear channel.
Checking Step: Bob makes the following checks
eLet AR = a, ... a. Let T'(A, R) = [t'], where t', is the element
actually received by Bob (either t, or #). If a 5 tk2,i, for any
tk2,i # #, t19n Bob rejects.
* Bob checks all the conditions discussed in the local-verifiability
Lemma for randomizing tableaus. If one of them fails, i.e. if Bob
sees that the tableau is not a valid randomizing tableau for A, then
Bob rejects.




Figure 3.6: A protocol for proving assertions about products of per-
mutations.
-i
lelements. Second, we want to show that, with high probability, only a small
amount of very local information is leaked by the protocol.
Lemma 3.13 [Transfer of Confidence]. Let A = a1,... ,ak, and a be as
defined in Step 1 of protocol PROVE-PRODUCT(A, k). Suppose that a
fk ai. Then there exists some constant c such that no matter what Alice
sends in Step 2 of the protocol, Bob will reject with probability 1/kc.
Proof: The proof is virtually the same as with the naive version of the
protocol. If Alice sends an invalid tableau for A, then, due to the local-
verifiability lemma, Bob will detect this fact and reject with probability at
least 1/k0 . If the "AR" sent by Alice is not equal to the top row of the
tableau, Bob will detect this fact with probability at least 1/k10.
Before we bound the amount of information transferred by the protocol,
we first show that with high probability, there will be k - 1 consecutive rows
in the tableau which Bob does not see. This will allow us to use the gap-
randomization lemma. To show the existence of k - 1 consecutive unseen
rows, we simply show that with high probability, Bob only sees a small
number of tableau elements.
Lemma 3.14 In protocol PROVE-PRODUCT(A, k), the probability that Bob
sees more than j tableau elements, aside from the top row, is bounded above
by 2-.
Proof: Using the binomial theorem, we can bound from above the proba-
bility that Bob receives exactly i of the k elements transferred. We have
prob(Bob receives i elements) - 3) ( ( )ki
<(k 3) ( I)i
(ek 3)i
e




The existence of a large gap in the tableau follows from this lemma.
Lemma 3.15 In protocol PROVE-PRODUCT(A, k), the probability that for
all i, Bob receives some element from one of rows i + 1, i + 2... , I + k - 2,
is bounded above by 2 -*.
Proof: Since there are k2 rows, discounting the last row, Bob would have
to see at least k2/(k - 2) > k elements to avoid having a k - 2 row gap.
However, by Lemma 3.14, the probability that Bob receives more than k of
these elements is at most 2 -k 1
We can now show that with high probability, Bob gains extra knowledge,
in the information sense, about only a few elements of A.
Lemma 3.16 [Security] In protocol PROVE-PRODUCT(A, k), with proba-
bility at least 1 - 2 - 2-3, Bob's view will depend only on the the product
a = -L aj, and at most j of the ai's.
Proof: With probability at least 1-2 there will exist an i < k2 such that
rows i +1,... , i + k -2 are not seen by Bob. By the gap randomness property
of tableaus, rows i + k - 1,..., k2 will depend only on a. With probability
at least 1 - 2-, Bob will see no more than j elements in rows 0,... , i.
These elements will belong to at most j columns, i1 , ... , i3 . However, by the
columnwise-independence property of tableaus, this view will only depend on
elements ago, ... , ai,. The probability that no gap exists or that more than j
elements are seen is at most 2 -k + 2-', which implies the lemma. I
It should be noted that the above arguments are very insensitive to minor
fluctuations in the transferal probabilities. In order to prove the transfer of
confidence lemma, it sufficed that each element was received with probability
at least k-c for some c. In order to prove the security lemma, it sufficed
that each element was received with probability at most k-c, where c is a
sufficiently large constant. Thus, in order to make our lemmas go through, we
need only insure the following two properties about the transmission rates.
1. (confidence) prob(Bob receives a group element) > k-c,
for some constant c.
2. (security) prob(Bob receives a group element) < k-c,
for c sufficiently large (c > 10 suffices).
This observation is crucial in the next section, where we replace the group
transfer channel with the ordinary oblivious transfer channel.
3.3.5 Replacing Group Element Transfer with Obliv-
ious Transfer.
So far, we've shown how to transfer confidence about products of group
elements, provided the base group is finite, using a group element oblivious
transfer channel. While this channel is useful for expository purposes, we
would like our protocols to only rely on the existence of ordinary oblivious
transfer. Fortunately, the necessary modifications are very straightforward.
We need to address two differences between the channels. First, we need to
deal with the fact that we can't actually set the transfer probability. Second,
we need to deal with the fact that only bits may be transferred, not arbitrary
group elements.
Adjusting transfer probabilities.
In the idealized channel, we were able to adjust the transfer probability. For
suitable transfer probabilities, we can easily emulate this ability using the
following simple trick. If the transfer probability, p, is of the form 2-", then
we can convert each bit, b, into n bits, b1, ... , bn, such that
b = b1 E ..- D bn.
To simulate transferring b with probability 2-, we just transfer bits
b1,... , b, each with probability }. The receiver can recover b iff he receives
all of the bi's. We call such a b, implicitly represented as the exclusive-or of
a sequence of bits, a "group bit."
Transferring bits instead of group elements.
We cannot so easily simulate the ideal transfer of group elements. However,
we can approximate this transfer in a manner sufficient for our purposes.
Suppose that the base group, G, has < 2m elements. We can uniquely
identify each element by m "group bits". Each group bit will actually be
represented as the exclusive-or of a sequence of bits, as described above. To
transfer a group element, g, we just transfer each of its identifying group
bits. If the receiver gets all m group bits, it can recover g. Thus, if each
group bit is transferred with probability > k-c, the receiver will get each
group element with probability k-mc. As long as m is truly a constant, this
will not affect the transfer of confidence lemma.
However, if some, but not all of the group bits representing a group
element g are received, the receiver has some partial information about g.
Thus, this simulation is not really faithful. However, if each group bit is
transferred with probability k-c, the probability that any of the bits m bits
are received is bounded above by mk-c.
When we argue about transfer of confidence, we suffices to assume that
the receiver only looks at elements for which it received all of the group bits.
Such an idealization ignores a lot of information obtained by the receiver,
but this is allowable since possessing more information will only increase the
receiver's ability to acquire confidence. Likewise, when we analyze knowledge
transfer, we assume that the receiver receives a group element if it received
any of the group bits in the element's representation. This is assuming more
information on the part of the receiver, but again this is allowable in estab-
lishing an upper bound on information obtained.
By setting our simulated bit transfer probability to 2- l for c suffi-
ciently large, we can insure the following two conditions hold.
1. The receiver receives each element in toto with probability > k-c', for
some constant, c'.
2. The receiver receives a bit from a given element with probability at
most mk-c < k'O, for c sufficiently large.
Thus, we can assume an ordinary oblivious transfer channel, without any
loss of generality.
3.4 Committing Bits With Zero-Knowledge
Proofs.
In the previous section, we showed how to prove assertions about products of
permutations. In this section, we show how to apply this technique to prove
arbitrary NP assertions about committed bits. To do this, we make use of
Barrington's construction for implementing NC' circuits in terms of width
5 permutation branching programs(W5PBP's).
Our commital protocol is largely based on the simple-commit protocol.
We take the set, X, of bits produced by simple-committing a set of bits,
bi,... , b", and then prove assertions about set X in a way that only re-
veals a small number of bits from X. We can then show that revealing
this small number of bits does not compromise the security of the original
simple-commit protocol.
3.4.1 Bounding the complexity of'the predicates we
must prove.
While as an end result, we would like to prove arbitrary NP assertions with
our formalism, our task would be much easier if we only had to prove very
simple assertions. In fact, it suffices to be able to prove NC' assertions. By
a well-known result of complexity theory, any NP predicate, P(x1,... ,),
may be replaced by an existential quantifier, and an NC' predicate. Thus,
there exists a constant c, and an NC predicate P, such that
P(x1,..., z") <=> P(x1,...,1X z i Y1,.. 7- iync).
In order to commit a set of bits, X1 , ... , Xz, and prove some NP as-
sertion P about them, one simply determines the appropriate witness bits,
Y1,... ,y c' commit them along with the x's, and prove the corresponding
assertion, P. The witness bits, y1, ... , yc, may be determined in polynomial
time, given an accepting run of a nondeterministic polynomial-time machine
which computes P. Thus, this conversion is without any significant compu-
tational overhead. Paradoxically, it helps to commit bits which one has no
intention of decommitting.
3.4.2 Preliminaries
In the SIMPLE-COMMIT protocol, Alice commits a bit, b, to Bob by writing
it as an exclusive-or of several bits, 1, ... , bk, and then transferring these
bits to Bob using an oblivious transfer channel. If Alice simple-commits a
set of bits, b',... ,b", she writes bt = b .-- bb, for 1 < i < n. For
notational convenience, we designate this set of bits by X = 1,..., ,
where xk(i-1)+j = b). At the end of the SIMPLE-COMMIT protocol, bit xi is
known to Bob with probability 1/2, independently from all the other bits of
X.
Converting predicates on b, ... , b" to predicates on X.
Given all the bits of X, one can trivially reconstruct the bits b',..., b". This
gives a natural of converting a predicate P(b1 ,... ,b") into an equivalent




Essentially, all we've done is to account for the trivial encoding of our bit-
sequence.
Since our decoding procedure is an easy NC operation, the complexity
of predicate Px will be about the same as the complexity of P. In particular,
if P is in NC, then P, will also be in NC'.
3.4.3 Evaluating NC' Predicates as Products of Per-
mutations
Given some predicate, P(x1, 1.. .,xk), Barrington [B] shows how to convert it
into a width-5 permutation branching program, Bp of length m = (kn)c, for
some constant c based on the complexity of P. We can write this branching
program as
BP = ((ii , 'ri0, 71), (i2, 724, 7l), - ,(ii, ir 7, r ), a),
where for j [1, m], and k E {0, 1}, we have ij E [1, nk], and r E S5.
Element a, the "accept" element, is in S5 - I, where I is the identity element.
A
The group S5 is the group of permutations on 5 elements. To evaluate a
branching program, Bp, on input (x1, ... , Xnk) we simply compute
Bp(x1,...,IXn) = J rs.
j=1
The result of this computation is some element in S5 . By Barrington's con-
struction, we have
Bp~xl .. - Xn { a if Px(X 1,..., nk)
Br~1, . . xn) = I otherwise.
Formally, we needn't include a as part of the definition; we can say that
a branching program accepts iff the resulting product is not the identity.
However, for our purposes, we need the fact that revealing the product of
the permutations gives away no more information than revealing whether the
predicate is true.
3.4.4 The Zero-Knowledge Bit-Commital Protocol.
Since we can express the truth of an NC' predicate in terms of evaluating
the product of a sequence of permutations, we can use the machinery of the
last section to give a simple bit-commital protocol. As usual, we adopt the
convention that Alice possesses some bits, which she wishes to commit to
Bob, along with a proof of some NC predicate, P.
Remark: The group element transfer procedure is chosen to have the follow-
ing properties. For any element g which is represented in binary as 91 ... g7,
Bob can reconstruct each bit g; with probability less than k-1 0/7. Hence,
prob(Bob gets information about g) < k-10.
Similarly,
prob(Bob gets complete information about g) > k-71,
for k sufficiently large.
. Whereas in the commital protocol, one may wish to commit a set of bits,
in the decommital protocol, one may only wish to decommit a single bit.
This is easily accomplished using essentially the same protocol as SIMPLE-
DECOMMIT.
Protocol Zero-Knowledge-Commit(bI,... ,b", k, P)
1: Alice chooses a random X = x 1, ... Xnk, subject to
k
b' = @Xk(i-1)+s 
-
j=1
Alice transfers X to Bob using the oblivious transfer channel. We
denote by X' = x',..., ' the set of values which Bob receives.
2: Using some canonical procedure, Alice computes
Bp = ((ii, 70 r1),(i2,IrO,7r1),..,,(im, irl ),a),
a branching program that computes P.. We assume without loss of
generality that m > k, since branching programs may be trivially
padded by including triples of the form (i,,I,I). Alice computes
A = a, ... ,am, by
XiJ
3: Alice executes PROVE-PRODUCT(A,m), using an ordinary obliv-
ious transfer channel. Specifically, each group elements g E S5
to be transferred is broken up into 7 bits, 91,... ,g7(the 7 comes
from the fact that |S51 = 120). Each bit, gi, is broken up into
I = 10[~log m~ + 3 bits, which we write,
9i = 95,---,9i.
Each bit, gi is then transferred with probability 1/2. Finally, the
value of X is saved for later use.
Checking Step: Bob makes the checks given in Figure 3.8. He aborts
if any of the checks fails.
Figure 3.7: A protocol for bit commital with zero-knowledge proofs.
Checks Bob makes in protocol ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT.
* Bob makes all the checks from protocol PROVE-PRODUCT. For
checking purposes, Bob treats any element whose bits were not all
received as '#', i.e. as unreceived.
* Whenever he receives bit x1, and whenever he completely receives
element aj, where ij = 1, Bob checks that
ai = 7r .xi
a1 *
Since Bp is canonical, Bob can indeed make this check.
9 Finally, Bob checks that the product of the ai's, as asserted by
Alice, is equal to the "accept" permutation, a, of Bp.
Figure 3.8: Consistency checks for protocol ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-
COMMIT.
Protocol Zero-Knowledge-Decommit(X, i, n, k) /* decommit bit b',
*/
Alice sends Bob the values of Xk(i-1)+j, for j E [1, k], over a clear
channel. Bob checks the validity of his decommital by comparing
these bits to X'. If, for any value of i, j, z'2(i_)+ # #, and
k1 Xk(i-1)+j, then Bob rejects. Otherwise, he computes
k
j=1
Figure 3.9: Decommital protocol for zero-knowledge bit commital
scheme.
3.4.5 Properties of the Zero-Knowledge- Commital
Protocol.
We wish to establish four properties of our protocols. These are,
1. (Reliability) Alice cannot trick Bob into recovering a different bit than
was committed without Bob detecting this with nonnegligible proba-
bility.
2. (Confidence) If P(bl,..., b") is false, then Bob will reject with nonneg-
ligible probability.
3. (Independence) Decommitting one bit gives no information about any
other bits, other than what can be inferred by knowing the value of the
committed bit.
4. (Security) After ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT, with high probability,
Bob gains no information, in an information theoretic sense, about the
values b', .. ., b.
The properties of reliability and confidence are relatively straightforward
to prove. The properties of independence and security require some more
machinery, which we will develop in the next section.
Before giving the proofs of reliability and confidence, we first note that
while a malicious Alice may violate the commital and decommital protocols
as much as she wishes, it still makes sense to refer to her committed bits.




While she may pick whatever value of X she wishes to send, she still must
send it.
Lemma 3.17 [Reliability] For any strategy Alice may employ, the probabil-
ity that, at the end of protocol ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT, Bob recon-
structs some bit bi' # b is at most }
Proof: This property carries over from the base protocols, SIMPLE-
COMMIT, and SIMPLE-DECOMMIT, and the proof is identical. I
Lemma 3.18 [Confidence] There exists some c such that if P(b', ... , b") is
false, then Bob will reject after ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT with probability
at least k-c, for k sufficiently large.
Proof: There are three possibilities we must consider.
1. Alice behaves honestly, picking both the correct sequence A, and fol-
lowing protocol PROVE-PRODUCT.
2. Alice picks A correctly, but violates the protocol PROVE-PRODUCT.
3. Alice picks A incorrectly.
In Case 1, Alice will convey the correct value of the branching program,
and thus the predicate, on X. In this case, Bob will certainly reject if the
predicate is false. In Case 2, by Lemma 3.13, Bob is guaranteed to reject
with probability at least m-c', for some c'. Since m < ke", for some c", we
can pick c = c'c". Finally, in Case 3, Bob will detect an incorrect element of
A if he sees the entire element, and the bit it depends on. This will happen
with probability at least k-"/2, when k is sufficiently large. I
3.5 Simulation Results for Zero-Knowledge
Bit Commital.
3.5.1 Introduction.
In order to incorporate our bit-commital protocols into larger protocols, it
is necessary to fit them into the simulation paradigm. Thus, in order to
bound how much information the receiver obtains at various times during
the commital and decommital protocols, we construct a simulator which ap-
proxinates the view seen by the verifier. We require that this approximation
be statistically close; it must be impossible to distinguish the simulated dis-
tribution from the actual one, with probability greater than . + 1/nc, for any
c, given only a polynomial number of samples from each distribution.
Why is Simulation Possible?
On the face of it, simulation results are paradoxical. Generally, simulators
are required to run in probabilistic polynomial time. However, they must
simulate views obtained from arbitrarily powerful entities. For instance,
we might ask a simulator to simulate the commital of a sequence of bits,
b', ... , b", along with a proof that they encode a Hamiltonian cycle of some
arbitrary graph. If the simulator actually ran the zero-knowledge commi-
tal protocol, it would have to find a Hamiltonian cycle, or be caught some
nonnegligible fraction of the time.
The reason it is possible for a weak simulator to simulate powerful entities
is because it does not have to use an actual oblivious transfer channel. It's
sole requirement is to reproduce what the receiver would hear at the receiving
end of the channel. Thus, the simulator can randomly decide which bits will
get through the simulated channel, and then decide what values these bits
will actually have. This is in sharp contrast to the actual oblivious transfer
channel, where one decides what values the bits in ones message will have,
and then the channel randomly decides which bits will get through. This
extra flexibility makes our simulation results possible.
What must be simulated?
The commital protocol leaks information in three separate ways, each of
which must be dealt with. First, the commitor sends X through an oblivi-
ous transfer channel. Second, she sends a randomized tableau based on X
through an oblivious transfer channel. Third, she sends the top row of the
tableau in the clear. The first way of leaking knowledge is easily analyzed;
the bulk of this section will be involved with formally analyzing knowledge
leaked by revealing portions of the tableau.
3.5.2 The Notion of Masks.
Given a sequence of n bits, B = b1, .. ., b,, that are sent through an oblivious
transfer channel, we can model the action of the channel as follows. The
channel first generates a random sequence of n bits, F = f, ... , f,. It then
outputs B' = b',..., b',, where bj = b; if fi = 1, and b; = # otherwise. We
call;F a mask for the channel, and adopt the notation,
B' = B E F.
Also, if we are considering some subset of B, it makes sense to view F as
masking this subset as well. Thus, we can speak of
{bi, b5, b7} e F.
If,
F = [1 0 1 0 0 0 1]
,this would yield {bi, #, b7}.
A simple but important feature of masks is that they are independent
of the data actually being transmitted. Also, it is easy to generate masks
with the correct distribution; it suffices to flip n coins. The separation of
masks and the data they mask is useful for our simulator construction. Our
simulator first generates a mask with the correct distribution, then simulates
the masked data.
3.5.3 A simple example.
Suppose someone generates the following distribution. He chooses the bit
sequence b1,... , b, uniformly, subject to the constraint that
n
b=1 => God exists.
i=1
It seems difficult to statistically approximate this distribution. If one guesses
wrong, an infinitely powerful being can detect ones error after seeing one sam-
ple of the simulated distribution. However, one can simulate the distribution
BE F, where F is a uniformly distributed mask. One simply generates B and
F uniformly, and output Be F. If F consists entirely of l's, then Be F = B,
and one will be detected (unless one is enlightened, or lucky). In all other
cases, it is impossible for even an infinitely powerful being to distinguish the
simulated distribution from the actual one. Since, F consists entirely of 1's
only 2-n of the time, the two distributions are indistinguishable.
3.5.4 Preliminary Conventions.
Our simulator construction is complicated by the complexity of the data
structures it must work with. It must simulate, among other things, a masked
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tableau, which is an array of elements of S5 , which are represented by a
sequence of 7 group bits, each of which is broken up into an exclusive-or
of a sequence of bits. Fortunately, this structure is hierarchical, and we
can organize the simulator along these lines. To facilitate this approach,
we introduce the following terminology for talking about how much a mask
reveals about higher level features.
Definition 3.7 Given a mask, F, which is to be applied to a tableau, T,
we say that F exposes a bit, b, of T, if it is equal to 1 on the location
corresponding b's location in the tableau. In other words, F exposes a bit if
this bit would still be seen when T is masked by F. We say that F exposes a
group bit, b, if it exposes all the bits that make b up. We say that F exposes
a group element, g, if it exposes any of the bits that make g up. We say that
F exposes a column of T if it exposes any element in that column. We say
that F exposes a row of T if it exposes any element in that row.
In the above definition, it is important to distinguish a bit from its value.
When we talk about exposing a particular bit, or other feature, we are ac-
tually referring to a tableau position. Whether a mask exposes or fails to
expose a feature depends on the mask and the position of the feature in the
tableau, but not on any of the actual values of the tableau elements.
The above definitions of when F exposes something make sense for any
tableau, regardless of how the base row was actually generated. In the case
where the tableau is generated from a branching program, we can also for-
mulate what it means for F to expose a branching program variable.
Definition 3.8 Let
B ((ii, 7*, 71), (i2, 7, 7) , (im, 0, 7r1), a)
be a branching program on variables X1,... ,x. Let A = a1,... ,am be
defined by
Let T be a tableau with base row A. We say that a mask F exposes variable
xi if, for some j such that ij = i, F exposes column j of T.
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3.5.5 Simulating Unexposed Tableau Features.
It turns out to be very simple to simulate the masked values of unexposed
tableau features. An unexposed bit, b, will always be turned into the special
symbol, "#", when it is masked by F, by definition of bit exposure. Thus,
when simulating T E F, the simulator simply writes a # in this position,
without even hazarding a guess about what the bit's value may have been.
Simulating the masked value of an unexposed group bit, g, is somewhat
more subtle, since some of the bits of g may be exposed. However, we can
make the same argument as with the toy example described in the introduc-
tion. Recall that g is written as gi D - -- e gl, where g1,... ,g are chosen
uniformly subject to this constraint on their parity. Suppose that bit g; is
unexposed. If one doesn't know gi, then one has no information about g, and
the values of the other bits are distributed uniformly. Thus, the simulator
ca n pick the values of g1,... ,g uniformly, and then compute the result of
masking by F.
As soon as one can simulate the masked values of unexposed group bits,
one can simulate all the masked values of unexposed higher level features.
For instance, one simulates the masked value of an unexposed group element
by simulating the masked values of each of its 7 group bits. But all of these
group bits are by definition unexposed, and thus may be handled as described
above.
3.5.6 Bounding the number of exposed tableau ele-
ments.
We now argue that, with high probability, a random mask, F, exposes only
a few tableau elements of T. To do this, we first show that a random F
exposes each element of a tableau with sufficiently low probability.
Lemma 3.19 Let T be a randomizing tableau, where each group bit is bro-
ken up into 10 [log ml + 3 bits. Let g be a group element of T, and let F be
a uniformly chosen mask. Then,
1
prob(g is exposed by F) < m -
Proof: Let g = 9 1, ... , 97. where gi is a group bit. Group bit g, is exposed
iff all of its bits are exposed. Since each bit is exposed with probability },
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we have
prob(g, is exposed by F) = - ml+3
M-10
-- 8
Now, since g is exposed only if one of its bits is exposed, we have
prob(g is exposed by F) < 8 -prob(g; is exposed by F)
7 (m810)
<-I
Having bounded the probability of a single element being exposed, it is
easy to show that, with high probability, only a few elements will be exposed.
Lemma 3.20 Let T be an m 2-stage randomizing tableau, whose rows are
of length m, and where each group bit is broken up into 10 [log ml +.3 bits.
Let F be a uniformly chosen mask. Then, with probability at least 1 - 2-3,
only j elements not in the top row will be exposed by F.
Proof: By Lemma 3.19, each element of the tableau will be exposed with
probability at most m-10 . The argument then proceeds exactly as with the
proof of Lemma 3.14. I
Remark: We exclude the top row from our argument for two reasons. First,
this allows us to use the same calculations as with the proof of Lemma 3.14.
Second, in the protocol we wish to analyze, the top row of the tableau is
revealed in the clear.
Lemma 3.20 motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.9 Let T be an m2-stage randomizing tableau, whose rows are
of length m, and where each group bit is broken up into 10 [log ml + 3 bits.
We say a mask, F, is c-tame if it exposes at most mc elements of T.
Using our lemma, we have that if F is chosen at random,
prob(F is c-tame) > 1 - 2-"c.
Thus, for the purposes of our simulation, we may safely assume that, for any
constant c > 0, a uniformly chosen F will be c-tame.
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3.5.7 Simulating (T(A, R) e F, AR) by making queries
about A.
Using some of the machinery outlined in the previous sections, we can begin
to derive some crude simulation results. These results will not be ideal - they
will not give the desired bounds on the amount of information transferred -
but will be good enough to be used in the proof of our main lemmas.
Suppose we have a mask F, which is c-tame for some constant c < 1.
Suppose some sender has an unknown permutation sequence A = a1, ... , am,
where a; E S5 , and a = Hli a1 is known. This sender chooses an m2-stage
tableau, T = T(A, R) for some uniformly chosen R. He uses the standard
conventions (i.e. those used in the bit-commital protocol) for representing
group elements and group bits. Then he sends, to some receiver, T e F, and
AR(T), the top row of T. We wish to simulate the distribution (T E F, AR),
using as little information about A (other than its product) as possible.
Clearly, if we have no information about A, other than its product, we
cannot succeed. A mask, F, even if it is c-tame, may expose the tableau
position on the bottom row corresponding to a5. In this case, one would have
to know some information about a5 in order to carry out the simulation. We
therefore adopt a less arduous requirement for our simulator. We allow them
to ask for particular values of A. For instance, if F, exposed a5 , the simulator
can choose to ask for the value of a5 .
Given a base row, creating a random tableau is easy, so our simulator can
easily carry out its task given access to all of A. However, for our purposes,
we wish to bound the number of queries our simulator makes.
Lemma 3.21 [The Tableau Simulation Lemma] Let A = a1, ... Iam, where
a, E S5, and a = UTi a;. Let F be a c-tame mask, where c < 1. Let
Tm be the uniform distribution over m 2-stage tableaus, T(A, R), and let Tm
be represented as with the commital protocol. Consider the distribution
TA,m = (Tm e F, AR(Tm)), where AR(Tm) is the topmost row of Tm. There
exists a simulator, M(m, a, F), with the following properties.
1. On input a, m, F, where m is written in unary, M(a, m) runs in ex-
pected polynomial time.
2. M(a,m) realizes the distribution TA,m.
3. M(a, m) makes at most mc queries about A.
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Proof: Our proof is by construction. We give our simulator in Figure 3.10.
First, we make some simple observations about F. For convenience, let I =
m". Mask F exposes at most I rows and I columns of Tm. This follows from
the fact that F exposes only I elements of Tm. We denote by I = {i 1 ,... , II}
the column numbers exposed by F. Since only I < m rows are exposed, there
must exist some j such that rows j+1, ... , j + m -2 are all unexposed, by a
trivial counting argument. Using these facts, we now construct the simulator.
The simulator described in Figure 3.10 clearly works in expected polyno-
mial time. It only asks for at most I = mc values of A. It suffices then to
show that the simulator approximates the correct distribution. In fact, we
can show that it realizes exactly the distribution (T e F, AR). It is necessary
to establish two facts.
1. The partial tableau produced in steps 4.1-4.5 is correctly distributed.
In other words, the partial tableau construction produces the same
distribution over its defined region as would be obtained if one were to
sample the actual tableau distribution, and project these samples into
the same defined region.
2. Filling in the undefined regions with random bits gives the same distri-
bution, after masking by F, as would be obtained if these regions were
filled in correctly.
Analyzing the partial tableau distribution.
First, we note that the decomposition of group elements to bits in Step 4.5 is
identical to the decomposition used in the bit-commital protocol. Therefore,
we can look at the distribution of partial tableaus on the group element level.
If the distribution of group elements is correct, so will the distribution on the
bit level. We now must show that Steps 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 correctly fill in
their regions of the partial tableau.
Step 4.1 simply fills in the relevant entries of the bottom row with the
values of their corresponding entries in A. Since the bottom row of the
actual tableaus are always equal to A, Step 4.1 clearly realizes the correct
distribution on its domain.
Step 4.2 produces the correct distribution on its domain, due to the colum-
nwise independence lemma. In the actual construction of a tableau with a
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Simulator Masked-Tableau(a,m,F)
1: Compute Ij, as defined above. Ask for the values of a;,, ... a,,
for ik E I.
2: Uniformly choose Roe,. = r1 ,...,rj, where r, E S5 . Like-
wise, uniformly choose R.pper = rj+m, ... , r2. The sequences
Rower, Rupper will be used as partial randomizing sequences, used
to create portions of a tableau.




4: Construct a partial tableau T = [tyg], as shown in Figure 3.11.
5: The tableau T will have many of its group elements undefined.
Consequently, the group bits which make up these elements, and
the bits which make up these group bits, will also be undefined.
Uniformly select the values of the undefined bits. We make no
restrictions on the group elements implicitly defined by this process,
nor even require that these elements are well-defined.
6: Output T e F, AR(T). Note that the top row of T will be well-
defined, since all rows above j + m - 1 are completely defined.
Figure 3.10: Simulating a masked tableau.
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Creating a masked Tableau.
4.1: For g E I, compute to,g = ag.
4.2: For f E [1,j],g E I, compute tf,,, using the construction specified
in the definition of randomizing tableaus, and the partial random-
izing sequence, Rowe,. Note that in the definition, each tableau
element is expressed as a function of the randomizing sequence and
the element just below it in the tableau. Hence, this construction
is well defined.
4.3: For g E [1, m], compute a/+m-1,g = '9
4.4: For f E [j + m, m2], g E [1, m] compute t1 ,, using the construction
specified in the definition of randomizing tableaus, and the partial
randomizing sequence, Ru,,er.
4.5: Decompose each defined element tj,9 into its group bits. Randomly





Figure 3.11: Creating a partial tableau.
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given base row, A, using a randomizer R = r, ... , rm, we can compute tf,g,
by
tf,g = Ff(to,g, ri,. . .,rf),
where Ff is a function depending only on f and, implicitly, m. Step 4.2 uses
the same functions to compute its elements as in the actual construction. It
uses the same distribution on the randomizing elements, and starts out with
exactly the same base elements (in its domain).
To prove that Step 4.3 fills out row j + m - 1 with the correct condi-
tional distribution, given the entries already filled in, we invoke the gap-
randomization lemma. By this lemma, the conditional distribution of row
j + m - 1, given rows 0,...., j, will be uniform over all possible rows with the
correct row-product. Row j + m - 1, which is equal to A', is clearly given
this uniform distribution, by Step 3 of the simulator.
The analysis of Step 4.4 is identical to the analysis of Step 4.2. Instead
of building up from the base row, we simply build up from row j + m - 1.
To wit, for f > j + m - 1, we can write
f,g Gj+m-1,f (tj+m-1,g, rj+m, ... , rf))
where Gj+m-1,f is a function depending only on j, m, and f.
As a trivial consequence of the above argument, masking the simulated
partial tableau with F yields the same distribution as masking the corre-
sponding portions of the actual tableau with F. Masking only destroys in-
formation, making distributions less distinguishable from each other. Fur-
thermore, the top row of the tableau is properly distributed, since it is part
of the partial tableau.
Filling in the tableau with random bits.
Having established that the output of the simulator is valid for the top row,
and portion of the tableau which contains all the exposed group bits, we
now only have to establish that it outputs a correct distribution on all the
unexposed portions of the tableau. However, the masked version of this
region is just the union of a set of masked group bits. By the argument
in the previous section, one might as well pick their bit vectors at random.
If a mask F does not expose a group bit, then it masks one of the bits of
the bit vector representing the group bit. If one projects a set of variables
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onto a proper subset, it doesn't matter whether these vectors are uniformly
distributed, or uniformly distributes subject to a parity constraint. The
resulting distribution is the same. In other words, if you don't see all the
variables, you can't make even an educated guess as to their parity.
Thus, we have established that the output of the simulator yields a correct
distribution on the top row of the tableau, and on all portions of the masked
tableau. The lemma follows. I
3.5.8 Simulating the Commital/Decommital Proto-
cols.
In the previous section, we were able to simulate masked tableaus, along
with their top rows. Such a simulation looks promising, since the heart of
the commital protocol involves giving the verifier a masked tableau. However,
the simulation had two drawbacks. It required that the mask be sufficiently
regular, and it required the simulator to make a small number of queries
about the base row of the tableau. The first problem is not serious, since, by
Lemma 3.20, a randomly chosen mask will be sufficiently regular with proba-
bility extremely close to 1. However, the second problem is more challenging
to deal with. We get around it by simulating the answers to the queries asked
by the tableau simulator.
Converting queries about A into queries about X.
Our simulator for masked tableaus worked regardless of how the base row, A
was initially created. However, in the commital protocol, Alice computed A
from a branching program, Bp, and a set of input variables, X = x1, ... , Xnk.
The branching program is known to everyone, including any simulator we
construct. The value of X, on the other hand, contains enough information to
reconstruct the committed bits, and therefore is not known to the simulator.
However, we can directly convert queries about A into queries about X. This
is accomplished by using the identity,
aj = grjx,
where ij, rj are determined by Bp. Note that queries about two different
elements of A may sometimes be answered by a single query about X. In
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any case, the number of queries about X required to run this portion of the
simulation is bounded above by the number of queries that were originally
made of A.
A simulator for the commital protocol which makes queries of X.
We now exhibit a partial simulator for the commital protocol. This simulator
assumes that someone actually creates the bit sequence, X. During the
course of the simulation, we allow this simulator to make queries about X.
Note that such a simulation result in no way bounds any knowledge transfer,
since having even limited access to X a priori gives one a great deal of
information about the committed bits. In the next section, we will show
how to simulate these queries, which will complete this particular simulation
project. We assume that k > nc, for some constant c.
The following lemma states that the simulator given in Figure 3.12 will,
if given access to the proper distribution of X, output a sufficiently close
approximation to the output of the actual ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT pro-
tocol.
Lemma 3.22 Let bl,..., b" be a set of bits, and let X = X1,.. .,Xnk. be





the induced distribution of simulator PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE(n, k, P)
will be indistinguishable from the output of protocol ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-
COMMIT(b, ... , b" I k, P), for k sufficiently large.
Proof: The output of protocol ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT may be broken
into two components:
1. The transmission of X, chosen according to the distribution stated in
the lemma.
2. The transmission of an appropriately chosen randomizing tableau, T,
with base row A(a function of X and P).
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Simulator Partial- Zero-Knowledge( n, k, P)
1: Compute
Bp = ((ii, 70 r) . (im, 7o rl ) a),
the branching program for Px on input X. There exists some eas-
ily computable constant, c > 0 such that k > m2c. We also as-
sume that m > nk, a condition which may be easily enforced by
"padding" the W5PBP's with identity permutations.
2: Uniformly choose a mask, Fx, of length nk. Mask Fx will be
used to simulate the transfer of X. Uniformly choose a mask, FT,
of length q = 7M(M 2 + 1)(10[log ml + 3), which will be used to
simulate the transfer of the tableau. Notationally, we write Fx =
fx1,... ,fxnk, and FT = ft1,...,ftq. If FT isn't c-tame, then
abort the simulation.a
3: For all i such that fx = 1, query the value of x. Using these
answers, compute X e Fx.
4: Run simulator MASKED-TABLEAU(a,m,FT). Whenever MASKED-
TABLEAU asks for the value of aj, ask for the value of xi, (unless
it has already been asked for), and send the value of X'j back to
MASKED-TABLEAU.
5: Simulator MASKED-TABLEAU will output something of the form,
(T E FT, AR(T)). Output (X E Fx,T E FT, AR(T)).
Figure 3.12: Partial component of zero-knowledge bit-commital sim-
ulator.
aNote that the simulator will be aborted with only negligible probability.
We handle these two components separately. First, the transmission of X is
equivalent to generating a uniformly distributed tableau. Fx, and outputting
X E Fx. This is precisely the distribution of the first component output
by PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE, provided it doesn't abort. Note that the
distribution of X stated in the lemma is equal to the distribution of X used
by ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT. The transmission of the tableau, T, with
base row A, is equivalent to the following steps.
1. Uniformly choose mask FT. The protocol, of course, transmits the
tableau, rather that masking it. However, the transmission of a tableau,
or any other data structure, implicitly defines a mask, which is equal
to 1 on all the bit locations that are actually received.
2. Compute A, based on X and P.
3. Produce, with a uniformly distributed randomizing sequence,R, a
tableau T = T(A, R), and output T e FT.
Now, PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE also uniformly chooses its mask, FT, and
computes A according to the same algorithm. Simulator MASKED-TABLEAU
will perfectly realize the output T(A, R) E FT, provided that FT is c-tame,
for some constant c < 1. Thus, if there were no tameness restrictions on
FT, we would be done. In other words, the distribution produced by the
simulator, conditioned on FT being c-tame, is equal to the distribution of
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT, conditioned on the mask implicitly defined by
the transmission of T being c-tame. Furthermore, the probability that FT
isn't c-tame is the same as for the (implicitly defined) masked used in ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT. Thus, for a large set of possible outputs, 0 = (X e
Fx, T E FT), the probability that 0 is output by the simulator is equal to
the probability that 0 is output by the actual commital protocol.
To complete the proof, we now argue that this set of exactly simulated
outputs occurs with probability very close to 1. This is equivalent to bound-
ing above the probability that a uniformly chosen FT will not be c-tame.
However, as a corollary to Lemma 3.20, we have,





for all constant c". Now suppose that an infinitely powerful judge re-
ceived p(n) samples of the simulator's output, and p(n) samples of ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT's output, for some polynomial p. Then with proba-
bility at least ( - 2p(n)/n"),
for any constant c", all the outputs, 0, received by the judge, would be output
with identical probabilities from both sources. In this case, the judge could
not correctly decide which distribution was which with probability greater
than }. Thus, it is impossible for the judge to correctly distinguish the two
distributions with probability greater than
1 + 2p(n)/nc",2
for any constant c". The lemma follows. I
How much information does the commital protocol convey about
X?
The proof of the above lemma actually implies s'omething much stronger.
Most of the subtlety involved was in handling the cases where the simulator
aborted. In hindsight, these cases were not important, since they occurred
with negligible probability. In the case where the simulation actually outputs
a triple (X E Fx, T E FT, AR(T)), we have the following facts, which follow
almost immediately from the construction of our simulator.
1. There exists a specific set, I = {i1 ,... , i}, such that the simulator
asked for the values of xi, for i E I, and only those values. This set, I,
is a deterministic function of the masks Fx, FT.
2. The value of (X e Fx, T e FT, AR(T)) output by the simulator induces
a conditional distribution on X[I] = {x; : i E I}. The conditional
distribution the simulator's output induces on X is equal to the con-
ditional distribution induced by the conditional distribution on X[I].
That is, no other information about X is revealed other than that which
is revealed by X[I].
3. Suppose that the actual commital protocol's output, after going
through the oblivious transfer channel, was (X e Fx, T e FT, AR(T)).
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Then the conditional distribution induced on X[I] and X is the same
as that induced when the simulator outputs
(X e Fx, T F, AR(T)).
Fact 1 is clear from the construction of the simulator, since the queries are
purely functions of Fx, FT. Fact 2 is not simply due to the fact that the
simulator only queried the values of X[I]. Parts of the tableau simulated
would naively seem to depend on parts of X outside of X[I]. However, in
the proof of the correctness of the MASKED TABLEAU simulator, it is shown
that the dependencies of these components, which appear above m - 2 row
gaps, are washed out by the randomizing sequence. Fact 3 is implicit in
the proof of the indistinguishability between the commital protocol and the
simulation.
In other words, suppose that we took the output of protocol ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT, which is of the form,
(X e Fx,T ED FT, AR(T)),
and computed I from Fx, FT.2 At this point, we could compute X[I] from
the values of X, as computed by the protocol, and I. This is essentially what
the simulator does after computing Fx, FT, except that instead of comput-
ing all of X beforehand, it just makes the appropriate queries based on I.
Furthermore, the distributions of I, and hence X[I] is the same for both the
protocol and the simulator. It is this delay in evaluating most of the values
of X that allows us to carry off the simulation.
Simulating queries of X.
Simulator PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE works fine, provided that some
benevolent entity is willing to construct X according to the correct distri-
bution, and then answer queries about X. In this section, we show how to
simulate such an entity. the difficulty to be addressed is that it is impossible
for the simulator to realize the distribution on X without knowing the values
of the committed bits. However, we precisely want to show that a simulation
2 Again, note that Fx, FT are implicitly defined by the action of the oblivious transfer
channel.
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is possible without knowing the values of these bits. Thus, we must somehow
simulate queries to X without actually producing X.
Fortunately, this is actually very easy to accomplish. Our algorithm is
very simple: When asked for a bit xi of X that one hasn't been asked be-
fore, choose the value of xi at random. We now must show that an oracle
that makes a random assignment will be, for the purposes of the simulation,
indistinguishable from an oracle which produces a correctly distributed X.
To facilitate the argument, we introduce the following terminology.
Definition 3.10 Fix n and k. We define a query set, I, to be a set
{ii, ... , i3 }, Where i1 E [1, nk]. A query set I E {1, ... , nk}* is well behaved
if for all i E [1, n], we have
Ii g I,
where I; = [k(i - 1) + 1,. .. ,ki].
Intuitively, this just says that a well-behaved query set cannot ask for all
the bits corresponding to a bit, b'. We now show that with high probability,
our simulation will only produce a query set which is well behaved.
Lemma 3.23 Let n < kel, for come constant c1. Let P(x 1 ,..., x,,) be an
NC' predicate, and let P, be as defined in Section 3.4. Let Bp be a canonical
W5PBP branching program for P, of length m, where nk < m < kC2, for
some constant c2. Then, for any constant, c, the probability that simulator
PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE(n, k, P) aborts or makes a set of queries that is
not well-behaved, is less than 1/kc, as k grows sufficiently large.
Proof: The simulation only aborts if the mask, FT, is not c3-tame, for some
constant, c3, such that m v k. By the proof of Lemma 3.22, this occurs
with negligible probability. We now bound from above the probability that
the query set produced by PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE is not well-behaved.
The queries produced come in two flavors. First, in Step 3 of the simulation,
each element, xi, of X is queried with probability 1/2. Second, in Step 4
of the simulation, at most one query is made to handle each query made by
MASKED-TABLEAU. The set of queries made in Step 3 has a very simple dis-
tribution, which we will show is, with high probability, "very well-behaved."
By very well behaved, we mean that it would take at least k/3 additional
queries to make the query set stop being well-behaved. We then observe that
the number of queries made in Step 4 is much smaller than this bound.
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Denote by Q(i) the number of queries xj, for j E [k(i - 1) + 1, ki], made
in Step 3 of the simulation. By the binomial theorem, we have the following
exact formula for the distribution of Q(i).
prob(Q(i) = j) = 2-k.
Now, using standard Chernoff bounds, we can bound the probability that
Q(i) > jk, for any i, by
32
prob(Q(i) > -k) < e-k/18.3
Thus, we have
2
prob((~i E [1, n])Q(i) > -k)) < ne-k/83
< k" e-k1
Thus, with probability exponentially close to 1, the queries of Step 3 will
leave k/3 of the bits representing each committed bit unqueried. But Step 4
only makes a total of mC3 < v'W queries. However, for k > 9, VW < k/3, so
the query set will still be well-behaved. The lemma follows. I
The complete commital simulator.
We can now specify the complete simulator for ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT.
This simulator will give two outputs. The first output will be the simula-
tion of the commital protocol. The second output will be an ordered pair,
(I, X[I]), where I is a query set, and X[I] is the set of constraints placed on
X. This pair will be used to simulate the decommital phase.
The following lemma shows that the simulator given in Figure 3.13 does
indeed correctly simulate the commital of n bits.
Lemma 3.24 Let b', ... , b" be a set of bits, and let P be some NC pred-
icate. Then, for any c, and for k sufficiently large, the distributions pro-
duced by protocol ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT(b',..., b", k, P), and by the
first component of simulator ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT(n, k, P) cannot be




1: Set I = {}.
2: Run PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE(n,k, P). Handle each query for
the value of xi as follows:
if i E I then answer X[I].
else Pick b E {0, 1} uniformly.
Set I = I U {i}
if I is not well behaved, then abort.
else Define xi = b.
answer b.
3: Simulator partial-zero-knowledge will output something of the
form
(X e Fx, T e FT, AR(T)). Output
((X e Fx,T e FT, AR(T)),(I,X [I])).
Figure 3.13: Simulator for zero-knowledge bit-commital scheme.
By k being sufficiently large, we require that it be at least nc, for some
constant c > 0.
Proof: Simulator ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT is just PARTIAL-ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE run with a simulation of the X oracle. By Lemma 3.22,
PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE, run with a correct oracle for X, cannot be





We now argue that the simulation of the X oracle will be exact, provided
that the query set I it must answer is well behaved. This is just another
restatement of standard parity trick. For a set of committed bits, b', ... b",
the correct distribution of X = X1,..., Xnk is uniform, subject to,
(Vi) bt = parity(X[I]),
where Ii = [k(i - 1) + 1, ki]. By definition of a well behaved query set, we
have that Ii n I is a proper subset of I. Hence, X[I; n I] will be uniformly
distributed, which is precisely the distribution of answers realized by the
simulated oracle.
Finally, by Lemma 3.23, PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE makes queries
which are not well-behaved with only exponentially small probability. There-
fore, simulator ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT cannot be distinguished from
PARTIAL-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE, run with a correct X oracle, with probability
+ 1/k'",
for any c". The lemma follows. I
Simulating the decommital protocol.
After having gone through so much work to simulate the commital protocol,
the simplicity of simulating the decommital protocol comes as a very welcome
relief. The only subtlety is that we use the values of I, X[I] output by the
commital simulator.
To decommit bit bi, the decommital protocol merely sends over the values
of xz, for j E [k(i - 1) + 1, ki]. The value of X = X1 ,... , Xnk is completely
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Simulator Zero-Knowledge-Decommit(n, k, I, X[I], i, b')
1: Let Ii = I n [k(i - 1) + 1, ki], and write X[I;] = Xk(i-)+1. -,Xki.
For j E I n I;, let xj be as given in X[I].
2: For for j E I; - I, choose x uniformly, subject to the constraint,
b' = parity(X[I]).
Output X[1I].
Figure 3.14: Simulator for zero-knowledge bit-decommital.
determined during the commital process, so the decommital phase is deter-
ministic, and very simple. However, our simulator for the commital phase
does not generate a complete description of X, but merely describes those
portions of X which are relevant to its output. Therefore, our simulator must
generate on the fly portions of X, with the correct distribution, conditioned
on the constraints imposed on X during the commital simulation.
Our simulation is given in Figure 3.14. In the simulation, n, k are the
parameters of the original commital protocol, (I, X[I]) is the second compo-
nent output by simulator ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT, i specifies which bit
is being committed, and b' specifies the value of this bit.
It should be remarked that Step 2 may not be well-defined if
Ii = [k(i - 1) + 1, ki].
However, this would imply that the query set I is not well-behaved. However,
all query sets, I, output by the ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT simulator are
guaranteed to be well-behaved. We now argue that the simulated distribution
produced for committing and decommitting bits is indistinguishable from the
actual distribution produced.
Lemma 3.25 Let bl, ... , b" be an arbitrary set of bits, and let P be an
NC' predicate. Then, as k grows sufficiently large, the distribution produced
by ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT(b', .. ., b", k, P), followed by running ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT(X, i, k) for all i E [1, n], will be indistinguishable
from the simulated distribution.
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Remark: Clearly, if the simulation for decommitting all of the bits is indis-
tinguishable from the actual decommital, then simulating the decommital of
any subset of these bits will also be indistinguishable. We are giving the in-
finitely powerful judge the maximum amount of information it could receive
to help in distinguishing the simulation from the real thing.
Proof: Decommitting all the bits corresponds to revealing X. The action
of the simulators can be summarized by the following steps.
1. (commital simulation) Generate, Fx, FT, and implicitly I, with the
correct distributions. Occasionally, the simulation aborts, but with
only negligible probability, so we will ignore this possibility.
2. (commital simulation) Generate X[I] according to the correct distribu-
tion. Compute (X e Fx, T e FT, AR(T)), which is correctly distributed
given X[I]. Output
((X e Fx, T e FT, AR(T)), (I, X[I])).
3. (decommital simulation) generate and output X, agreeing with X[I].
The action of the actual protocols can be described as the following.
1. (implicit in the oblivious transfer line) Generate, Fx, FT, and implicitly
I, with the correct distributions.
2. (commital phase) Generate X, implicitly generating X[I]. Compute
and output (X e Fx, T e FT, AR(T)).
3. (decommital phase) Output X.
The distributions of ((X e Fx, T e FT, AR(T)), computed in Step 2 of
both the protocol and the simulator, are indistinguishable, by Lemma 3.25.
Nominally, the distributions of (X[I], I), generated by the simulator, and
implicitly by the protocol, are also indistinguishable. This fact follows from
the simulation result for the simple-decommit protocol. Whether one
* Uniformly generates a set of bits X[I] = Xk(i-1)+1, -.. , Xki, subject to a
parity constraint, and then takes a proper subset of these bits, X[InIi],
or,
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* Generates X[I n I;] uniformly, and then generates the rest of Xi, uni-
formly subject to the parity constraint,
the resulting distributions on X[I], X[I n Ii] are the same. Note that the
subsets are indeed proper, since I is well-behaved, by the construction of the
simulator. Note that we are again using the fact that the protocol "gener-
ates" values of I that are not well behaved with only exponentially small
probability. The lemma follows. I
3.6 Proving, and improving, aspects of our
protocols.
Before concluding this chapter, we finish with a discussion of the reliability,
confidence, independence, and security properties of the protocol.
First, we note that the simulation results settle the question of indepen-
dence and security. Since, for k, our security parameter sufficiently large,
we can simulate ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT without knowing the bits that
were committed, the security property of our protocol follows. Likewise, since
the simulator for the decommital of bit b' only needs to know the value of b*,
the independence property follows.
Second, we can amplify the reliability and confidence of our bit-
commitment protocol by running it many times in parallel. Consider the
following protocols for secure commitment and decommitment. For our ex-
position, we let C be the constant with the following property: If a possibly
malicious Alice ran ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT, and tried to commit a set
of bits, b',..., b" such that P(b',..., b") was false, Bob would reject with
probability at least k-c, as k grows sufficiently large.
3.6.1 Analyzing independence, security.
We wish to argue that these protocols have strengthened reliability and con-
fidence properties, while retaining the independence and security properties.
First, it is easy to see that the independence and security properties are met.
We can run the simulators for commital and decommital in parallel. Such a
simulation clearly works, since the protocols are all noninteractive. We give
our simulators in Figures 3.17 and 3.18.
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Protocol Secure- Zero- Knowledge- Commit(b',..., b, k, P)
1: Let C be defined as above. Alice runs ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-
COMMIT(b,. .. ,b",k,P), for 1 = nkc+100 times in parallel. She
remembers X = X 1 ,... ,X;, the values of X returned by each run
of the commital protocol.
Checking Step: For each run of ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT,
Bob makes all the checks he would normally make, and rejects if
he would have rejected in one of these instances.
Figure 3.15: An improved zero-knowledge bit-commital scheme.
Protocol Secure-Zero-Knowledge-Decommit(X, i, n, k)
1: Let X = X 1,..., X1. For j E [1, 1], Alice runs ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-
DECOMMIT on input (X3 , i, n, k). Bob will either reject one of the
decommitals outright, in which case he rejects, or he will recover
bits b1,..., bf. If any of these bits are different, then he rejects,
otherwise he reconstructs b' = bl.
Figure 3.16: Improved zero-knowledge bit-decommital scheme.
Simulator Secure- Zero-Knowledge-Commit(n, k, P)
1: With I defined as in the protocol, run simulator ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT(n,k,P), I times. For convenience, denote
I = I1,... ,Il, the set of values of I output by the simulators.
Likewise, write X[I] = X1[11], . .. ,X 111 .
Figure 3.17: Simulator for improved zero-knowledge bit-commital
scheme.
Simulator Secure-Zero-Knowledge-Decommit (n, k,I, X[1], i, b')
With I defined as above, write I = I1... ,I, and write X[I] =
X[I1],..., XIlj. For j E [1,1], run simulator ZERO-KNOWL EDGE-
DECOMMIT(n,kIj, XIj, i,b)
Figure 3.18: Simulator for improved zero-knowledge bit-decommital
scheme.
3.6.2 Analyzing reliability, confidence.
In discussing reliability and confidence, we consider the possibility of Alice
being malicious. She may, for example, wish to commit a set of bits which do
not satisfy predicate P. Alternatively, she may wish to cause Bob to recover
bits other than the ones she committed. In any case, she has to work under
the following constraints.
1. Alice must implicitly commit a matrix B of bits,
bl bi ... b
bl b ... b
bl b2 ... bn
Decommitting a bit b' in the larger protocol corresponds to decommit-
ting column i of B. Note, of course, that Alice is not constrained to
make b' = b' , for all c, d, as would be the case if Alice was good. Fur-
thermore, she can attempt to have Bob reconstruct a bit, bj, incorrectly,
but will be detected with probability at least 1/2.
2. Denote B, = bi,..., bn. Alice must give a zero-knowledge proof of
P(B;) for each row i E [1, 1]. Naturally, Alice may try to give incorrect
proofs, but she will be detected with probability k-c, independently
for each incorrect proof she gives.
To facilitate the discussion, we make the following definitions.
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Definition 3.11 Fix predicate P, and let 1, c be as defined above. Let B be
an I by n matrix, as described above. We say that a row i is valid if P(Bi)
is valid. We say that B is valid if all but at most kc+1 of the B1 's are valid.
We say that a bit i is defined, with value bt, if bj # b' for at most k values of
j. Since I > 2k, the value of a defined bit is unique. If bit i is not defined,
then it is undefined.
We now show that Alice can convince Bob to reconstruct bit i as b only
if bit i is defined, with value b.
Lemma 3.26 [reliability] Consider protocol SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-
COMMIT, run with particular values of n, k, and P. Let C, I be defined
as above. Let B be the matrix of bits implicitly committed by a possibly
malicious Alice. Suppose that bit i is not defined with value b. Then, the
probability that, while running SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT on
bit i, a possibly malicious Alice can get Bob to reconstruct bit b', is at most
2 -1, for k sufficiently large.
Proof: If bit i is not defined with value b', then there must be at least k
values of j such that b' # b'. In order for Alice to get Bob to reconstruct
bt , she must therefore get him to reconstruct k bits which were other than
what she implicitly committed. However, due to the reliability property of
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT, Bob has at least a one half chance of rejecting
on each of these k decommitals, independent of whether he accepts or rejects
any of the others. The lemma follows. I
Thus, when a possibly malicious Alice goes through the motions of com-
mitting n bits, we may divide these bits up into two categories. Some bits
may be undefined, in which case Alice can hardly ever get Bob to reconstruct
any value at all for these bits. The other bits are defined, with set values.
Alice can hardly ever get Bob to reconstruct the "wrong" value for these bits.
Thus, the protocol is very reliable.
Stating our confidence result is complicated by the fact that some bits
may be undefined. We would like to say that if Alice commits a set of bits
b1,... , b" , such that P(bl,... , b') fails, then Bob will reject with extremely
high probability. However, the way the protocol stands, Alice may, for each
row i E [1,1], make sure that P(B = bl,..., b,') holds, but pick wildly
different values for the Bi's. In such a case, Bob will not reject, even though
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some of the "committed" bits may not even be defined. What we in fact
need to say is given, and proven, in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.27 [confidence] Consider protocol SEC URE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-
COMMIT, run with particular values of n, k, and P. Let C, I be defined
as above. Let B be the matrix of bits implicitly committed by a possibly
malicious Alice. Then one of the following two cases must hold:
1. Bob rejects with probability at least 1 - 2-k at the checking stage of
SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT.
2. Given B, one can easily compute a set of bits, b,..., b" such that
(a) P(bI,.. ., b") is true.
(b) If bit i of B is defined, it has value b'.
To prove this result, we consider the case where B is valid, and the case
where B is not. First, we argue that if B is not valid, then Bob will reject
with high probability.
If B is not valid, then there must be at least kc+1 rows i, such that row B
is invalid. By definition, Bob will reject each such row with probability k-c,
regardless of whether or not it accepted or rejected any other rows. Hence,
prob(Bob doesn't reject) (I - k-c)
< 1( - k-c .
Now, (1 - x-1)' is less than 1/2, for x sufficiently large. Thus, as k grows
sufficiently large, we have
prob(Bob doesn't reject) .()
We now show that if B is valid, then one can use it to generate a set of
"good" values for all the committed bits, meeting the criteria given in the
statement of the lemma.
Assuming that B is valid, there exist I - kc+1 rows j, such that P(Bj)
is valid. We will denote this set of rows by G (for "good"). Now, suppose
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for some i that bit i is well defined, with value bi. Then at most k rows of
G disagree with b' in their ith position. Therefore, at most nk rows of G
disagree with any of the defined bits. Since I - kc+1 - nk > 0, there must be
at least one row j such that
P(b),..., bV) is true, and
b)' = b(for bit i defined, with value b').




Oblivious Transfer: The NCI
circuit case.
4.1 Introduction.
In the previous chapter, we showed how, using an oblivious transfer channel,
one can implement very strong commital protocols. Alice can commit a set of
bits to Bob, along with a zero-knowledge proof of an arbitrary NP assertions
about these bits. Then, Alice can reveal any subsets of these bits, at her
discretion, without revealing anything about the other bits. As a byproduct
of this commitment technology, Alice can noninteractively prove any NP
assertion to Bob.
The problem with all this is that Bob plays the role of the spineless wimp.
While Alice does all of the committing, decommitting, and proving, Bob sits
passively, making monotonous, routine checks of Alice's integrity. Nobody
worries about Bob's integrity; who cares whether a jellyfish is good or evil?
In this chapter, we consider a more equal scenario, which we call oblivi-
ous circuit evaluation. In oblivious circuit evaluation, Alice and Bob actively
work together to compute a function whose arguments are distributed be-
tween them.. Both Alice and Bob have secret information which they wish
to hide from each other. Thus, the scenario is much more symmetric than it
was before. As we shall see, some asymmetry will remain in the definitions,
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but this will be more due to technical considerations than a reflection of the
spirit of the problem.
What is Oblivious Circuit Evaluation?
Let us return to the Alice and Bob story of the previous chapter. Recall
that Bob was trying to factor some 500 digit number n. Alice happened to
possess d, a 100 digit factor of n, which she hoped to sell to Bob on a bit by
bit basis. Using oblivious transfer, she was able to put each of the 100 digits
into a magic envelope, and convince Bob that they did indeed represent a
factor of n.
Bob, who had only 25 dollars, was willing to buy 25 of the digits of d.
However, his choice of which digits to buy was somewhat embarrassing. His
choice wasn't something logical, such as digits 1 through 25, or 76 through
100. Rather, it consisted of the winning megabucks numbers for the past
four days, and the number 17, which was Bob's lucky number. Bob feared
persistent, unmerciful teasing at Alice's hands. "Ok, Alice," he said as he
handed over the money, "Just give me the envelopes, and I'll go home and
pick my 25 digits out."
Alice, who had been born considerably before yesterday, disagreed with
this proposal. "How can I be sure you'll only take your fair share. Besides,
these envelopes I made can't be opened without my active participation. I
simply have to know which digits you want."
"Well, maybe some other time," Bob said sadly. But both knew that
"some other time" would never come to pass...
This story would have ended without explaining oblivious circuit evalu-
ation, but for a remarkable turn of events. A few days later, Alice received
a Microvax II for her birthday. "Ureka!" she exclaimed. "Our problems are
solved."
"How so?" Bob asked.
"Simple. I'll just make a program that will allow you to type in which
25 digits you want to see, give you the answer, and then forget what you
asked." Alice was very pleased with herself.
"Well... I might go for this approach." came Bob's hesitant reply. "But I
want to see a listing of the program. Just to make sure it gives me the right
answer, and really forgets what I asked it. And by the way, are you sure the
operating system is secure?"
"Of course, silly," Alice chortled, "It's Unix."
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So, Alice and Bob sat down and wrote themselves a program. The pro-
gram first took a 100 digit number from Alice, and checked that it did indeed
divide n. Then, after clearing the screen, it went through the desired trans-
action with Bob. There was no way Alice could learn anything about what
Bob's input was, and there was no way Bob could learn any more information
than what he had paid for.
Life from then on was seemingly idyllic. Alice and Bob soon learned to
write even more sophisticated programs. One day, for instance, Alice offered
to, for only $5.95, let Bob know how many how many times a particular
digit, of Bob's own choosing, appeared in her divisor. On another day, Alice
charged Bob $10 to learn what value the number had when taken modulo
any 8 digit number of Bob's choosing.
But then, after it seemed that all their security problems had been solved,
Bob spied a new paperback on Alice's bookshelf. It was titled:
How to break Unix, in 10 easy lessons.
"Alice, I am at a loss for words." he said, and then proved himself wrong
by continuing, "How could you have done this? You have destroyed the very
basis of all our dealings with each other."
"Bob, I saw the videocassette." Alice replied.
"What videocassette? What are you talking about?" blustered Bob, as
beads of sweat started to trickle down his forehead.
"The one so surreptitiously lodged behind Debbie does Dallas." Alice
answered. "The one titled, Compromise Unix with Jane Fonda."
"I didn't know what it was about. It sounded like some kind of kinky,
soft-porn flick. You know, like Barbarella. Honest."
Alice was not impressed. Business took a very slow turn from then on.
they could still do whatever could be done with the magic envelopes. But the
sheer range of deals they could make with the microvax was gone, seemingly
forever.
In this chapter, we show how Alice and Bob can, with the use of an ideal
oblivious transfer channel, implement oblivious circuit evaluation for NCI
circuits. In this protocol, Alice and Bob agree on some function, F, which
can be expressed as an NC' circuit. Function F takes two arguments, i andj, each of which may consist of some polynomial number of bits. Inputs i
and j are known to Alice and Bob, respectively. At the end of the protocol,
the following three conditions must hold.
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1. Bob learns the value of F(i,j).
2. Bob only learns F(i, j). that is, Bob doesn't learn anything else about
the value of i than can be inferred by knowing the values of j and
F(i, j).
3. Alice learns nothing.
4.1.1 Outline of the Chapter.
In Section 4.2, we discuss the oblivious string transfer protocols of Brassard-
Crepeau-Robert[BCR], and Crepeau[C], and show how to combine it with
our zero-knowledge proof commital methodology. In Section 4.3, we show
how Alice and Bob can securely evaluate NC' circuits.
4.2 A Protocol for 1-2-Oblivious
String Transfer.
In this section, we discuss a very useful protocol due to the combined work
of Brassard-Cr peau-Robert[BCR], and Crepeau[C]. The reason for devoting
a section to their work, instead of a simple citation, is three-fold. First, since
we use: their work as a subprotocol, a description of our protocols would
not be complete without it. Second, while using subroutines is very easy
and convenient, using subprotocols is a much trickier affair. In order to
verify that ones protocol meets all the desired security constraints, one must
explicitly construct a simulator for it. However, this task is very hard to
accomplish without also constructing simulators for all ones subprotocols.
This difficulty is probably more due to the immaturity of the field than to any
fundamental theoretical obstacles. Nevertheless, we must live in the present.
Third, as will be made clearer, we can write down a slightly simpler, single
staged reduction from the problem they solve to ordinary oblivious transfer.
This simplification is not due to any conceptual contribution on our part.
Historical hindsight allows us to, knowing the final outcome of a series of
steps, fabricate a somewhat larger jump that leads directly to the end result.
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4.2.1 Statement of the Problem.
The problem of 1-2-oblivious string transfer is conceptually very simple. Sup-
pose that Alice has two strings, So and S1, each of length n. 1 Alice is willing
to reveal one, but only one of these strings to Bob. Bob has some bit x,
signifying which string he actually wishes to see. At the end of the protocol,
we desire the following security conditions.
1. Bob learns Sx, except with probability < 1/k", for any c, where k is
the security parameter.
2. Bob gains no information about S1 _,, except with probability < 1/k,
for any c, where k is the security parameter.
3. Alice learns nothing.
Brassard-Cr6peau-Robert[BCR] first reduced this problem to the case
where each of Alice's strings consist of only 1 bit. This case is known as 1-2-
oblivious transfer. Crepeau[C] then reduced 1-2-oblivious transfer to ordinary
oblivious transfer. For simplicity's sake, we present a single-staged reduction
to oblivious transfer.
4.2.2 The Protocol.
The protocol in Figure 4.1 implements 1-2-oblivious string transfer using
ordinary oblivious transfer. As usual, k denotes our security parameter. In
order to make all our security requirements hold, we require that k > nc,
for some constant c. FOr convenience, we shorten the name of our oblivious
string transfer protocol to OST.
Does Bob learn SX?
We wish to say that that Bob can recover S', without any error, with ex-
tremely high probability.
1We may alternatively require that |So 1, IS, I < n, a slightly more general scenario.




0: We denote Alice's secrets by So, Si, and Bob's selector bit by x.
1: Alice makes the following computations.
1.1: We write Si = sisi -- s, for i E {0, 1}. Alice then chooses
2nk bits, s,, for i E {0, 1},j E [1, n], and I E [1, k]. These
bits are chosen uniformly, subject to
k
1=1
1.2: Alice uniformly chooses two bijections,
Ro, Il1 : [1, n] x [1, k] -+[1, nk].
1.3: Alice uniformly chooses 3nk bits B = b1 ,.. ., bafnk.
2: Alice transfers B to Bob, using the oblivious transfer channel.
3: Bob computes Ao, A1 , two disjoint subsets of [1, 3nk]. We write
A1 = at,... , a. We require that |Aol = |A1 | = nk, and that Bob
received bit ba, for j E [1, nk]. If no such sets exist, then Bob
aborts. Otherwise, Bob sends A0 , A1 to Alice.
4: For notational convenience, we adopt the notation
< i,j, l >= asl,;).
For all i E {0, 1},j E [1, n], and I E [1, k], Alice sends Bob,
Alice also sends Bob Ho, and 11.
5: Bob uses the bits given in Step 4 to reconstruct sa,, for j E [1,n],
and I E [1, k]. He then reconstructs S, = sisi --s for j E [1, n],
by computing the appropriate parity function(given in Step 1.1).
Figure 4.1: Protocol for oblivious string transfer([BCR],[C]).
132
Lemma 4.1 At the conclusion of OST(So, 31, x, k), Bob completely recov-
ers Sx, with probability at least 1 - 1/kc, for all constant c.
Proof: Bob will always be able to reconstruct SX, provided that he can
successfully create the sets A0 and A1 in Step 3 of the protocol. This can be
done if and only if Bob actually received at least nk of the 3nk bits. By a
simple application of Chernoff bounds, we have
prob(Bob gets less than nk bits) < e-(nk)2 /(2.3nk)
-nk
The lemma follows. I
Does Alice learn anything?
It is not hard to see that if Bob follows the protocol, then Alice will gain no
information about x. All Alice receives from Bob is an ordered pair of sets.
One of these sets refers entirely to bits which Bob received; one does not.
However, since Alice has no idea which bits actually got through, this tells
her nothing. Given Alice's knowledge, either set is equally likely to refer to
bits which got through to Bob. Note that there is no chance, not even an
exponentially small one, of Alice getting any information. Such a distinction
between exponentially small and 0 is not in the spirit of this thesis, but may
be of slight theoretical interest.
One might also consider whether Alice can gain any advantage by cheat-
ing. However, Bob's message to her depends only on the channel, and not on
anything she does. Furthermore, any messages she sends are either clearly
incorrect, say having the wrong number of bits, or correspond to some legiti-
mate choice of So and S1. Since Alice, playing legitimately, can pick whatever
So, S1 she likes, this does not confer any extra power on her. All she can do
by cheating is to perhaps give Bob some extra information about the string
he did not select. Thus, there is no point in Alice breaking the protocol if
she is willing to play in the first place.
How much does Bob learn?
The crucial task before us is to formally show that Bob does not learn any-
thing about string S1.,. This is done by the standard, painful exercise of
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explicitly constructing a simulator. An issue which must be addressed, how-
ever, is that of exactly what powers the simulator should be allowed to have.
With our commital protocols, we constructed a simulator which ran in prob-
abilistic polynomial time. This made sense, since we wanted to show that
the zero-knowledge proofs transmitted absolutely no information. However,
in this case, some information is definitely transmitted, namely the string
S,. Since we are making no assumptions about Alice or the strings Si, we
must seemingly allow our simulator to have arbitrary computational power.
We would like to say that running our oblivious string transfer protocol
is somehow equivalent to using some ideal "black box" protocol which meets
the desired security specifications. To show this, we consider the following
scenario. Imagine that Alice is willing to reveal exactly one of her two strings.
Since we are bounding Bob's knowledge, it is kosher to allow the simulator
to reveal its choice to Alice. The simulator is a probabilistic polynomial-
time machine which can query Alice for exactly one of these strings. The
simulator also talks to Bob, who is running (perhaps maliciously) his side
of the OST protocol. The job of the simulator is to simulate Alice running
her side of the protocol, through a simulated oblivious transfer channel. The
goal of such a simulation is to
Now, if such a simulator exists, then Bob can not learn anything more
from running the protocol, even maliciously, than he could obtain through
running some ideal oblivious string transfer protocol with Alice. In partic-
ular, this would imply that he learns nothing about S-.,, where bit x is
implied by Bob's actions.
Another way of looking at this is that the simulator acts as a buffer
between a trustworthy Alice and a malicious Bob. Instead of having the
malicious Bob speak to Alice directly, we have him speak to the simulator,
who then interacts with Alice, through an ideal protocol. Bob cannot tell
whether he was talking directly to Alice, or to the simulator. This means that
any information he could steal from Alice, he could learn from participating
in the ideal protocol, and running the simulator himself.
The simulator we present will occasionally abort the simulation, needing
more information than can be obtained by running the ideal protocol with
Alice. In these cases, we make no guarantees about how much information
Bob obtains. However, as will be shown, the simulator aborts with only expo-
nentially small probability. Thus, as far as we are concerned, this possibility
may be safely ignored.
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4.2.3 The Simulator.
Our simulator, given in Figure 4.2 is actually quite straightforward. First, it
simulates sending the 3nk random bits to Bob. When Bob sends back his two
sets, it determines which string, if any, Bob has any hope of learning. Then it
queries Alice for this string. Finally, it computes, in a fairly straightforward
manner, its final transmission to Bob.
As usual, we ignore the possibility that Bob may send back something
really weird. We implicitly assume that any party aborts the protocol if it
receives a transmission that doesn't remotely resemble a legal message. This
behavior is very easy to simulate, and in the interest of clarity, we ommit
further mention of it.
Is this a faithful simulation?
Before we show anything about the distributions produced by the simulators,
we first show that the simulator rarely aborts.
Lemma 4.2 Let k be at least nc' for some c' > 0. Let Bob use any "rea-
sonable" strategy (i.e. Bob never says anything that would cause Alice to
immediately abort - e.g. giving messages of the wrong length). Then simu-
lator OST(n, k) will abort with probability less than 1/kc, for any c.
Proof: The simulation aborts (nontrivially) under the following two cir-
cumstances:
1. F, the mask it uses to simulate the oblivious transfer channel, has more
than 7nk/4 ones.
2. there exists some j such that
(Vlf<Fg = 1.
The first case can be routinely dealt with using a standard Chernoff bound
argument. We can bound the probability that this case occurs by e-Q(nk).
Hence, for the purposes of this lemma, we can assume that this condition is
always met.
The second case is also easy, though slightly more complicated to write
out. Now, we can assume that the number of ones in F is no more than
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Simulator OST(n, k)
1: The simulator makes the following computations.
1.1 The simulator uniformly chooses two bijections, I1o, II1, from
[1, n] x [1, k] to [1, nk].
1.2 The simulator uniformly chooses 3nk bits, B = b1,..., b3nk.
1.3 The simulator uniformly chooses a 3nk bit mask, F =
fi,...f3nk. If the number of ones in F exceeds 7nk/4, then
the simulator aborts.
2: The simulator sends B E F to Bob. Bob sends back two disjoint
sets A0, A1 , each of size n. We write Ai = al,. ank, where aj E
[1, 3nk].
3: For i E {0, 1}, The simulator computes ei = {J : fa' = 1}|. It then
3
calculates x, such that e, > e1,. In other words, the simulator
picks the x corresponding to which set A, refers to the most bits
that were actually received.
4: The simulator asks Alice for her value of S. We write S, =
Ss- s . The simulator uniformly chooses S-F = s1s ... - .
5: The simulator chooses 2nk bits, s',,, for i E {0, 1}, j E [1, n], and
I E [1, k]. These bits are chosen uniformly, subject to
k
;=1
6: If there exists some j such that
(Vl~f 1,
then the simulator aborts. Otherwise, the simulator sends Bob the
value of
for all i E {0,1}, j E [1, n], and I E [1,k]. Also, the simulator sends
Bob Ho and H1.
Figure 4.2: Simulator for oblivious string transfer protocol.
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7nk/4. Then, by the definition of x, we have that ei_ < 7nk/8. In other
words, there are at least nk/8 values of m such that
fal = 0.
We now show that for any j E [1, n], and for H1.. chosen uniformly, the
probability that,
f~~~>= 1,
for all I E [1, k], is exponentially small. Since H1_, is completely random,
the above probability is equal to the probability that
fm-= 1,
for k distinct random values of m E [1, nk]. That is, the value of m is
chosen k times from [1, nk], without replacement. This probability will only
be increased if we allow m to be chosen with replacement. However, since
at least 1/8 of the m's violate the condition, the chance of none of them
violating it is at most ( 7 / 8 )k. The lemma follows. I
We now show that the above simulator will give a faithful simulation,
provided that k is at least nc for some c > 0.
Lemma 4.3 Let k be at least nc for some c > 0. Then the distribution
of conversations between the simulator of OST(n, k) and Bob will be in-
distinguishable from conversations between Alice and Bob running protocol
OST(n, k). This holds regardless of Bob's strategy (which is allowed to differ
from the protocol), and Alice's choice of So and S1.
Proof: The simulation can differ from the actual protocol in two ways.
1. The simulation aborts under certain situations, when the real protocol
would not.
2. Given some strategy of Bob's, and some value of So, 31, the ensemble
of conversations with the simulator may differ from those with Alice.
The first case is handled by Lemma 4.2. The second case is handled almost
by inspection. Virtually everything computed by the simulator is computed
in the exact same way as by the actual protocol. The only difference is that
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a random S 1 _, is used instead of the actual one. However, assuming that
the simulation doesn't abort, we know that
(Vj( ll<,f = 0.
Thus, for each j , there is an I such that
was never "received" by Bob. Hence, the value of
will be uncorrelated with anything visible to Bob, and in particular, it will be
uncorrelated with sJ. The values of a7,...,si computed by the simulator
are uniformly distributed, and the values that would be computed by Alice
are distributed uniformly subject to a parity constraint. However, since only
a proper subset of these bits are seen, the distributions are indistinguishable.
Thus, whether we used the correct values of the sr's or random ones, or even
all O's, the distribution will still be the same. The lemma follows. I
What does this lemma really say? One way of looking at it is that if we
were to modify a protocol, replacing the use of OST with Bob just query-
ing Alice for one of the strings, the knowledge given to Bob would be the
same(except with neglible probability). This of course assumes that the OST
protocol is being used as essentially a black box, with Alice forgetting about
what happened during the protocol. In other words, if the protocol were to
have Alice's later behavior depend on, for instance, which particular values
of the sil's she chose, then conceivably Bob could gain extra information.
Alternatively, another way of looking at this lemma is that Bob might
was well obey the protocol. Instead of committing the faux pas of actually
cheating, Bob could simply think about cheating. He could then with high
probability simulate this cheating while legitimately running the protocol
with Alice.
Running OST in parallel.
It is worth noting that this simulation can be run in parallel. With high
probability, the simulator can keep on running, and give accurate simula-
tions, regardless of whatever Bob tells it. Thus, even with several Bob's
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conspiring, they cannot block the simulation. Often, more conventional sim-
ulations ([GMR],[GMW]), have to start over whenever Bob gives an awkward
question. Bob will give a nonawkward question with non-neglible probabil-
ity, so these strategies work for a single Bob. However, when one tries to
run these simulations in parallel, the probability that all the Bob's ask non-
awkward questions at the same time becomes exponentially small. In some
sense, the standard simulations are pathological, since intuitively one should
be able to run zero-knowledge protocols in parallel - lots of O's in parallel
should still be 0!
We adopt the convention that whenever we run OST several times in
parallel, we run them in lock step: Alice gives all her messages for Step 2
at once, and all her messages for Step 4 at once. Thus, Alice doesn't give
Bob any information about any of the strings until Bob has finished sending
messages. Likewise, when we run the simulations in parallel, we have the
simulator ask Alice for all the strings at once. This convention will turn out
to be useful in later protocols.
4.2.4 An application: Oblivious decommital.
We have described a protocol which allows Bob to select exactly one of 2
strings given by Alice, such that Alice doesn't know which string Bob se-
lected. This is by itself a very useful capability. However, we can do even
more by combining the oblivious string transfer protocol of this chapter with
the commital/decommital protocols of the previous chapter. Recall that Al-
ice decommits a bit by simply giving out a particular string she decided on
in the commital phase. Therefore, we can have the following scenario. Alice
has committed a set of bits, b,..., b", possibly with a zero-knowledge proof
of some assertion about these bits. Let I0, I1 be subsets of [1, n]. Alice is
willing to either
* Decommit bits bi, for i E Io.
* Decommit bits bi, for i E I1.
How would she do this? Well, in either case, she would simply release to Bob
a set of strings, one for each bit she wished to decommit. These sets of bit
strings may be thought of as one big string, so in either case, Alice is really
just sending a big string to Bob. We can call these strings So, Si respectively.
139
Protocol Oblivious-Decommit(X, k, 1o, I)
1: Alice computes strings So, S1, by making the appropriate calls to
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT.
2: Alice and Bob run OST(n, k), where Alice's secret strings are So
and S1 , and Bob's selector bit is x. Bob uses Sx to reconstruct the
committed bits whose locations are in Ix. He does this by taking
each substring of S, which corresponds to a single bit decommital,
and treating it as if he had been sent the string by the usual de-
commital protocol. If he detects some inconsistency, he does not
assign any value to the decommitted bit. However, he does not tell
this fact to Alice.
Figure 4.3: Protocol for oblivious decommital.
Now, suppose Bob wished for Alice to decommit the bits referred to in
I,, for some x, but did not wish for her to know his value of x. All they have
to do is run the oblivious string transfer protocol, with strings So, S1. We
give the protocol and its simulator in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
Remark: The reason Bob ignores bad strings is to protect his value of x.
Running OST clearly gives Alice no information about x, but seeing whether
Bob received a consistent string could give Alice information. For instance,
she could make So complete garbage, and determine x from whether Bob
complained. With Bob sufficiently taciturn, Alice gets no information about
x by the same argument as for protocol OST.
The simulator for this protocol is equally trivial. Our scenario is as fol-
lows. The simulator talks to Alice, who is willing to reveal one of two groups
of bits. The simulator also talks to a possibly malicious Bob, and attempts
to simulate the oblivious-decommital protocol run with him.
It is not hard to see that the oblivious decommital protocol and its sim-
ulator have the desired properties, provided that k is sufficiently large. All
the simulator is doing is making calls to Alice and other simulators whose
faithfulness has already been established. Furthermore, they may be run and
simulated in the same lockstep style as with OST. Also, it is clear that Alice
cannot trick Bob into recovering a bit other than what was committed - she
has no advantage over the usual method of decommitting.
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Simulator Oblivious-Decommit(I, X[I], k, Io, I1)
1: We write X[I] = {zx}, for i E I. The simulator runs the simulator
for OST(n,k), where n is the length of the concatenated decom-
mital strings. When the simulator asks for string Sx, the simulator
asks Alice to reveal the values of bits x;, for i E Ix.
2: For each location i E Ix, Alice runs simulator ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-
DECOMMIT(N, k,I,XI],i,xi), where N is the total number of bits
committed.
3: The simulator concatenates the decommital strings into a single
string, Sx, which it hands to the OST simulator.
Figure 4.4: Simulator for oblivious decommital.
4.2.5 Incorporating OST and oblivious-decommital
simulators into larger simulations.
As we will use OST and OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT- in larger protocols, it is
essential that we be able to use their simulators as subroutines in the larger
simulations. It is not immediately obvious that one can do this for arbitrary
simulators, since the simulators' primary purpose is to bound knowledge
transfer. Fortunately, they can indeed be used, in a relatively straightforward
manner.
The simulators we've constructed in this chapter all make queries to
some friendly Alice, who is in effect running some ideal version of OST
{OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT}. Of course, the larger simulations may not have
a friendly Alice at their beck and call. Or, as will be more often the case,
they will have an Alice to whom they can make limited queries, but who
will not help them with such details. However, they may be able to simulate
Alice's responses to the OST {OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT} simulator's queries.
If so, then the simulation of the OST {OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT} phase will
be correct.
Now, often it will be the case that in some protocol, Alice will perform
a lot of oblivious string transfers, and the pairs of strings she uses may not
be easily simulated. However, the OST simulator will only ask for one of
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these strings, and it is often substantially easier to simulate the answers of
these queries than to simulate the actual pairs. For instance, consider the
following protocol fragment.
17: Alice, having finally computed bit b, which is 1 iff God exists, uniformly
chooses some random bit, r. She then runs OST(b E r, r, k).
It may well be very difficult to simulate the pair (b e r, r). However, one
can still simulate step 17 by
1: Choose bit r' uniformly. Run simulator OST(1, k).
2: When the OST simulation makes query, x, answer with r'.
In this example, seeing one of the two bits is equivalent to seeing a random
bit, so the simulation goes through. Note also that in the above example,
the higher level simulator was able to know which bit the OST simulator
requested. This might seem magical, but really isn't. The crux of the OST
simulation is that one knows which bits the (simulated) oblivious transfer
channel sent to Bob, since one is the one simulating the channel. With this
extra information, one can determine which, if any, of the two strings Bob
will be able to learn anything about.
4.3 Oblivious Evaluation of NC' Circuits.
Before tackling the general problem of oblivious circuit evaluation, we first
consider a restricted version. Instead of working with arbitrary polynomial-
sized circuits, we confine ourselves to log-depth polynomial-sized circuits, i.e.
those circuits in NC'. In this section, we describe a protocol which allows
Alice and Bob to securely compute F(i, j), where F is an NC circuit.
To do this, we use Barrington's theorem on the equivalence between
W5PBP's and NC' circuits. Our general strategy is to first convert our
circuit into a set of branching programs, and then randomize our branch-
ing program so as to intermediate computations (this will become clearer in
the next section). These randomized branching programs can be easily com-
puted using the oblivious string transfer or oblivious decommital protocols
described in the last section.
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Our exposition will be first given under the (incorrect) assumption that
Alice may be trusted. It will turn out to be very easy to convert our protocols
to ones in which Alice may be malicious, but is forced to behave honestly (or
risk having Bob abort the protocol).
4.3.1 Simplifying our circuits.
For the moment, we will confine our attention to circuits which have only
one bit as output, and are thus amenable to Barrington's transformation.
Later, we will show how to increase the number of bits of output. Thus, we
are really concerned with how to obliviously evaluate W5PBP's.
4.3.2 Randomizing W5PBP's.
Recall that a W5PBP, B, with inputs x 1 ,.. ., z, is of the form,
B =((ii, ir , 71), (i2, I24, 7r ), ... ,(im, T 0 , 7r'), a),




If this product is equal to a, the output is defined to be 1. If the product
is equal to the identity, the output is 0. It is required by the definition of
W5PBP's that a and I are the only possible products.
We now define the notion of a randomized W5PBP.
Definition 4.1 Let B be a length m W5PBP, with notation as above, and
let R = ri,..., rm-1 be a sequence of elements of S5 . We define the random-
ized W5PBP, BR by
BR=((i 1 , , 7r'1), (Z2, 7r 10 7r') .. 0 j, r% 7r')1 a),
where
o 1= <r 1r1 <
=rm....1r, and,
.7M
for 1 <~ <in
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Essentially, we are doing the same randomization of permutation se-
quences we did in proving the gap-randomization property for randomizing
tableaus. Now, if we take the product
m
.j=1
for any valuation of the x's, and expand out the values of the 7's, we get
a telescoping product, in which all the r's cancel out. This is essentially
the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.9, so we will not expound
on it with our usual gusto. This implies that BR is a legitimate branching
program, and furthermore that
B R(x1,.. ., Xk) = B(x1,... , zk).
A useful property of randomized W5PBP's.
As we saw, randomizing a branching program will in no way affects its output.
Therefore, one might ask why one would want to have them. The reason is
that, in a certain technical sense, sufficiently randomized W5PBP's hide
all partial information about their intermediate calculations. We make this
statement more precise, as follows.
Lemma 4.4 (the W5PBP Security Lemma) Let B be a length m W5PBP,
with notation as above. Let x 1, Xk take on some arbitrary set of values. Let
R = r 1 ,..., rm-1 be a uniformly distributed randomizing sequence. Let
A' = r'1,. 7rixim
be the sequence of permutations obtained by evaluating BR. Then A' will
be uniformly distributed over length m sequences of elements in S5, subject
to
" ,/sj a ifB(xl,...,Xk) = 1,
H = I if B(xl,..., xA) = 0.
Notation: We refer to a W5PBP that is randomized with a uniformly dis-
tributed randomizing sequence as a uniformly randomized W5PBP.




The lemma follows immediately. I
What does this mean in terms of security? It means that if Bob sees
the sequence of permutations used to evaluate some uniformly randomized
W5PBP, it tells him the final answer, and nothing more. This idea is the
fulcrum of our protocol for evaluating NC' circuits.
4.3.3 The Protocol for W5PBP Evaluation.
Let B consist of the triples (i, 7r9, iJ), for j E [1, m], along with an accept
state, a. Let us assume that Bob possesses inputs x1,...,xj, and Alice pos-
sesses inputs xi+,, - x,. We wish for Bob to be able to determine the value
of B(x1,..., x,), without learning anything more, and without leaking any
information to Alice.
The following definitions are useful for the statement of our protocol.
Definition 4.2 Let B be a W5PBP defined as above. For i E [1,n], we
define the sequence vart(B) = var'(B), var'(B),... by
var'(B) < var2(B) <
and j E vart(B) iff ij = i. We define the sequence of pairs,
Vi(B) = (VM(B), Vl(B)),
by,
Vj3 B) = r 73M'(B) a,(B = ri.grvar'(B)''''
We denote by B.,,, the sequence i1,..., im.
The sequence vart(B) simply consists of the indices of all the triples in
B that refer to variable x;. The sequence V7 (B) consists of all the permu-
tations that appear in the evaluation of B when x; = j. Thus, one way of
computing B(x1,..., x,,) is to first compute V'i(B), for i E [1, k], and then
multiply these permutations in the standard order. The point here is that
these sequences contain all the permutations we need.
Our first protocol, given in Figure 4.5, is very naive in that it's security
relies on Alice obeying the protocol. We will see that our commital technol-




1: Alice uniformly chooses a randomizer R, and computes BR. Alice
then computes V(BR) for i E [1, n].
2: For i E [1, 1], Alice and Bob execute, in parallel,
OST(Vo(BR)7 Vl(B R)I,ik).
3: For i E [1 + 1,n], Alice sends Bob Vri(BR). Bob now uses this
information to reconstruct B(xi,.. ).
Figure 4.5: Protocol for oblivious W5PBP evaluation (honest case).
Bounding Alice's information.
It is not hard to see that Alice receives no information about Bob's variables
from this protocol. This follows from the fact that OST gives no information
to Alice.
Bounding Bob's information.
We would like to show that Bob receives no more information than he could
if he simply gave Alice his arguments, and had Alice return B(x 1 , ... , X)
to him. To show this, we construct a simulator which communicates with
Bob, and simulates Alice running her side of the protocol. At some point, the
simulator will give Alice its arguments, and receive the value of the branching
program. We give our simulator in Figure 4.6.
We would like to build on our previous simulator work, namely the simu-
lator for OST. Recall that the simulator for OST is guaranteed to provide a
faithful simulation, but has to talk to a friendly Alice, to whom it makes its
requests. The real Alice is only willing to play the ideal W5PBP evaluation
game. However, we can have our new simulator run the OST simulat-ions,
and simulate this friendly Alice to them (given some help from the real Al-
ice). This is a big win, since we can use the OST simulators as a sort of
buffer. Whereas a malicious Bob may perform in extremely bizarre, though
ultimately ineffectual ways, the behavior of the OST simulator is standard-
ized: No matter how Bob behaves, the OST simulator merely asks Alice for
one of two particular strings.
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Simulator Honest-W5PBP-Eval(Brs.,, 1, n, k)
1: Let q; be the length of V 0(B) (note that this equals V/(BR), for
any randomizer R, and j E {0, 1}). For i E [1, 1], (where Bob con-
tributes x1, . .. , x) the simulator executes, in parallel, subsimulator
OST(q;, k). Subsimulator OST will, in the course of its execution,
make I queries to the simulated Alice, which we denote xi,... ,xi.
The simulator sends x 1,..., x, to Alice, who returns B(x1, .. x).
2: The simulator uniformly chooses r 1 , ... ,m subject to
" 7ri a If B(z 1,...,Xz) = 1
I If B(z1,...,Xn) = 0'i=1
For j E [1, n] the simulator computes
Vstm = rvar' (B)' rvar'(B)I''
3: The simulator gives the OST subsimulator,
V" , V 1 m,
as answers to its queries.
4: The simulator sends Bob V'im,..., Vs"".
Figure 4.6: Simulator for oblivious W5PBP evaluation (honest case).
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We now show that this simulation is correct when the security parameter
is sufficiently large.
Lemma 4.5 Let W5PBP B be as above, and let k > (nm)c, for some
c > 0. Then for any strategy Bob employs, the output of simulator HONEST-
W5PBP-EVAL(B, 1, n, k) will be indistinguishable from the output of pro-
tocol HONEST-W5PBP-EVAL(B, I, n, k).
Proof: Given the bound on k, k is guaranteed to be at least qf for all
i E [1, 1], and some c > 0. Hence, by Lemma 4.3; the simulations of OST
will be indistinguishable from the actual runs, provided that the answers
given by the simulated Alice are correctly distributed.
The actual Alice runs OST with the values Vio(BR) and Vl(BR), for
I E [1, 1]. Thus, its answers to the simulator's queries would be of the form
Vx1I (BR).. ., V'(BR),
where the distribution on simulator queries, x1, ... zIX, have some distribution
which depends on Bob's strategy. Also, Alice gives Bob the values of
x"+1+( BRJ. Vxz"(BR)
where x1+1, - ,X, are set by Alice.
What is this view? Writing
BR=((i 1 , I7r'01 7r'"),..., (i, r'%, ir'"), a),
the set of transmissions sent by Alice is equivalent to the set of permutations
for j E [1, m]. But by the W5PBP Security Lemma, this is simply equal to
the uniform distribution on permutation sequences r1, ... , Irm , subject to
" r a if B(zi, ... , zn) = 1HI if B(zi,..., zn) = 0
This holds for any valuation of x 1, ... , xI. Now, the simulator's output, when
unraveled in the same way as with the real Alice, also possesses the above
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distribution, for any valuation of x 1, ... , xi. This follows immediately from
Step 2 of the simulator. The lemma follows. I
Thus, in terms of knowledge, a dishonest Bob had might as well select
some x 1, ... , x1 himself, and run the protocol. If he wasn't concerned with
hiding his information, he might as well just tell Alice his x 1,...,xJ, and
have her compute B(x 1,..., Xn) for him.
4.3.4 Dealing with a malicious Alice.
In HONEST-W5PBP-EVAL, it is assumed that Alice behaves perfectly hon-
estly. However, there are two ways in which Alice can be malicious.
1. She may try to steal information from Bob, finding out information
about x1 , ... , .
2. She can try to get Bob to reconstruct some value of B(x1, ... Xnx) with-
out herself deciding on some value of x;+1, ... , x,, or simply reconstruct
a value of B(x1,... , x,) which is wrong.
To address these problems, we would like to fix our protocol so that
1. Alice never gets any information about x1,... , x1.
2. If Bob reconstructs some value b, it must be the case that
(a) Given Alice's set of transmissions, one can uniquely compute a set
of values x1+ 1, - - -, xn-
(b) b = B(x1, 7..., xn).
This is actually quite easy to accomplish, given our commital and de-
commital technology. We first have Alice commit all the permutations she
initially creates, along with proof that they correspond to a correct run of
the protocol. All of the string transfers and transmissions will be oblivi-
ous decommitals and decommital of these committed bits. The protocol for
oblivious W5PBP evaluation is given in Figure 4.7.
149
Protocol W5PBP-Eval(B, 1, n, k)
1: Alice uniformly chooses a randomizer R, and computes BR. Al-
ice then computes V(BR) for i E [1,n]. Alice then uses protocol
SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT to commit
1. R,
2. Vi(BR), for i E [1,1 1,
3. Her choice of xi, for i E [I + 1, n], and
4. V"i(BR), for i E [1 + 1, n].
This commital is accompanied by a zero-knowledge proof that the
Vi(BR)'s and the Vzi(BR)'s are correctly computed, given R and
X1g1,...-,z. This predicate can be made to be in NCI through
the judicious use of extra committed bits.
2: Alice and Bob execute I parallel runs of OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT. For
i E [1, 1], Alice obliviously decommits either V0(BR) or Vil(BR).
3: For i E [1+ 1, n], Alice runs SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT.
Alice decommits V.i(BR). If Bob detects any inconsistency in re-
constructing bits during Steps 2 and 3, he concludes that he cannot
reconstruct B(X1, ... ,zX). Otherwise, Bob uses his information to
reconstruct B(X1,...,zX).
Figure 4.7: Protocol for oblivious W5PBP evaluation (general case).
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Can Alice cheat Bob?
We wish to argue that in order for Bob to recover some value, b, a malicious
Alice must essentially commit to values for x+l, ... , x,, and it must be the
case that b = B(x 1,..., x,). This follows immediately, since Alice is forced
to commit her arguments and all the permutations she uses throughout the
protocol, along with a proof that they chosen according to the specifications
of the protocol. After the commital phase is over, the game is all in Bob's
hands. All Alice can do is to violate the oblivious decommital protocols. But,
with high probability, this will either not affect the game at all, or cause Bob
to realize that Alice is cheating. Alice can't trick Bob into recovering different
strings than what she committed.
It is also not hard to see that even a malicious Alice cannot learn anything
about Bob's input. The only point where Bob talks to Alice is during the
oblivious decommital phase in Step 2, and Alice gets no information from
this protocol. Note that Bob does not give Alice any feedback about whether
he successfully reconstructed all the obliviously decommitted bits.
A somewhat uncomfortable point is that Bob cannot reveal that he did
not receive a value. This suffices for the chief application of our thesis, but
is unsatisfactory. One would like to allow Bob to complain, without fear of
leaking information. At the end of the this chapter, we will present a simple
scheme for handling this problem.
Bounding Bob's knowledge.
We would like to be able to say that the new W5PBP evaluation protocol
yields no more knowledge to Bob than the old one. To this end, we present
a nearly identical simulator, given in Figure 4.8.
Lemma 4.6 Let W5PBP B be as above, and let k > (nm)c, for some
c > 0. Then for any strategy Bob employs, the output of simulator
W5PBP-EVAL(B, 1, n, k) will be indistinguishable from the output of pro-
tocol W5PBP-EVAL(B, 1, n, k).
Proof: the proof is essentially the same as with the protocol for the honest
case. All that has changed is that we have added a commital step, and
changed calls to OST into calls to OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT. We know that
these give the correct simulations, provided the Alice they are talking to is
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Simulator W5PBP-Evaluate(B, 1, n, k)
1: The simulator runs, as a subsimulation, simulator SECURE-ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT(N,k,P). Here, P is the same predicate as
with the commital protocol, and N is the total number of bits
committed by the protocol.
2: Let qi be the length of V,9(B) (note that this equals V3(BR), for
any randomizer R, and j E {O, 1}). For i E [1, 1], the simulator
executes, in parallel, subsimulator OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT. Simula-
tor OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT will, in the course of its execution, make
1 queries to the simulated Alice, which we denote x1 ,... ,x. The
simulator sends x 1,... ,x; to Alice, who returns B(xi,.. z,).
3: The simulator uniformly chooses ir1,... , Irm, subject to
M 7ri a If B(x 1 ,...,xz) = 1
I If B(zi, ...,z4) = 0'
For i E [1, n] the simulator computes
V'm = Tvari(B)>irvar'(B), -
4: The simulator gives the OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT subsimulator the
values V1'"m,...,V 1"m as answers to its queries.
5: For i E [I + 1, n], the simulator makes the appropriate calls to sub-
simulator SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT to simulate the
bitwise decommital of the strings V2i (BR). The value of Vxi(BR)
that is "decommitted" will be V"
Figure 4.8: Simulator for oblivious W5PBP evaluation (general
case).
152
correctly simulated. The simulation of Alice is the same as with the honest
case, so this part of the lemma follows by same proof as before. I
4.3.5 Functions with multi-bit outputs.
The W5PBP-EVAL protocol allows people to obliviously evaluate NC' cir-
cuits which have a single output bit. However, we would like to be able to
evaluate circuits which have multi-bit outputs. We can accomplish this goal
by representing each output bit of NC circuit as the output of a W5PBP.
Naively, we would then run several independent versions of the W5PBP
protocol, one for each W5PBP. This won't quite work, because we need
to enforce the constraint that Bob's arguments to each branching program
are the same. Fortunately, this constraint can be enforced by merging all
the OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT protocols for a particular variable into a single
OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT protocol. to this end, we make the following defini-
tion.
Definition 4.3 Let B = B1, ... , BM be a sequence of W5PBP's with inputs
x1, .x.. , zn. We define Vi(B) = (Vt(B), Vi (B)) by
Vi (B) = V'(B1), .. ., V'(Bm)
Our protocol for general NC' circuit evaluation is almost typographically
the same as the W5PBP-EVAL protocol, which is as to be expected. Like-
wise, the simulator is nearly the same as the old simulator. We present the
protocol and simulator in Figures 4.9 and 4.10, respectively.
As before, the only messages which Bob sends to Alice are in the parallel
OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT phase. By the same argument as before, this gives
Alice no information if Bob never complains.
Likewise, provided that k > (nmM)Y, for some c > 0, the indistinguisha-
bility proof of the single-bit case carries over to the multi-bit case. One might
wonder why the bounds on k seem to grow progressively more complex. All
we require is that k is sufficiently large in every subprotocol it is used in. In
this case, the size of the all the sets of bits being manipulated is bounded
above by some polynomial in m, n, M, k, so as long as k > (nmM)c, for some
c > 0, it will also be bounded above by some polynomial in k.
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Protocol NC 1 -Eval(C,1,n,k)
1: Let B = B1,..., BA, where each W5PBP B; evaluates output bit i
of C. Let each W5PBP B be of length m (we can assume that they
are all of equal length, since we can pad out short W5PBP's with
triples of the form (xi,I,I)). Alice uniformly chooses randomizers
R = R1,..., Rm, and computes BR = BR,..., BRM. Alice then
computes VI(BR) for i E [1, n]. Then, using protocol SECU RE-ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT, Alice commits
1. 1,
2. V;(BR), for i E [1, ],
3. Her choice of xi, for i E [I + 1, n], and
4. Vf'(B'), for i E [I + 1, n], and her choice of xi.
This commital is accompanied by a zero-knowledge proof that the
Vi(BR)'s and the V'(BR)'s are correctly computed, given 1? and
zg1,,...,x. This predicate can be made to be in NC' through
the judicious use of extra committed bits.
2: Alice and Bob execute I parallel runs of OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT. For
i E [1, 1], Alice obliviously decommits either Vi(B) or Vil(BR).
3: For i E [1+1, n], Alice runs SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT.
Alice decommits Vxi(BR). If Bob detects any inconsistency in re-
constructing bits during Steps 2 and 3, he concludes that he cannot
reconstruct the values of Bi(x1,...,Xz), for i E [1,M]. Other-
wise, Bob uses his information to reconstruct Bi(xi,... ,zX), for
i E [1, M].
Figure 4.9: Protocol for oblivious NC' circuit evaluation.
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Simulator NC 1 -Evaluate(C, 1, n, k)
1: The simulator runs, as a subsimulation, simulator SECURE-ZERO-
KNOWLEDGE-COMMIT(N,k,P). Here. P is the same predicate as
with the commital protocol, and N is the total number of bits
committed by the protocol.
2: Let B be as defined in the protocol. Let q; be the length of
V,9(B) (note that this equals Vi3(BR), for any randomizer R, and
j E {0, 1}). For i E [1, 1], the simulator executes, in paral-
lel. subsimulator OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT. Subsimulator OBLIVIOUS-
DECOMMIT will, in the course of its execution, make I queries to the
simulated Alice, which we denote x 1,...,x 1. The simulator sends
xl,...,x; to Alice, who returns
B1(x1, ...,1 zn),...,I By(z1,...,zXn).
3: For i E [1, m] and j E [1, M] the simulator uniformly chooses 7r,
subject to
f 7r a IfBi(i,7...,z)=1
I IfBi(x,...,Xz)=O
For i E [1, n],j E [1, M] the simulator computes
ILJJVari (Bi)'I var2'(B,)'
The simulator then computes
V tm = V'"[1], ... , v'"M]
4: The simulator gives the OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT subsimulator the
values V"m, ... ,Vf" as answers to its queries.
5: For i E [I + 1, n], the simulator makes appropriate calls to the
simulator for SECURE-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE-DECOMMIT, to simulate
the bitwise decommital of Vxi(BR). The value of Vx'(BR) that is
"decommitted" will be V"".
Figure 4.10: Simulator for oblivious NC1 circuit evaluation.
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4.3.6 Compressing the number of rounds of commu-
nication.
The NC' circuit evaluation protocol clearly takes only a constant number of
rounds of communication, since it consists of only a constant number of steps,
each of which only require a constant number of rounds of communication. In
fact, one can trivially "merge" the steps of this protocol into an essentially
optimal number of rounds. In Step 1 of the protocol, Alice commits her
bits by transferring a single message to Bob. In Step 2 of the protocol,
Alice and Bob perform a set of oblivious decommitals in parallel. Oblivious
decommitals are nothing more than glorified 1-2 oblivious string transfers,
which consist of Alice transferring a string to Bob, Bob sending a message
to Bob, and Alice sending a message back to Bob. In Step 3 of the protocol,
Alice performs a set of decommitals, which just consists of sending a message
to Bob.
Now, the transfer Alice executes at the beginning of Step 2 can be com-
bined with the transfer she executes in Step 1. Her message to Bob at the
end of Step 2 can be combined with the message she sends in Step 3 of the
protocol. Thus, the final protocol can be written in the following form.
* Alice transfers a set of bits to Bob.
* Bob sends Alice a message.
9 Alice sends Bob a message.
In general, this is the best that can be done, even when both parties are
honest. There is no point in Bob sending any messages to Alice before she
executes oblivious transfer: Since the message can't have any correlation with
Bob's input (to maintain obliviousness), Alice could just as easily generate
the message distribution herself. Similarly, one can argue that Bob must
send a message to Alice, and get some reply. This is hardly a proof, and we
leave the details to the reader.
It is an interesting open question whether general circuit evaluation can
be accomplished using only a single transfer and two messages. In the cryp-
tographic scenario, we have the constant-round protocols of [Y] and [GMW],
but these techniques break down in the noncryptographic domain.
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4.3.7 Allowing Bob to complain.
As far as the scope of this thesis is concerned, there is no need to allow Bob
to complain if he gets a bad string in the one of the OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT
protocols. However, from an aesthetic point of view, we would like to give
some idea of how to improve our scheme. In fact, we do not need to modify
the NC-EVAL protocol, but merely change the way it is used.
Recall that Alice could not give Bob any decommital string that would
cause him to reconstruct any bits other than what was committed. However,
she could give him strings which he would reject with probability at least
1/2. By knowing whether Bob received a bad decommital string, Alice could
get information about which strings he received, which in turn would yield
information about Bob's bits.
Now suppose Bob randomized his actual arguments, yielding values
x1,... ,x which have the following property. For any set of q indices,
i,... , i, the values of xi, ... are uniformly distributed, regardless of
what Bob's original values were. Then, the following two statements follow
by elementary probability theory.
1. Suppose that Alice makes (intentional) mistakes in only r < q of the
pairs of strings that she runs OST with in the OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT
protocol. The probability of Bob complaining will be the same regard-
less of his original arguments.
2. Suppose that Alice makes (intentional) mistakes in at least q of the
pairs of strings that she runs OST with in the OBLIVIOUS-DECOMMIT
protocol. Then Bob will complain with probability at least
1 -.
,)q-
The first fact follows from the randomization property of Bob's arguments.
The second property also subtly follows from the randomization property.
Any bad pair will be detected by Bob with probability at least 1/4, since a
bad string will be chosen by Bob with probability 1/2, and this bad string
will be detected with probability at least 1/2. For up to q - 1 pairs, these
1/4 probability will be independent of each other, giving the desired bound.
Thus, if q is large, say equal to k, then Alice will learn nothing from
cheating, even if Bob complains. If she deviates on no more than q pairs,
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then Bob's probability of complaining will not depend on his original set of
arguments. If she deviates on q pairs, then Bob will almost always complain.
The only question that remains, then, is how can Bob randomize his
original arguments to have the (q - 1)-independence property. The trick is
to use the standard parity trick. Given some circuit C(x1,... , x,), we define
the nq argument circuit, Cq(x1, ... , Xn,q) by




Clearly, if C is an NC' circuit, Cq will also be NC.
To evaluate C(x1,..., xn), with complaining, Alice and Bob just run
NC 1 -EVAL on Cq(x11,... , Xn,q), where Bob uniformly chooses his arguments
subject to the above parity constraint. This randomization satisfies the





In the last chapter, we developed protocols and simulators for the secure
evaluation of NC circuits. In this chapter, we show how to extend these
techniques to the secure evaluation of arbitrary polynomial-sized circuits.
For the rest of our discussion, we will express all our protocols in terms of
NC' circuit evaluation, and not resort to any lower-level primitives. This
discipline will make our arguments much less agonizing.
In order to use our NC' circuit capability, we develop some simple ma-
chinery which will allow us to further constrain Alice and Bob's behavior. We
refer to the first technique we use as the method of encrypting conversations.1
This technique has a two-fold purpose. Using it we can hide from Bob the
intermediate values computed in a series of NC' circuit evaluations. We
can also use this technique in order to force Bob to behave in an honest
fashion. The second technique, known as consistency checking, allows us to
have a great deal of control over Alice's input to a series of circuits. Consis-
tency checking, a standard technique in cryptography, provides a mechanism
through which Bob can be convinced that Alice's input to a given circuit is
the same as her input to another circuit.
'This technique was concurrently and independently discovered by Chaum, Damgi.rd,
and Van de Graaf [CDG], and slightly simpler form of it was also independently discovered
by Goldreich and Vainish [GV]. Given its naturalness, it has probably been discovered by
many others as well. However, we are the first to give it a snazzy name.
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5.1 General secure circuit computation. Re-
ducing to the NC case.
The result we have been ultimately aiming for, and which subsumes all the
previous results of this investigation, is a reduction from secure circuit com-
putation to oblivious transfer. The idea of our reduction is very simple. Any
circuit can be thought of as a series of shallow circuits chained together.
Since we can chain together NC' circuits, we can securely evaluate arbitrary
circuits. We expand on this idea below.
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the circuits we are dealing
with are levelled. By a levelled circuit, we mean a circuit in which each gate
may be assigned an integer value, denoting its level, subject to the following
constraints.
1. All gates which are directly connected to the input have value 1.
2. If the output of gate a is piped into the input of gate b, then the level
of b is one greater than the level of b.
We denote the depth of a levelled circuit by the maximum level of its gates.
Clearly, we can take a nonlevelled circuit, and construct an equivalent levelled
circuit whose size is polynomial in the size of the original circuit.
We can now state our problem as follows. Let C(x, y), where x and y are n
bit inputs, be a levelled circuit of size s(n) and depth d(n).2 We assume that
s is polynomial in n. Bob knows x and Alice knows y. Alice and Bob wish
to securely evaluate C using an oblivious transfer channel. Bob is allowed
to learn C(x, y), and nothing else, and Alice is to learn nothing. We give a
pictorial description of this process in Figure 5.1.
We can break up C into m = [d(n)/ log n] circuits, C1,..., Cm, with the
following properties.
1. For i E [1, m], circuit C; has depth O(log n).
2. The following identity holds:
C(x, y) = Cm(Cm-1(-..- C,(x, y) .. ))
2 Following the usual convention, we allow n to be a variable, in which case we are




This decomposition is straightforward. First, we define C; as the circuit
obtained by copying levels (i - 1) log n +1... , max(d(n), i log n) of C. The
inputs to Ci simply correspond to the inputs of the level (i - 1) log n + 1
gates, and the outputs of Ci are the outputs of the level max(d(n), i log n)
gates. Such a decomposition meets the above conditions. Essentially, the
input to C is fed into circuit C1, the output of circuit Ci is piped into the
input of circuit Ci+,, and the output of Cm corresponds to the output of C.
We give a pictorial description of the decomposition in Figure 5.2.
The decomposition described above shows how to reduce the evaluation
of general circuits to the evaluation of NC' circuits, but does not show how
to reduce the secure evaluation of general circuits to the secure evaluation
of NC' circuits. Naively, one might securely evaluate circuits C1,...,C,
piping the output of each circuit into the next, but such a system would be
insecure in two distinct ways:
1. Bob is supposed to make his input to circuit C+1 equal to the output
of circuit C;. However, a malicious Bob may violate this constraint.
2. Bob receives all of the intermediate outputs of C1,..., Cm-1 as well as
the final output of Cm.
We must deal with both these ways in which the naive protocol may leak
knowledge. To do this, we use the method of encrypted conversations. In
order to implement this method, it is necessary to enforce consistency con-
straints on the behavior of Alice, which we show how to do at the end of the
chapter.
Our end result is a protocol for chaining together NC' circuits C1, ... , C,
in the manner described above, without giving Bob knowledge about any of
the intermediate computations. We call this protocol CHAIN(C1, ... , Cm, k)-3
To securely evaluate a circuit C, Alice and Bob can simply decompose C into
NC' circuits C1,..., Cm, and chain them together using the CHAIN protocol.
We give the top-level protocol, and its simulator, in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
As is clear, the real work to be done is in the implementation of the CHAIN
protocol.

















1: Let C be decomposed into C1,..., Cm. Alice and Bob run protocol
CHAIN(Ci,.. ., Cm, k).
Figure 5.3: Top level protocol for secure circuit evaluation.
Simulator Circuit-Eval(C, k)
1: Let C be decomposed into C1, ... , Cm. The simulator runs subsim-
ulator CHAIN(C,,.. .,C m, ks(n), k).
Figure 5.4: Top level simulator for secure circuit evaluation.
5.2 Encrypted Conversations.
In this section, we describe the main idea behind our protocol for securely
chaining together a series of NC' circuits. We consider the following scenario.
Alice and Bob have a sequence C1,..., Cm of NC' circuits they wish to
evaluate. We assume that each circuit takes n bit inputs from Alice and
Bob, and gives an n-bit output. This is not a serious restriction, since we
can add dummy inputs and outputs to the circuit, and make n be equal to
the maximum number of bits that any of our circuits will need.
We want to enforce constraints on Bob's knowledge and freedom of action
that are much more stringent than those we have enforced so far. These are
1. For i E [1, m - 1], the output of C is to be used as Bob's input to
circuit C+,. Otherwise, Bob is to gain no information.
2. For i E [1, m - 1], Bob receives no information about the output of
circuit C;. He does receive the output of Cm, provide he obeys the first
condition.
The above two conditions are at first glance paradoxical. We want Bob
to carefully chain the output of one circuit into the input of the next, but we
do not want him to know these values. It is like asking a courier to deliver
a message, but not wanting him to read it en route. To see the main idea
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of how this is paradox is resolved, we give a solution based on a physical
abstraction we call secure envelopes.
5.2.1 A solution using secure envelopes.
To give some intuition on how our reduction works, imagine that we have
black boxes which implement secure NC' circuit evaluation. These boxes
can be programmed to, instead of working with numbers in the clear, take
as input and give as output an abstraction known as secure envelopes. A
secure envelope can only be created or opened by a black box; its contents
are invisible to Bob, and cannot be altered in any way. Secure envelopes can
be also be made in different shapes, and the black boxes can be programmed
to create or accept envelopes of a particular shape.
We now give a solution in this scenario, which is depicted in Figure 5.5.
Alice and Bob make a series of black boxes which securely evaluate circuits
Ci,..., Cm. All of these black boxes take ordinary inputs from Alice. The
black box which evaluates C, takes an ordinary input from Bob, and the box
which evaluates Cm gives an ordinary output to Bob. All of the other inputs
and outputs are put into secure envelopes. The box evaluating C puts its
answer in a secure envelope which is of a shape only accepted by C,.,. If a
box receives an input which is of the wrong shape, then it will refuse to give
out an envelope of any type.
We wish to informally argue that this scheme blocks off the two ways the
naive protocol can leak information. First, Bob gets no information about the
intermediate computations, since the contents of the envelopes are invisible
to him. Second, Bob is constrained to chain the output of C;_1 into the input
of C;. He cannot make any new envelopes, and if he ever gives an improper
envelope to a box, he will not get a new envelope for the next box, and thus
never get any more envelopes at all. Thus, if he attempts to maliciously
cheat, he will receive nothing more than a collection of unreadable envelopes
for his troubles.
5.2.2 Implementing secure envelopes with secure
NC1 circuit evaluation.
We now show how to simulate the existence of secure envelopes using our
ability to perform secure NC' computations. Essentially, our solution uses
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an encryption scheme that provably has strong properties in the information
theoretic setting. This may seem odd, since we do not know how to prove
the security of most cryptosystems. However, for our purposes, we can have
the number of bits specifying the code be longer than the message itself, in
which case the problem is not difficult.
Specifically, we construct, for all n, encryption functions, K(x), where x
is of size at most n. These functions have the following three properties.
1. (invertibility) For all keys, K, and x,x' of size n, K(x) # K(x') if
x : x'.
2. (unbreakability) For any x, x' of size n, and K distributed uniformly
over all such functions, the induced distribution on K(x) will be indis-
tinguishable from the induced distribution on K(x').
3. (unforgeability) Suppose that K has a uniform a priori distribution on
K, and that K(x) = y, where x is an arbitrary message. Then for any
z # y, the conditional probability that, (3x', xi 5 n)K(x') = z, is at
most 2-.
The following lemma exhibits such an encoding scheme.
Lemma 5.1 Fix n, and let p be a 2n + 1 bit prime. Define the set of keys,
K, to be the set of all ordered pairs of the form (a, b), where a, b E Z,, and
a # 0. Define
K(x) = ax + b mod p.
The resulting encoding scheme is invertible, unbreakable, and unforgeable.
Proof: To prove invertibility, we note that if K = (a, b), then
K(x) - K(x') mod p = a(x - x') mod p
# 0mod p,
for a, x - x' # 0 mod p. To prove unbreakability, we note that for any x, y,
and K = (a, b), K(x) = y iff b = y - ax mod p. Thus, there are exactly p - 1
values of K (one for each possible value of a) such that K(x) = y. Hence,
the induced distribution on K(x), where x is arbitrary, and K is distributed
uniformly, is equal to the uniform distribution on Z,. To prove unforgeability,
we note that if K has a uniform a priori distribution, and K(x) = y, then
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the conditional distribution on K is equal to the distribution on (a, y - ax)
(here, arithmetic is over Z,), where a is distributed uniformly over Z, - {0}.
Thus, for any fixed z, the conditional distribution on K-'(z) will be uniform
over all elements of the form
a-'(z - (y - ax)) = x + a-'(z - y) mod p.
For z # y, this corresponds to p - 1 > 22" distinct values, of which at most
2" values correspond to n bit integers. I
Incorporating the encoding/decoding scheme into NC' circuits.
Given NC' circuit C;(y, z;_1), 4 we wish to modify it so as to compute with
properly encrypted inputs, "reject" forged inputs, and produce encrypted
outputs. This new circuit will take an encrypted argument, e;_1, from Bob,
and produce for him an encrypted argument, e;. The encryption process will
be controlled by Alice.
To perform this transformation, we first note that the encoding scheme
described above is easy to compute and invert (in a limited sense) using NC'
circuits. For a fixed value of p, and we can create an NC' circuit that, on
input K = (a, b) from Alice, computes K(x) = ax + b mod p. To see that
we can perform inverses, note that our set of encryption functions is closed
under inverse. If K = (a, b), then its inverse, K-', is equal to (a-', -a-'b),
where arithmetic is done over Z,. Thus, an encryption circuit can double as
a decryption circuit if Alice gives the inverse of the key she wants to decrypt
under.
We now incorporate the encryption scheme into the original circuits. For
simplicity, let us assume that circuit Ci's input from Bob and output to Bob is
exactly n bits,5 and that p is a 2n +1 bit prime. We can construct a modified
NC' circuit, C;[p], which takes from Bob a (2n + 1)-bit encoded input, which
we refer to as ei_ 1. From Alice, C;[p] takes the same input, y, that was
taken by C;, and two additional inputs, which we denote by K-i1 and K.
These additional inputs are encryption functions for the scheme described
4Note that, for i > 1, Alice will not actually input any values to circuit Ci, so the y is
ignored. We include it as an argument to make our definitions cover all the cases.
sWe can "pad" inputs and outputs by ignoring extraneous input pins and writing O's
on extraneous output pins.
168
Circuit Ci[p](y,ei1,K,~'_,K;)
1: Treat ei-1 as a 2n +1 bit number. If zi1 > p, then halt and output
null (2n + 1 O's).
2: Compute zi_1 = K,(e;_1). If zi_ 1 has more than n bits(i.e.,
z;_ 1 > 2' when viewed as a number), then halt and output null.
3: Compute z; = C;(y, zi_1). Treating zi as an n-bit number, compute
ej = Ki(z), and output ej.
Figure 5.6: Construction of NC' circuit Cj[p].
above, and are thus both represented by elements of Z, x Z,. The meanings
of the subscripts and inverses will be more apparent from the description of
the CHAIN protocol. A more formal specification of this transformation is
given in Figure 5.6, and a transformed version of circuit Ci is depicted in
Figure 5.7.
We note that this transformation can be made to cover circuits C1 and
Cm. The y input is handled by the definition. The fact that C, accepts
unencrypted input from Bob, and Cm gives unencrypted output to Bob, can
be preserved by defining Ko-' = Km = (1,0), the identity encryption. The
other values of Ki will be selected at random in the larger protocol.
5.3 Implementing the chain protocol, as-
suming constraints on Alice's inputs.
Using our information theoretically secure encryption scheme, Alice can im-
plement secure envelopes, and thus hide all of the intermediate results from
Bob. This allows us to give a partial solution, based on what may seem at
first to be a very large assumption. We assume that Bob can enforce ar-
bitrary constraints on Alice's input to a set of NC' circuits. We give the
resulting protocol in Figure 5.8. In the next section, we show how to achieve
such constraints.
Informally, this protocol prevents Bob from cheating, since all the addi-





Figure 5.7: 34 Diagram of a modified circuit Cjp].
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Protocol Naive-Chain(C,,. . . ,Cm, k)
1: Adding dummy inputs and outputs if necessary, ensure that for
some n > k, C1,... , Cm give and receive n bit quantities to and
from Bob. Alice and Bob agree on a 2n + 1 bit prime, p. This
implicitly defines circuits C1[p],...,Cm[p]. For convenience, we de-
note Ci{p] by CT. Using modulus p, Alice uniformly chooses keys
K1, ... ,Km1, and defines Ko, Km = (1,0).
2: Alice and Bob successively evaluate circuits Ci,..., C*, with se-
curity parameter k, subject to a constraint to be described later.
Bob gives C1* the input he would have given to C1, plus n + 1 O's
put in for padding (since his n bit input is treated as a 2n + 1 bit
number). His input to CT will be the output of Cf_1. Alice's inputs
to CT are what she would have input to C;, and keys K,-_, K,. The
following consistency constraints are enforced:
1. If K71'[i] or Kst[i] are of the form (a, b), then a E Z and
b E Z,. That is, all keys are legal.
2. K-1'[0] = Kot[m] = (1, 0)
3. If K 0st[i - 1] = (a, b), and K71'[i] = (c, d), then ac = 1 mod p
and cb + d = 0 mod p. In other words, the keys are indeed
inverse to each other.
If Bob sees a violation of these constraints, he concludes that the
final output of circuit C*, is meaningless, otherwise he recovers the
value that Cm would have had, which will be equal to the value of
C,*, up to padding bits(since the N bit output is represented by a
2n + 1 bit number).
Figure 5.8: A naive protocol for chaining together NC' circuits.
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tions. If Alice gives the encryption functions specified by the protocol, they
will not affect the final answer; the encryption of C1[p]'s output is reversed
by circuit Cj,1[p]. However, since the protocol assumes that Bob can tell
whether Alice gave reasonable inputs, it is still part wishful thinking. For
this reason, we do not give any detailed analysis.
5.4 Consistency Checking.
We consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob wish to securely evaluate
a set of NC' circuits, C1,..., C. If they evaluate these circuits in the usual
fashion, i.e. independently, then both Alice and Bob can make their inputs
to each circuit independent from their inputs to any of the other circuits.
However, may may wish to impose some constraints on Alice, of the form,
"bit 6 of Alice's input to circuit 5 must be equal to bit 7 of circuit 17."
Essentially, we would like to enforce consistency constraints on Alice's inputs
to her circuits.
Up to now, our methodology has not addressed this issue. However, con-
sistency checking is a common problem with many simple solutions. Given
the ability to securely evaluate NC' circuits, it is particularly easy. The
following solution is based largely on a suggestion by Crepeau.
First, we use an expanded representation for bits. Given a bit b, and
security parameter k, we represent b by an 3k by 3 matrix, B = [bij], such
that the exclusive-or of the bits on any row of B is equal to b. That is,
3
Vi E [1, mk]) b = bij .j=1







We note the following two simple facts:
172
1. If Bo and B1, are k-expansions for 0 and 1, respectively, then BO and
B, must differ in at least k locations.
2. Let b be a bit chosen according to some a priori distribution, and let
B be a uniformly chosen k-expansion for b. Revealing any 2 elements
from each of the rows of B will not alter the conditional distribution
on b (i.e. this information gives no information about b).
These both follow from the properties of the parity function.
Suppose we have an NC' circuit, C(y, x), in which Bob has input x, and
Alice has input y = y1,... Iy (i.e. an n bit input). We can create a modified
NC' circuit C{k}, with the following properties.
* C{k} has Bob's normal input x, i.e. the input taken by C. However,
instead of having input bits, y = y1, ... , y,, Alice has input
Y = Y, .. ,Yi
where each Y corresponds to a k-expansion for yi.
* Bob has additional inputs, c) E [1, 3] for i E [1,n] and j E [1,3k].
* The output of C{k} has outputs of three types. These are.
1. C{k} outputs a "legitimacy" bit, Q, which is 1 iff Y,..., Y are
legal k-expansions. If Q is equal to 0, then all of the other outputs
will be all O's.
2. If Q 1, then C{k} outputs the value of C(y,x), where y =
Y1,... , y, and Y is a k-expansion for yi.
3. If Q = 1, then C{k} outputs a set of "checksum" bits, for i E [1, n],
and q E [1,3k]. If we write Y = {yb}, where q E [1,3k], and
j E [1, 3], then C{k} outputs y > .
Intuitively, this scheme may be thought of as follows: Each of Alice's
bits is represented by a 3k x 3 matrix. During the circuit computation, Bob
is allowed to see one element from each of the vectors. We now show how
the above scheme can be used to enforce consistency constraints on Alice's
inputs, while otherwise preserving her privacy. Here is a partial example for
the checksum queries and outputs. If Y were the k-expansion given in the
above example, and ci,.. .,ci were equal to 1, 3, 2, 3, 1, 2, then the circuits
output would include 1, 0,0, 0, 0,1.
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Enforcing consistency constraints.
Suppose that Alice and Bob wish to evaluate circuits Ci,... , C, and Alice
wants to convince Bob that some of her input bits are equal to others. We
assume that each bit appears in only one consistency assertion, a restriction
which will turn out to be unimportant. This consistency condition can be
ensured by evaluating a set of modified circuits C1 {k},..., C,{k}, for appro-
priately chosen values of k. For each of her input bits of the original circuits,
Alice gives a corresponding k-expansion. She chooses her k-expansions in the
following manner.
e If Alice wishes to convince Bob that bit i of her input to C is equal to
bit j of her input to C, then she uses the same k-expansion to represent
both these input bits.
a Alice's k-expansions for an input bit are chosen uniformly from all legal
expansions with that value, subject to the previous constraint.
Bob chooses his "checksum" inputs in the following manner.
* If Alice wishes to convince Bob that bit i of her input to C. is equal to
bit j of her input to C, then Bob uses the same set of checksum inputs
on both these inputs. That is, the values of ci,..., ci in circuit C,
will be equal to the values of c, c'.. kin circuit Cb.
e Bob's choice of checksum inputs is uniform subject to the above con-
straint.
Now, suppose that Alice attempts to break one of the consistency con-
straints being imposed. If any of her k-expansions are invalid, then Bob will
detect this fact immediately, since the legitimacy output of the circuit will
be 0. However, if two valid k-expansions represent different bits, they must
differ in at least 3k places. However, since Bob sees one element of each of
the vectors, chosen at random, he will note a discrepancy with probability
1- 2 1 - 2 -(k)
Thus, if k is our security parameter, then Alice cannot violate any consistency
constraint with any significant chance of escaping detection.
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Does this scheme leak information to Bob?
A priori, allowing Bob to learn many of the bits in the k-expansions of Alice's
input bits might compromise security. We now argue that if m is sufficiently
large, this will not happen. The bound on the size of m depends on the set
of consistency constraints imposed on Alice's inputs.
Every time a particular k-expansion, Yj, is used, Bob is allowed to see
exactly one element of his own choosing from each of the 3k vectors which
make X up. We have placed the restriction that a given bit can appear in
at most one assertion, hence an expansion will appear at most twice. Hence,
Bob will be allowed to see at most 2 elements from each of the rows of Y1.
However, since Y1 is uniformly chosen, this imparts no information about
whether Y is an expansion of a 0 or a 1.
Proving more general assertions about Alice's argu-
ments.
Being able to prove assertions of equality between pairs of inputs allows
one to also prove much more complicated assertions. For example, suppose
Alice wants to convince Bob that her input d to circuit C1 is a factor of her
input n to circuit C2. All Alice and Bob need do is agree on a checking
circuit, CHECK(a, b, c), that takes inputs a, b, c from Alice, and return 1 iff
c = ab. Alice and Bob can then evaluate C1, C2 , and CHECK, enforcing the
consistency constraint that the first and third inputs to CHECK are equal to
the inputs d and n to C1 and C2, respectively.
Similarly, Alice can prove any NP assertion about her inputs, provided
she has a witness for the assertion.' Each of Alice's input bits are ensured
via consistency checking to be duplicated in a final "checking" circuit. The
constraint circuit takes all the inputs of the previously evaluated circuits,
whatever further inputs Alice wishes to give it (i.e. witness bits), and outputs
a 1 iff some predicate holds for these input bits. By agreeing on the checking
circuit they use, Alice and Bob can enforce any NP assertion about Alice's
inputs.
Thus, consistency checking allows us to perform commital with zero-
knowledge proofs in a very flexible manner. One can commit inputs, use them
6We implicitly use the fact that any NP assertion can be verified by an NC' circuit,
given a good witness.
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in circuit evaluations, and then at a much later time give a zero-knowledge
proof for some assertion about the inputs. One need not even decide on what
assertion to prove until this much later time. This flexibility is much greater
than that afforded by the ordinary zero-knowledge commit protocols.
There is a price for all this flexibility. By using NC' evaluation for all
ones base operations, one might use slightly more rounds than if one "codes
up" ones protocols from scratch. However, our NC' protocols are extremely
cheap, consisting of only three rounds.7 More to the point, the number of
rounds used in our general protocol will be not even close to what we can
show is optimal, so there is no point quibbling over multiplicative constants.
Simulating the evaluation of NC 1 circuits with consis-
tency constraints.
We have seen how to evaluate a series of NC' circuits with consistency con-
straints, and some of the ways this capability may be used. We would like
to simulate this sequence of evaluations. This simulation is very straightfor-
ward, since we are still evaluating a sequence of ordinary, if slightly trans-
formed NC' circuits. Thus, we can use the simulator for ordinary NC' circuit
evaluation, provided we can simulate all of the outputs of these circuits. In
addition to simulating the usual circuit outputs, which we get from a "friendly
Alice" (or, as is often the case, a higher level simulator), we must also simu-
late the legitimacy output bit, and the checksum output bits. If Alice abides
by the protocol, then the legitimacy output bit will always be equal to 1.
The checksum bits output will be distributed uniformly, subject to the con-
straint that if the same bit of what should be two identical k expansions
(according to the consistency constraint) are requested, then the same value
will be returned in both instances. Thus, the extra outputs can be trivially
simulated.
While this scheme is very simple, it is cumbersome to constantly write
down all of the checksum queries, and explicitly expand out bits into k-
expansions. In order to make our future protocols more readable, we will
suppress the details of the consistency checking scheme, and its simulation,
as much as possible. It should be emphasized that behind this somewhat
7in fact, only two rounds are needed in slightly modified scenarios, to be obsessive
about the matter.
176
loose exposition is a very mechanical procedure for using and simulating our
scheme.
Figure 5.9 gives our final protocol, in somewhat gory detail.
Properties of the chain protocol.
The CHAIN protocol we describe has four important properties.
1. If Alice and Bob behave according to the protocol, then at its conclusion
Bob gets an answer which is the correct result of chaining C1, ... , C,
together. More precisely, Alice's messages will implicitly define some
inputs, Y, and Bob's messages will implicitly define some input, X.
Bob will recover
Cm (Cm- 1(-- (C2(C1 (X, Y))-.).
2. If Bob is honest, then no matter how Alice behaves, Bob will either get
the correct result of chaining, or get no answer whatsoever, and Alice
will learn nothing about Bob's inputs. More colloquially, Alice must
either play or quit. She cannot cause Bob to recover garbage.
3. Alice learns nothing about Bob's inputs.
4. No matter what strategy Bob employs, his view of the conversation can
be simulated by a simulator which is allowed to give an input, X, to a
"friendly Alice," who will return the end result of chaining the circuits
with her inputs.
The first three properties are relatively straightforward. The first prop-
erty holds because all of the linear transformations over GF(p) which are
applied to the outputs of the circuits are inverted before the next circuit
computes with them. Thus, in terms of the final answer, it is as if the trans-
formations were never employed. The second property holds because Alice is
constrained to behave honestly by the commitment and consistency checking
schemes. She has to give a zero-knowledge proof that all of the computations
she sets up are properly constructed. If she attempts to cheat in any way
which would cause Bob's final answer to deviate from a correct chaining,
then with high probability, Bob will find out before the conclusion of the
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Protocol Chain(C1,.. . ,Cmk)
1: Adding dummy inputs and outputs if necessary, ensure that for
some n > k, Cl,..., Cm give and receive n bit quantities to and




For convenience, we denote C;[p] by C'. Using modulus p, Alice
uniformly chooses keys K1,... ,Km_1, and defines Ko, Km = (1,0).
2: Alice and Bob successively evaluate circuits C*,...,C* , with se-
curity parameter k. Bob chooses his checksum inputs according to
the rules given in Section 5.4. His normal input to C* is equal to
what he would normally have input to C1, encoded as an element
of Z,. His normal input to CjE will be the output of Cr_1. Alice's
input to CZ consist of the inputs she would have given to C;, along
with keys K-,-, K;, which correspond to K;1, Kom respectively.
Each bit of these inputs are expanded into uniformly distributed
k-expansions for thar bit.
3: Alice and Bob run a checking circuit, CHECK, which we describe
in Figure 5.10. If Bob sees a discrepancy, he concludes that the
final output of circuit C* is meaningless, otherwise he recovers the
value that Cm would have output, up to trivial decoding from Z,
to bit strings.
Figure 5.9: A protocol for chaining together NC' circuits.
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Circuit Check: Circuit CHECK takes as input from Alice the k-
expansions of all of Alice's keys,
K,-n'[1], Kout[1], .. ., K7il[m], KOut[m],
In protocol CHAIN, Alice makes the inputs K,1'[1], Kout[i] equal to the
values of K,1i, Kout she input to circuit i. For each k-expansion input
by Alice, CHECK takes a set of checksum queries from Bob, as per the
consistency checking scheme of Section 5.4, and outputs the answers to
these queries. In protocol CHAIN, Bob makes the same checksum queries
for each k-expansion as he used before (As specified by the consistency
checking scheme). Circuit CHECK also outputs a 1 iff the following
three conditions hold.
1. Whenever K,'l[i] or Kout[i] are of the form (a, b), then a E Z* and
b E Zp. That is, all keys are legal.
2. K,1[0] = K0st[m] = (1, 0)
3. Whever Kout[i-1] = (a, b), and K~il[i] = (c, d), then ac = 1 mod p
and cb + d = 0 mod p. That is, the keys are inverse.
Figure 5.10: Consistency checking circuit for use in the CHAIN pro-
tocol.
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protocol, and effectively decide that Alice has stopped playing. The third
property holds because Alice's view of each of the steps of the protocol is
independent of Bob's input variables. This follows from the fact that this
independence holds for the NC' circuit evaluation protocol.
To prove the fourth property of the our protocol, we explicitly construct
the simulator, which appears in Figure 5.11. For ease of presentation, we
suppress the simulation of the consistency checking scheme. That is, we
suppress the description of how Bob's checksum queries are simulated. For
a description of how this is accomplished, we refer the reader back to Sec-
tion 5.4.
Lemma 5.2 Let k be sufficiently large. Then the output of simulator
CHAIN(C1, ... , ,Cm, k) will be indistinguishable from the output of protocol
CHAIN(C,, .. . Cm, k), regardless of Bob's strategy.
Proof: For k sufficiently large, all of the simulated NC' circuit evaluations
will be indistinguishable from the actual circuit evaluations, provided that
the input/output (I/0) behavior of the simulated circuits is indistinguishable
from the input/output behavior of the actual circuits. It therefore suffices
to prove that the behavior of the simulated Alice is indistinguishable from
the behavior of the actual Alice. In other words, we must show that the
I/O behavior of the simulated NC circuits is indistinguishable from the I/O
behavior of the real circuits.
By our previous simulation results, we have that with high probability,
Bob gets no information, in the information theoretic sense, about Alice's
inputs to C*,..., C*. In particular, Bob doesn't learn anything about the
encryption and decryption functions input by Alice than can be inferred from
the I/O behavior of the circuits he has run so far. We exploit this fact in
analyzing the I/O behavior of the actual circuits, for any strategy used by
Bob. We allow Bob to be arbitrarily powerful, but do not allow him to have
supernatural knowledge of the encryption and decryption functions.
The output of circuit C* will be uniformly distributed, due to the un-
breakability property of our encryption functions. Likewise, the output of
the simulated circuit C* is uniformly distributed.
To analyze the actual verses simulated behaviors of the rest of the Ci's,
there are two cases we must consider. In the first, "honest" case, we assume
that the input given to circuit C! is equal to the output of circuit Cr_1. In
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Simulator Chain(C1, ... , Cm, n, k)
1: The simulator, playing the part of Alice, agrees with Bob on a
2n + 1 bit prime p. The simulator then runs the subsimulator for
NC 1 -EVAL successively for circuits Ci[p]k},... ,C m p]{k}.
2: The subsimulator for the evaluation of C,[p]{k} will send the sim-
ulator a set of checksum queries, which are simulated according
to Section consistency, and some normal inputs. In particular, the
simulator for the evaluation of C1[p]{k} will give Bob's initial input,
which we denote by x 1,...,zx. The simulator sends these values to
Alice, who sends back
Z = Cm(Cm-(.. . (C 2 (C 1 (X, Y1), Y2 ) . .. ), Ym-1), Ym).
3: The simulator must also answer the normal queries of the subsimu-
lator for circuit C;[p]{k}.This normal output is simulated according
to the following rules: We denote by Qi the normal queries made
by the subsimulator for Ci[p], and by A; the answer given to the
subsimulator for Cj[p].
a: If, for some i > 1, Q, 5 A;_ 1, then A;,..., Am will consist of
all O's.
b: Whenever rule A doesn't hold, then A; will be chosen uni-
formly from Z*, for i E [1, m - 1], and Am will be equal to
Z.
4: The simulator then simulates the CHECK circuit, giving 1 as the
normal output, and simulating all the checksum queries in the stan-
dard manner.
Figure 5.11: Simulator for the CHAIN protocol.
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the "dishonest" case, there is some j such that the input to C deviates from
the honest case for the first time.
In the honest case, the output of circuits C*, -- ., C*_j will be uniformly
distributed, and the output of C* will be equal to the output of circuit
C(given the initial inputs to C* and Alice's inputs). This behavior is the
same as that of the simulated circuits.
Now, suppose that the input to C is different from the output of Cj_1.
By the unforgeability property of our encryption and decryption schemes,
the output of C* will be all O's, with probability at least 1 -2- . This holds
regardless of Bob's strategy. Now, if Bob fails to receive a valid encryption
from circuit Cj, he will have at most a 2-" chance of giving a valid encryption
to to Ce. We can continue this argument for circuits Cj+2,..., C*. By an
elementary probability argument, we can thus bound above the probability
that circuits Cj,..., C* will output anything but 0's by m2-.
The simulated circuits act in the same way, with one slight difference.
As soon as a "dishonest" input is given, all the circuit outputs will be O's,
with probability 1. However, for n sufficiently large, the discrepancy between
events happening with probability m2-" versus probability 0 is statistically
indistinguishable. The lemma follows. I
182
-W --- - W
Chapter 6
Interactive Proof Systems with
Multiple Provers.
6.1 Introduction.
6.1.1 A popular history of proof systems.
What is a proof? This simple question opens the loor to much turmoil and
chaos. All professional mathematicians and theoretical computer scientists
have some notion of what constitutes a proof, but do their notions agree? In
the practical sense, certainly not. Some people will write down three words
and an equation, and call it a proof. Others will write down twenty pages
of meticulously crafted exposition before they are satisfied. Still others will
have computers work out the tiny details of thousands of special cases, more
than can be computed, or even verified by a human being. Often, the more
loquacious individuals have little tolerance for the tersely presented papers,
and those who favor parsimony often have equally little desire for wading
through detailed proofs.
Still, despite these differences in practice, one can hope that researchers
have some common ideal of what constitutes a proof. To a great extent
they do. People can write down a fairly simple and intuitive set of axioms
and inferences rules, and devise a mechanical procedure for checking that a
sequence of axioms and inferences actually proves a theorem. True, there may
be quibbles about which axioms to allow, fights over the axiom of choice and
the continuum hypothesis, but for most purposes people can usually agree on
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their ideal notion of proof. After much work and suffering, mathematicians
achieved a certain measure of agreement.
And then came the theoretical computer scientists. They took the ap-
proach that it was not always enough to worry simply about the correctness
of proofs. In order for a proof to be useful, it should be small enough to read
and verify in a reasonable amount of time. Whereas in mathematics, rigor
is in, and parsimony is out, theoretical computer science has the notion of
an efficient proof, which requires both rigor and conciseness. Roughly, they
require that an efficient proof of an assertion be of size polynomial in the size
of the statement of the assertion.
From this revamped notion of proof springs forth the notion of NP, NP-
completeness, and much of modern complexity theory. While still a curiosity
to most mathematicians, there is a general consensus in the theory commu-
nity that this is the "correct" notion of what constitutes an efficient proof.
Then came the theoretical cryptographers. They decided to extend the
notion of efficient proofs. Ordinary proofs, they argue, are only one of many
ways of convincing someone of the proof of an assertion. Instead of consid-
ering proofs as some static entity that can be written down on paper, cryp-
tographers have developed the notion of proof systems in which an infinitely
powerful prover interacts with a polynomially bounded verifier according to
some prespecified rules. Furthermore, they relax the natural requirement
that it should be impossible to convince someone of an incorrect assertion.
Instead, they merely require that a charlatan has a nonnegligible probability
of being caught.
It remains to be seen whether the cryptographic notion of proof will sup-
plant the ordinary notion of proof. However, it has proven of inestimable
use within this field. Furthermore, it is the first reasonable notion of proof
which allows one to make a conceptually revolutionary distinction between
the transfer of confidence and the transfer of knowledge. It is now both the-
oretically and practically possible to convince someone of certain assertions
without imparting to that person any understanding about why the asser-
tions is true. This is a paradoxical development, since the original notions of
proof is a formalism for stating precisely why a theorem is true.
The goal of this chapter is to further generalize the notion cryptographic
notion of proof systems. Instead of having a single infinitely powerful prover
talking to a verifier, we consider scenarios in which we have several infinitely
powerful provers. We will consider the power of such models, and show
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that is suffices to work with much more restricted versions of our model.
Most importantly, we will analyze the knowledge complexity of our proof
systems. We will show that in our model there is a complete split between
confidence transfer and knowledge transfer. Any assertion that can be proved
in our model can be proved in a manner which releases no knowledge to
the verifier. This is the first such model for which this property has been
rigorously proved.
6.1.2 Outline of this chapter.
In Section 6.2 we formally and informally define our model. In Section 6.3,
we show that anything provable by k provers is provable by only 2 provers. In
Section 6.4, we prove a one-sideness result for 2-prover protocols, analogous
to the one-sideness results for single prover interactive proof systems. In
Section 6.5, we show that anything provable can be proved in statistical
zero-knowledge, modulo an assumption about the existence of commitment
with zero-knowledge proof schemes. In Section 6.6 we show how to implement
oblivious transfer, and thus establish our zero-knowledge result without any
assumptions.
6.2 The k-Prover Model: Formal and Infor-
mal Definitions.
There are two ways of expositing our new model. We can give formal defini-
tions, or we can describe our models intuitively. In this chapter, we will do
both. First we give our formal definitions, which must be written down, but
are not meant to be read, and then we will describe what these definitions
are trying to capture.
6.2.1 A Review of interactive proof systems and the
notion of zero-knowledge.
For the sake of completeness, we review the classical definitions of interactive




Definition 6.1 [GMR] Let P be a Turing machine which is computationally
unbounded and V be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. Both
machines have a read-only input tape, a work tape, and a random tape.
P has a write-only communication tape on which it writes messages for V.
V has a write-only communication tape on which it writes messages for P.
The input, which we will typically denote by x, is written on the input tape
of both the provers and the verifier. We call the ordered pair (P, V) an
interactive protocol.
In other words, we consider a model in which a probabilistic polynomially
bounded verifier interacts with an infinitely powerful prover. Like all Turing
machines, V has a special halt or accept state. Thus, we have some notion
of V, based on its interaction with P, accepting or not accepting a string x.
This allows us to define what it means for a language L to have an interactive
proof system.
Definition 6.2 Let L C {O,1}*. We say that L has an interactive proof
system(IPS) if there exists an interactive BPP machine V such that:
1. 3P such that (P, V) is an interactive protocol, and Vx E L,
prob(V accepts input x after interacting with P) > 2
2. Vx 0 L and VP such that (P, V) is an interactive protocol,
prob(V accepts input x after interacting with P) < 1
In other words, whenever x E 1, P is able to convince V of this fact with
probability at least 2, and whenever x g L, P is only able to deceive V with
probability at most }.
Zero-knowledge protocols.
Another key concept introduced in [GMR] is that of zero-knowledge proto-
cols. Intuitively, an interactive protocol is zero-knowledge if no verifier can
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learn anything from the protocol that it could not have learned before engag-
ing in the protocol. We in fact require something even stronger: It must be
possible to completely simulate any verifier's conversation with the prover.
Another, more technical requirement, is that we allow malicious verifier's
to have some arbitrary polynomial-sized advice tape to help them in their
conversations. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 6.3 Let (P, V) be an interactive proof-system for L. Let
Viewp,v(h)(x) denote the verifier's view during the protocol (i.e. the verifier's
coin tosses and the sequence of messages exchanged between the verifier and
the prover), with auxiliary input h. This is a probability space taken over
the coin tosses of V. We say that (P, V) is a statistical zero-knowledge pro-
tocol if for all probabilistic, polynomially bounded (PPT) verifiers V, there
exists a probabilistic Turing machine M which simulates V. That is, for all
x E L, and for all advice strings h, of size at most |x|", where a is some fixed
constant, the distribution M(x, h) (taken over M's random tape) is statis-
tically indistinguishable from ViewP,(h)(X). We also require that M(x, h)
terminate in expected polynomial time.
The advice string, h, is added to the definition for very technical reasons.
Basically, it allows one to prove closure properties for zero-knowledge pro-
tocols which would otherwise be false or difficult to prove. These technical
considerations don't come up in our model, and so we will delete any mention
of an auxiliary input. We could, if we wished, stick the advice functions into
our model without altering any of our proofs.
6.2.2 Formal definitions of the multi-prover model.
Definition 6.4 Let P1 , ... , Pk be Turing machine which are computationally
unbounded and V be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. All
machines have a read-only input tape, a work tape, and a random tape.
In addition, P1,...,PA share a read-only random tape in common. Each
P has a communication tape on which it writes' messages for V. V has
k communication tapes on which it writes messages for the provers. On
communication tape i, V writes messages to P;. We call the (k + 1)-tuple
(P 1,... Pk, V) a k-prover interactive protocol.
187
- . MA-b-ONOWNAMM I I - _- _ 1______A
Definition 6.5 Given an input ,x and interactive proof system
(P1 ,. .P - , P, V),
we define accept(Pi,..., Pk, V, x) as the probability that V accepts input x
after interacting with P 1, ... , P.
Definition 6.6 Let L C {O, 1}*. We say that L has a k-prover interactive
proof system(k-IPS) if there exists an interactive BPP machine V such that:
1. 3P1,...,Pk such that (P 1,...,P ,V) is an interactive protocol, and
Vx E L,
2
accept(P1, ..., PkV,x) > -3
2. Vx g L and VP1, ... , P such that (P1... ,Pk, V) is an interactive pro-
tocol,
accept(P1,...,Pk,V,x) 53
Definition 6.7 We denote by IP the class of languages which have k-prover
interactive protocols.
We should note here that the j, split between the acceptance proba-33
bilities for strings in and out of the language is purely arbitrary. We could
have just as well have required a split of i + e, - e or a split of 1 - e, e.
Fortunately, by the same argument as with ordinary interactive proof sys-
tems, these restrictions are all equivalent. Given a k prover interactive proof
system which achieves a . + e,) - e split, we can convert it to a protocol
which achieves a 1 - e, e split. We accomplish this by have the verifier run
the protocol polynomially many times, in series, and accept if and only if he
accepted for the majority of runs.
Definition 6.8 Let (P1 , ... , Pk, V) be a k-prover interactive proof-system
for L. Let Viewp....,p,v(X) denote the verifier's view during the protocol
(namely the verifier's coin tosses and the sequence of messages exchanged be-
tween the verifier and the provers). This is a probability space taken over the
coin tosses of V. We say that (P1 , ... , Pk, V) is a statistical zero-knowledge
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protocol if for all probabilistic, polynomially bounded (PPT) verifiers V,
there exists a probabilistic Turing machine M such that for all x E L, the
distribution M(x) (taken over M's random tape) is statistically indistin-
guishable from Viewp,.,pJ,(x), and M(x) terminates in expected polyno-
mial time. We say that (P1 ,..., Pk, V) is a perfect zero-knowledge protocol
if M(x) realizes the exact distribution of Viewp,,...,p,,,(x), and M(x) termi-
nates in expected polynomial time.
6.2.3 Informal Definitions.
The best way of imagining k-prover interactive proof systems is to imagine
k provers P 1, ... , Pk, who are trying to convince a verifier of some assertion
about some input, x. The verifier will toss a set of coins, and start posing
questions to the provers. Based on the input x and his random coin-tosses, he
poses a question to prover P1. The prover will then give him some answer.
Based on what he's seen (at this point his coin-tosses, the input, and the
answer to his first question), he formulates a question for the second prover,
P2. Likewise, he proceeds to question P3 ,..., Pk. He may then repeat this
questioning process, to his hearts desire. Of course, his total running time
must be polynomial in the size of an input.
Now, if the provers were allowed to confer with each other during the
protocol, there would be no point in having more than one of them. There-
fore, we impose the constraint that the provers are not allowed to confer with
each other during the protocol. We do allow them to collude as much as they
want before the beginning of the protocol. To do this, we allow them all to
have a common set of coin tosses and the input x. It is a homework exercise
to verify that this allows for essentially arbitrary colluding, since the provers
can simulate all the pre-protocol actions of the other provers.
Our definition of when a language has a k-prover interactive proof system
is just the natural extension of the ordinary definition, as a textual compari-
son will quickly reveal. Likewise, our definition for statistical zero-knowledge
is just the ordinary one altered to accommodate our new notion of proof
systems, and eliminating the advice strings in the definition.
189
I---- - - I _- I
What about other definitions of zero-knowledge?
There are almost as many flavors of zero-knowledge as flavors of ice cream
at Toscanini's.' One might wonder why we only attempted to extend the
notion of statistical and perfect zero-knowledge to the multi-prover scenario.
This is for an aesthetic reason: statistical and perfect zero-knowledge are
the strongest definition of zero-knowledge we have. Computational zero-
knowledge turns out to be a weaker and more difficult notion to work with.
We use it in the single-prover model in favor of statistical or perfect zero-
knowledge because we can then prove zero-knowledge properties for a much
wider range of protocols. However, in the multi-prover model, we can make
all our protocols achieve at least statistical zero-knowledge, so no weaker
definition need be considered.
6.3 On the Power of Two Verses Many
Provers.
In the last section, we introduced the k-prover model for interactive proof
systems. It essentially replaced the single prover found in the ordinary model
with many noncommunicating provers. The natural question to ask after cre-
ating this or any model is "What for?". An interesting model should capture
our intuition about some phenomena that is of interest to us, and should
have some some nontrivial properties that shed light on this phenomena.
This is an admittedly (perhaps purposely) vague statement which we will
nevertheless try to adhere to in the coming sections.
6.3.1 Why should many provers more powerful than
one?
It is not immediately obvious why having more than one prover should alter in
any way the class of assertions which can be proven. Intuitively, one might
argue, one infinitely powerful prover should be enough. Without proving
anything one way or another, we give some intuition for why having more
than one prover should help.
1Toscanini's is an ice cream parlor at Cambridge. This is not a compensated
endorsement.
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It is common for police to interrogate suspected criminals. 2 On good
days, they will have two suspects instead of just one, in which case they
will invariably separate them during questioning. The reason for this is to
catch inconsistencies. If the two suspects were together, they could easily
corroborate each other's testimony. However, if suspect A was not aware of
suspect B's answer to a question, he would not necessarily be able to back
him up.
Now, if it is harder to convince someone of a falsehood without being
detected, this will enhance ones credibility if one isn't caught. Intuitively,
this heightened credibility may allow one to convince someone of harder to
believe assertions. If lie detectors really existed, then passing such a test
would lend credibility to whatever one had said. Likewise, if questioning
two suspects apart from each other is more likely to reveal inconsistencies
in their story, then this procedure will also lend greater credibility if they
do give consistent answers. A story that is not believable when told by a
single person may be more believable when two people give independent,
corroborating reports. The intention of this informal argument is merely
to suggest the source of whatever extra power we may get. Unfortunately,
whether many provers can prove more than two is still very open.
Most of our belief that they can indeed prove more comes from what
we can't prove. For instance, we can't prove any analog to the result of
Goldwasser-Sipser[GS], which says that IP = AM'. This implies that all
interactive proofs can be reduced to probabilistic games of complete infor-
mation. There is no such equivalence known for the multi-prover case, and
so these proof systems seem to possess more of the flavor of games of in-
complete information. Games of incomplete information seem to be more
complex than games of complete information, and this complexity may be
exploitable in terms of language recognition power.
Furthermore, we cannot even prove that IP 2 is contained in PSPACE.
This is true even if the verifier simply sends random bits to each prover, and
then computes some polynomial-time predicate based on the input x,. the
random strings sent, and the answers received. In the single-prover model,
2 Likewise for civil rights activists, anti-nuke demonstrators, nonwhites, etc., but since
I would never dream of injecting politics into my thesis, I won't go into this.
3 The complexity class AM, proposed by Babai[Bab], is like interactive proofs, except
that in AM protocols, all the questions given by the verifier are randomly generated by a
fair coin.
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however, it is not hard to prove that IP EPSPACE[F].
6.3.2 Two provers are as many as we need.
Given our belief that two provers can prove more than one, it seems reason-
able to also believe that three provers can prove more than two. Likewise,
we might believe that for all i < j, IP; will be properly contained in IP.
However, it turns out that IPk = IP 2 for k > 2.
To prove this theorem, the following definitions are useful.
Definition 6.9 We define a history H to be finite sequence of ordered pairs
of strings. We denote by R the set of histories. Thus, if H E 7H, then H is
of the form (qi, a1 ), (q2, a 2 ), ... , (qj, ai).
Definition 6.10 For a fixed input, x, we define a strategy S to be a function
from N x E* to distributions on E*. In other words, a strategy S takes as
input [(q1, a1),..., (q,1, a;_1)], qj and produces a, according to some distri-
bution. A strategy is deterministic if its range consists of distributions on
single elements. That is, given an input string, a partial conversation, and a
question, it will always produce the same answer.
Remark: If strategy S is deterministic, the values of ai,..., a;_ 1 may be
reconstructed from q, ... , qi_1. Thus, for deterministic strategies S, we may
equivalently represent it as a function that takes a query sequence q1,..., qi,
and outputs answer qj.
The above definitions are merely a formalization of what we mean by a
prover's strategy. We will freely identify a prover with its strategy.
The following easy to prove lemma simplifies our analysis. It states that
in many circumstances we can assume that all the provers' strategies are
deterministic.
Lemma 6.1 Let (P 1,..., Pk, V) be an interactive protocol such that on in-
put x the verifier accepts x with probability p,. Then there exist P1,..., Pk
such that
1. P1,...,Pk are deterministic.
2. On input x, (P1,..., Pk, V) will accept with probability at least px.
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Proof: The proof of this lemma proceeds in two steps. First, we convert
a protocol in which the provers use arbitrary probabilistic strategies to one
in which they, at the beginning of the protocol, randomly choose a deter-
ministic strategy which they abide by for the duration of the protocol. This
transformation will leave unchanged the probability that the verifier accepts
x. We then transform this protocol into a purely deterministic one (from the
provers' point of view).
To accomplish the first transformation, we can just have each prover Pi
exhaustively go through every possible history 7 and question q, and sample
its response, a, according to strategy S;. Note that there are only a finite set
of histories and questions, since the verifier has some polynomial bound on
the number of steps it may execute. Prover P can then use these sampled
responses for the rest of the protocol. Clearly, it cannot matter to the verifier
whether the random choices made by P were made on the spot or decided
on beforehand. Thus, the probability that the verifier accepts x will be
unchanged.
After the first transformation, we have the following scenario. On input x,
deterministic strategies S,..., Si are chosen according to some distribution.
The expected value of accept(S ,..., SA, V, x) will be p. Now, by a standard
probability argument, there must be fixed deterministic strategies Si', ... , Sl'
such that accept(Si',..., Sk', V, x) is no less than the expected value, that is,
accept(S', 
... , Si', V, x) ; p.
The lemma follows. I
Lemma 6.1 will simplify our collapsing theorem, because now we can
assume that all the provers, good or bad, are using deterministic strategies.
This will allow a single prover to state precisely what another prover will do
under a given set of circumstances.
We cannot so simplify the verifier's strategy. If the verifier's strategy
is deterministic, then interaction can't increase the set of recognizable lan-
guages beyond NP. However, we can use the standard trick of viewing the
verifier as first sampling its set of random bits, and then acting determinis-
tically based on these bits. This corresponds to the first step of the above
reduction for the provers.
We now prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 6.1 IPk = IP 2 .
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Historical Note: The above theorem was first proved in [BGKW]. Subse-
quently, independently, this theorem was also proved by Fortnow, Rompel,
and Sipser[FRS].
Proof: Given an interactive protocol (P1,...,Pk, V) for a language L, we
produce a two-prover protocol (P1, P2, V') for L. We accomplish this trans-
formation in two stages. First, we create a 2-prover protocol that partially
achieves the requirements of interactive proof systems. We then show that
by running this protocol many times in series we can create a 2-prover inter-
active proof system for L.
On input x, where |xi = n, let Si be the strategy used by P, which with-
out loss of generality we assume is deterministic. Likewise, we also assume
without loss of generality that V asks exactly m questions of each prover,
where m is polynomial in n.
The core of our reduction is given in Figure 6.1. At the end of running
this 2-prover protocol, the verifier V outputs either "good," "bad," or "ugly."
Intuitively, V' outputs "good" if it detects no cheating, and determines that V
would have accepted given the simulated conversation. Similarly, V' outputs
"bad" if it detects no cheating, but determines that V would have rejected.
It outputs "ugly" if it detects cheating by the provers. A judgment of "good"
is positive evidence, though not conclusive, that x E L, and a judgment of
"bad" is negative evidence, though not conclusive, that x E L. A judgment
of "ugly," however, is conclusive evidence that the provers are cheating.
Now if x E L, then the provers will act as specified, and thus (P1 , P2, V')
will faithfully simulate the original protocol. Thus, V' will output "good"
with probability at least 2, "bad" with probability , and "ugly" with prob-
ability 0.
If x g L, then we would ideally wish to show that, for any provers P1, P2,
verifier V' would output "good" with probability at most . This would prove
our theorem immediately. Unfortunately, we cannot make this guarantee. A
malicious P1 can use its knowledge of the simulated V's random coin tosses,
R, to increase its chance of getting V to accept. What we can prove is
that if V' outputs "good" too often, then it will also output "ugly" with
nonnegligible probability.
Lemma 6.2 Let P1, P2 be deterministic provers, such that (F1, 2, V) is an
interactive protocol. Let x 0 L. Then with probability 2, bits R will be such
that one of the two cases must hold.
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Protocol 2-Prover-Partial(P1,... , Ps, V, x)
1: Verifier V' uniformly chooses a string R of coin tosses that would
have been used by verifier V. Thus, R corresponds to the contents
of V's random tape. It sends R to P1'.
2: Prover Pj computes the entire transcript of the conversation V
would have had with P1,..., Pk. This is possible since the provers'
strategies are deterministic, as is V's strategy once R has been
selected. Let q) be the jth question V asks Pi, and let a) be the
jth answer V receives from P. Prover Pj sends this transcript to
V'.
3: Verifier V' uniformly selects i E [1, k], and j E [1, m]. It sends
il qi,.., ) oP/.
4: Prover P2 sends ai to V'.
5: Verifier V' outputs either "good," "bad," or "ugly," according to
the following rules.
- If the transcript given to V' has V asking a question different
from what it would ask given the conversation so far and V's
coin tosses, then V' outputs "ugly."
- If P2 gives anything but aj in Step 4, V' outputs "ugly."
- Otherwise, V' outputs "good" if V would have accepted given
the transcript and its coin tosses, and "bad" if V would have
rejected.
Figure 6.1: Core protocol for simulating k provers with 2.
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1. Prover P1 acts in such a way that verifier V' will output "bad" with
probability 1.
2. Prover P1 acts in such a way that verifier V' will output "ugly" with
probability at least 1/mk. Recall that k is the number of provers, and
m is the number of questions asked of each prover.
Proof: First, we give the intuition behind our protocol. The good prover,
Pj, outputs a transcript of the conversations that P1 would have had with
verifier V if the verifier's random coin tosses were equal to R. We cannot
say so much about the transcript output by a bad prover, P1. Indeed, the
transcripts produced by P1 may not be consistent with the input/output
behavior of any real set of provers, since it may use knowledge unavailable
to a real prover. However, prover P2 is not allowed such foresight, and thus
its input/output behavior does implicitly define a set of provers P*,..., Pk*.
Intuitively, prover P1 must make his transcripts consistent with P'*.. .,P*,
or be caught with nonnegligible probability. this motivates the following
definitions.
Definition 6.11 Fix input x, and let P1 ,..., Pk be deterministic provers,
such that P uses strategy S; on input x. Let V be a probabilistic verifier, and
let R be a sequence of coin tosses. We define transcript(Si, ... , Sk, V, R, x)
to be the transcript of the conversation that would ensue if protocol
(P1 , .. ., Pk, V) were run on input x, and the verifier's sequence of coin tosses
were equal to R.
Definition 6.12 Let V be a probabilistic verifier, and let R be a sequence
of coin tosses. We say a transcript r is (V, R)-consistent if all the questions
asked by the verifier in r are equal to what V would have asked given that,
1.. Verifier V's sequence of coin tosses is equal to R.
2. The earlier portion of the conversation, as given by r, had actually
happened.
By definition, transcript(Si, ... , Sk, V, R, x) is (V, R)-consistent.
Note that if V runs in probabilistic polynomial time, then testing if a
transcript r is (V, R)-consistent is in P. This test is embodied in the first
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condition of Step 5 in protocol 2-PROVER-PARTIAL. It is also not hard to
see that if ri,r 2 are both (V, R)-consistent, but ti # t2, then they must have
one of the provers give different answers given the same sequence of previous
questions to it.
We now resume with the main part of the proof. With input string x, let
strategy Si be defined as follows. On input ([(qi, a1),..., (qj, as)], qi+i), Si
outputs the answer given by P2 when asked i, q, ... , q' on input x.
On input x ( L, and with bit sequence R, prover P1 can output
transcript(S*, ... ,SZ, V, R, x), or something else. By the definition of k-
prover interactive proof systems, we know that for any set of prover strate-
gies S*,..., S*, only i of the R's will cause transcript(S,. . .,S, V, R,x)
to have the verifier accept. Thus, for 2 of R's, the only way in which the3A
verifier can possibly output "good" is for P1 to give some transcript r which
is not equal to transcript(S*, .. . , Sk, V, R, x). It suffices then to show that
whenever this happens, V' will output "ugly" with probability ;> 1/mk.
For ease of exposition, let gj be the jth question asked by the verifier to
prover i, according to transcript(S*,... , S*, V, R, x), and let a denote the
ith prover's answer to this question. Similarly, let q[r] be the jth question
asked by the verifier to prover i, according to r, and let aj[r] denote the
corresponding answer.
We can assume without loss of generality that r is (V, R)-consistent, since
otherwise, the verifier would output "bad." Hence, there must be some i E
[1, k] and j E [1, m] such that q = qj[r] for I E [1,j], but a' # a'[r]. However,
with probability 1/mk the verifier will send P2 the values i, q,..., q). Then,
by definition of Si, the answer given by P2 will be equal to a), and the
verifier will output "bad." Hence, V' will output "bad" with probability at
least 1/mk. The lemma follows. I
Using Lemma 6.2, we now exhibit the complete transformation from a k-
prover to a 2-prover protocol, given by the protocol in Figure 6.2, and prove
its correctness.
Now, if x E L, then each iteration of protocol 2-PROVER-PARTIAL will
output "good" with probability at least 2. Thus, with very high probability,
the verifier will output "good" at least 4kmn times, as n grows large.4
4 Note that we do not care about values of z whose length is not sufficiently large. This
possibly troublesome set is finite, and thus easily dealt with.
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Protocol 2-Prover-Complete(P1,... , Pk, V, x)
1: Pj,P2,V' execute protocol 2-PROVER-PARTIAL(P1,...,P,VX)
8kmn times in series. If V' ever outputs "ugly," it aborts the
protocol and rejects. Otherwise, it accepts x iff it outputs "good"
more than 4kmn times.
Figure 6.2: Driver protocol for simulating k provers with 2.
If, on the other hand, x L, we wish to argue that with high probability,
either not enough iterations of the protocol will output "good," or one of
the iterations will output "ugly." With high probability, only 3kmn of the
iterations of the protocol will allow the first prover to output a faithful sim-
ulations and still have the verifier accept. Thus, with high probability, the
first prover would have to run kmn cheating simulations in order to make
the verifier accept x. In this case, the verifier will output "ugly" for one of
these simulations with probability
1 - (1 - mk)mkn > 1 -n,
for n large. Thus, with high probability, the verifier will reject x, and we are
done. I
6.3.3 Discussion, and open problems.
Can we collapse rounds as well as provers?
The theorem we have just proved illustrates two nontrivial facts about lan-
guage recognition in the multi-prover model. First and foremost, it is in-
teresting, though in hindsight not unsurprising, that having more than two
provers doesn't help. Philosophically, the ability to check provers against
each other, while keeping them all somewhat in the dark, has a qualitative
effect. Once the proof system model is complicated enough to have this
property at all, it reaps the full advantage there is to be had by it.
Secondly, the subprotocol 2-PROVER-PARTIAL effects a collapse not just
in the number of provers, but in the number of rounds of communication
as well. The essence of a proof system, if not the technically correct accep-
tance/rejection probabilities, is captured by this protocol. The amplification
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obtained by repeatedly running the protocol is a purely mundane step; the
magic has already occurred. Indeed, if one could obtain such properties in a
constant number of rounds in the standard model, one could collapse IP to
IP[2] (interactive proofs with only two rounds of communication) by running
the protocol many times in parallel. However, as is shown in [AGH], this is
almost certainly not true.
One might ask, in fact, why one couldn't simply run 2-PROVER-PARTIAL
many times in parallel, thus giving constant round interactive proofs. Stan-
dard interactive proofs can be run in parallel with roughly the same amplifi-
cation in security as when they are run serially. However, this amplification
property breaks down in the case of multiple provers. One of the more inter-
esting unsolved problems in this area is whether there is a cleverer scheme for
amplifying the acceptance/rejection probabilities of 2-prover proof systems
without increasing the number of rounds of communication.
The notion of robustness for protocol transformations.
In this section, we showed how to perform two forms of protocol transfor-
mations. We showed (existentially) how to convert a proof system with
probabilistic provers into a proof system with deterministic provers, and we
showed how to convert a multi-prover protocol into a 2-prover protocol. In
all these transformations, the verifier remains a probabilistic polynomial time
machine, and is thus not required to grow significantly more powerful. One
may ask whether the transformation leaves the power of the provers essen-
tially unchanged as well. Roughly, we call a transformation which leaves the
power of the provers unchanged a robust protocol.
Just what it means to leave the power of the provers unchanged is open
to interpretation. One tack would be to say that each new prover P' must
consist of a probabilistic polynomial machine which is allowed to, in the
course of the execution of the protocol, make polynomially many queries of
each of the original provers. In other words, a new prover, P', might make a
sequence of queries to the old prover P7 , restart it and make a new sequence
of queries, back it up one step and make a different last query, then make a
sequence of queries to the old P2 , etc. In this case, we say the protocol is
weakly robust.
A stronger requirement would be to only allow a new prover to have
polynomial accesses to the prover it is replacing (this notion is only applicable
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if a k-prover protocol is being transformed into a k-prover protocol). Thus,
the new prover P' can only use the old P5. We call such a transformation
robust.
The strongest notion along these lines is to require that each new prover,
Pj, is a probabilistic polynomial time machine which is only allowed to have
a single conversation with the old P. We call such a transformation strongly
robust.
Intuitively, robust transformations are much more realistic. In real proto-
col situations, the "provers" are not infinitely more powerful at all. Instead,
they may have some secret information, or access to some fairly specific ex-
tra ability. The notion of infinitely powerful provers is interesting from the
standpoint of complexity theory, and is useful as a way of modeling adver-
saries with unknown abilities. However, it should not be considered a realistic
requirement to place on those who must implement the protocols. Protocols
should be executable by relatively weak entities, and safe against infinitely
powerful entities.
Having made a set of requirements, it is interesting to see if we can
actually fulfill them. Unfortunately, this is hard. Our transformation from
probabilistic provers to deterministic ones does not fit any of these notions
of robustness. Each prover is essentially required to compute a deterministic
strategy which is as good as the random one. While we have an existential
proof that such a deterministic strategy exists, finding it could take a great
deal of time.
All of the protocol transformations that will be described in this thesis
implicitly use the probabilistic to deterministic transformation, and thus also
fail to be robust. This weakness is disappointing, since it makes these results
existential in nature. Thus, we prove that if there is a k-prover interactive
proof system for L, then there is a 2 prover interactive proof system for L.
However, being able to implement a k-prover interactive proof system for L
does not allow one to implement a 2-prover interactive proof system for L.
This difficulty is not unique to the multi-prover scenario. Neither the
original protocol transformation used by Goldwasser-Sipser to show that
IP = AM, nor the simpler transformation due to Kilian, is robust. Be-
cause of this, neither the protocol transformation used by Implagliazzo-
Yung, to show that IP is in zero-knowledge, nor a later transforma-
tion, discovered by Ben-Or-Goldreich-Goldwasser-Histad-Kilian-Micali-
Rogaway[BGGHKMR], are robust. This is a rather depressing state of affairs,
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which has received remarkably little attention. The problem of making pro-
tocol transformations robust, or showing that this would be difficult, is still
very open.
Interestingly, it is possible to robustly transform any 2-prover interactive
proof system for L into a 2-prover interactive proof system which is in sta-
tistical zero-knowledge. Indeed this transformation is strongly robust, in the
sense outlined above. Due to space concerns, this thesis contains only the
much simpler transformation, which is not robust. The robust transforma-
tion, which requires the full use of our oblivious transfer machinery, coupled
with some results about communication complexity, is briefly outlined in
[BGKW].
6.4 A One-sideness Result for 2-Prover
Proof Systems.
6.4.1 Definitions, and statement of the main theo-
rem.
In an interactive proof system for some language L, the verifier can make
two types of error. A verifier can either
1. Accept a string x which is not in L, or
2. Reject a string x which is in L
It is not hard to see that the first type of error can be eliminated exactly for
those languages which are in NP. Hence, this case is not interesting. The
second case is much more interesting, and thus warrants a definition.
Definition 6.13 Let (P1,..., Pk, V) be an interactive proof system for some
language L. We say that (P1,..., Pk, V) is one-sided if
(Vx E L)accept(P,.. .,Pk, V,x) = 1.
In short, an interactive proof system is one-sided if the verifier never
mistakenly rejects a good string. For the case of a single prover, we have the
classic theorem of Goldreich, Mansour, and Sipser:
201
Theorem 6.2 [GMS] Let L be an arbitrary language in IP(= IP 1 ). Then
there exists a one-sided interactive proof system (P, V) for L.
Thus, any language L that has an ordinary (one prover) interactive proof
system also has a one-sided interactive proof system. A natural question to
ask then is whether this theorem holds for proof systems which have more
than one prover. In this section, we answer this question in the affirmative.
Specifically, we prove:
Theorem 6.3 Let L be an arbitrary language in IP 2. Then there exists a
one-sided interactive proof system (P1 , P2, V) for L.
Note that we need not prove analogous theorems for IP 3, IP4 ,..., since
by the result of the previous section these language classes are equal to IP 2.
Proof: Our proof is completely derivative of the techniques of [GMS]. First,
we show how to reduce an assertion about language membership into an
assertion about the size of a certain set. We then use a lemma due to Lautman
to show how to prove these assertions in a one-sided fashion.
In our transformation from ordinary interactive proof systems to one-
sided interactive proof systems, we need to prove assertions about the coin
tosses used by the original verifier. To this end, we make the following
definition:
Definition 6.14 Let (P1 ,..., Pk, V) be a multi-party protocol, where
provers P1, P2 are deterministic. Let b(n) be a polynomial upper bound
on the number of random bits used by V on an input of size n. For any
input x, we define accepting(P1,..., Pk, V, x, b) to be the set of bit strings R,
of length b(lxI), such that V would accept x if its random tape consisted of
R.
The following identity follows immediately from the above definition:
|accepting(Pi,... , Pk, V, x, b)|
accept(P1 ,.. . , Pk,V, x) 2 b()
Thus, given a proof system for an arbitrary language L, asserting that x E L
is equivalent to asserting that accepting(P1 , ... , Pk, V, x, b) is large. The key
idea in our transformation is to use a lemma due to Lautman to give a
one-sided proof that a set is large.
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6.4.2 Covering sets and Lautman's lemma.
Before stating Lautman's lemma, some new terminology is useful. Lautman's
lemma applies to general sets, so the definitions below will not explicitly refer
to our definitions above. For continuity, note that we will always have set S,
be equal to accepting(P, .. ., Pk, V, x, b).
Definition 6.15 Let S, T be subsets of {0, 1}". Let r E {o1}. We define
the function Ihit(S, T, r)I to be those t E T such that t E r E S, where the G
operator performs componentwise exclusive-or.
Definition 6.16 Let S, T be subsets of {0, 1}". We say that T is a covering
set for S if, for all r E {O, 1}', Ihit(S,T,r) > ITI/2.
We are interested in classes of sets for which covering sets provably do or
do not exist. A trivial observation to make is that if |S| 2", no covering
set T exists. If r is distributed uniformly over {0, 1}", the expected value of
|hit(S, T, r)I will be equal to
ISI -ITI
by the linearity of expectation. For |S| 2"-, this is at most ITI/2. A
useful corollary of the above identity is that
prob | hit(S, T, r)}|>!c. - S -.TI
If |SI > 2"-1, and T = {0, 1}n, then Ihit(S,T,r)| > ITI/2 for all r E
{0, 1}". Thus, the set of all strings in {0, 1}n is a trivial covering sets. The
following lemma of Lautman shows that every sufficiently large S has a small
covering set.
Lemma 6.3 [Lautman's Lemma] Let S be a subset of {0, 1}", and let IS| >j - 2n. Then, for some constant c independent of n and S, there exists a3
covering set T C {0, }"l of size at most n*. This lemma holds when the
factor of 2 is replaced by any fraction greater than }. 1
3 2
Lautman's lemma is useful to us in at least two ways. First, it converts
a statement of the form "Property P holds for most values of x," into a
statement of the form "Property P' holds for all values of x." It is this
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conversion which will allow us to achieve one-sided protocols. Second, the
lemma also allows us to differentiate large sets from small sets. If |SI 5 2 n/3 ,
then for all possible |TI,
prob(jhit(S,T,r)| ;> ITI/2) < 2
Thus, if S is too small, no set T exists with the above two properties. Fur-
thermore, any set T will be exposed with nonnegligible probability by a
randomly chosen r.
6.4.3 Construction of the one-sided protocols.
We now show how to transform an ordinary multi-prover proof system into
a one-sided multi-prover proof system. We assume without loss of generality
that the proof system has exactly two provers, both of which are determin-
istic. We also assume that V runs for at most b(n) steps on an input of size
n, and asks exactly m questions of each prover. First, we consider protocol
ONE-SIDED-PARTIAL, given in Figure 6.3.
The following lemma formally states that the protocol is ones-sided, and
detects incorrect proofs with nonnegligible probability.
Lemma 6.4 Let (P1 , P2, V) be an interactive proof system for language L.
If x E L, and (P, P2, V') execute protocol ONE-SIDED-PARTIAL(P 1, P 2, V, x),
then V' will always output "good.". If x g L and V' follows its protocol
ONE-SIDED-PARTIAL(P 1, P2, V, x), then for all provers P1, P2 , (P1, P2 , V') will
output "bad." with probability at least 1/6mp.
Proof: First, we show that V' will always output "good" when x E L. If
x E L, then accepting(P1 , P2, V, x, b) will be at least 2 ).2 6N. Hence, by Laut-
man's lemma, such a polynomially sized covering set T will indeed exist. By
the definition of a covering set, and by the definition of the protocol, we have
that for any R, more than half of the Rk's will be in accepting(P, P2 , V, ., b).
Thus, for any R, more than half of the transcripts output by Pj will be ac-
cepting. Also, P2's answers will always be consistent with those given by Pl,
by definition of the protocol, so V' will always output "good."
We now consider the case where x g L. We wish to bound above the
probability that V' outputs "good." We can assume without loss of generality
that P1 , P2 are deterministic.
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Protocol One-Sided-Partial(P1, P2, V, x)
1: Let S be equal to accepting(P1, P2, V, x, b), and let T be a covering
set for S, where |TI ; nc. Here, c is a constant depending on
P1, P2, V, and lxi = n. Prover Pj' sends T to V.
2: Verifier V' picks R E {0, 1}b(n), and sends R to P11. Writing T =
{t1, ... ,,}, we define R[k] = R e tk, for k E [1,p]. These strings
are to thought of as possible random tapes of the original verifier
V.
3: For each k E [1,p], prover P' computes the set of transcripts of the
conversations V would have had with P1, P2, given random tape
R[k]. Let q)[k] be the jth question V asks P, using tape R[k],
and let a[k] be the jth answer V receives from P, using tape R[k].
Prover P' sends these transcripts, which we denote by r[1],... Ir[p]
to V'.
4: Verifier V' uniformly selects i E [1, 2], and j E [1, m]. It also chooses
k uniformly such that r[k] is an accepting transcript. Verifier V'
send P2 the values of q[k],... q[k] and a'[k],..., aj_ 1[k]
5: Prover P2 sends a)[k] to V'.
6: Verifier V' outputs either "good," or "bad," according to the fol-
lowing rules.
- If no more than p/2 of the transcripts were accepting, then
V' outputs "bad."
- If any of the transcripts given to V' has V asking a question
different from what it would ask given the conversation so far
and V's coin tosses, then V' outputs "bad."
- If P2 gives anything but a'[k] in Step 4, V' outputs "bad."
- Otherwise, V' outputs "good."
Figure 6.3: Core protocol for creating one-sided interactive proofs.
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Protocol One-Sided-Complete(P1, P2, V, x)
1: Pj, P2, V' execute protocol ONE-SIDED-PARTIAL(P1, P2,V,x) 6nmp
times in series. If V' ever outputs "bad," it aborts the protocol and
rejects. Otherwise, it accepts.
Figure 6.4: Driver protocol for making protocols one-sided.
As with the proof of Theorem 6.1, let strategy Si be defined as follows.
On input ([(q1 , ai), ... , (qj, a1)], q+i), Si outputs the answer given by P2 when
asked i, q[k],..., q[k] on input x.
By our definitions, we have that S = accepting(P*, P2*, V, x, b) will be
at most 2 b(n)/ 3 . Thus, for any set T, and a uniformly distributed R,
the probability that |hit(S, T,r)I > ITI/2 will be bounded above by 2/3.
Thus, with probability at least 1/3, for no more than half of the R1's will
transcript(P1, P2, V, R, x) be accepting. In such a situation, the only way
in which V' can possibly output "good" is for P1 to make at least one of the
transcripts r[k] be accepting, and different from transcript(P1, P2, V, R, x).
Now, if r[k] is an accepting transcript, then in Step 4 of the protocol,
verifier V' will be select it for testing with probability at least 1. If this
happens, then the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6.1, it will be
detected with probability at least 1 (the number of provers is equal to 2).
Combining all the conditional probabilities, the probability of the verifier
outputting "bad" on input x g L is at least
1 1 1 1
= . I
2 p 2m 6m
Finally, it is easy to boost the verifier's chance of catching false proofs by
running the protocol many times in series. The final protocol is as follows.
If x is in the language, then the verifier is guaranteed to accept all the
runs, and is thus guaranteed to accept. If, on the other hand, x is not in the
language, then the probability that P1 , P2 could fool the verifier 6nmp times
is at most
1 - 1 ) np< 2-e(n), 6 mp
6mp ~
for n large. The theorem follows.
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6.5 Transforming 2-prover proof systems
into zero-knowledge 2-prover proof sys-
tems.
6.5.1 Using a normal form for 2-prover protocols.
We can greatly facilitate the proof of our theorem by using the normal form
for 2-prover proof systems established in the proof of our one-sideness result.5
Proof systems transformed according to Protocol one-sided-partial have the
following general form:
1. Pj sends V' a message, ao.
2. V' sends P1' a sequence of random coin tosses, whose length depends
only on Ix 1.
3. Pj sends V' a message, a1.
4. V' picks a random sequence of bits, q2, whose length depends only on
lx.
5. Based on the values of ao, q1, a1 , q2, and x, V' deterministically decides
whether to abort the protocol. If not, the verifier deterministically
computes Q, A1 .
6. V' sends Q to P2.
7. P2 sends an answer, A2 to V'. V' accepts iff A1 = A2.
If x E L, where L is the language accepted by the untransformed interactive
proof system, then V' will always accept. Note that this implies that prover
P2 will be able to make A2 = A1 for any values of q1, q2. There exists
some constant c, such that for all sufficiently large x g L, and for all prover
strategies, V' will reject with probability at least |x|-c.
Note that it does not matter what P, learns after Step 3 of the protocol.
Thus, in a certain sense, there is no need to hide anything from P1, a fact we
will exploit.
'Here is where our transformation ceases to be robust.
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Other than these observations, We do not need to use any details about
how ao, q1, ai, q2, Q, A1 are computed, except that all the verifier's computa-
tions are in probabilistic polynomial time. We say that a protocol in this
form is in one-sided normal form with respect to language L.
How the verifier receives information, and how to hide it.
To motivate our protocol, we first consider how a possibly cheating verifier
may acquire knowledge. First, the verifier learns ao, ai, Q, A1 , which clearly
has the potential to leak knowledge. Second, a cheating verifier may give
the second prover a query Q', that is different from Q, potentially getting an
answer A2, which is different from A1 . Seeing the answer to such an illicit
question may give the verifier extra information.
We will use two different approaches to eliminating these sources of in-
formation. First, we will never allow the verifier to see ao, a1 . this lack of
knowledge still allows the verifier to compute q1, q2, which are random, but
makes it impossible for the verifier to compute Q, A1 . This task must there-
fore be delegated to P1, who is not trusted. We will perform this task by
using our techniques for commital with zero-knowledge proofs.
The task of eliminating information about Q, A1 is somewhat subtler,
since we must give the verifier some representation of Q, A1 in order for it to
communicate productively with P2. However, this representation must not
convey knowledge. We also need to ensure that the verifier really does give
this representation of Q to P2 . In order to do this, we use the unbreakable,
unforgeable information-theoretic encryption scheme introduced in the last
chapter.
6.5.2 A zero-knowledge protocol using envelopes
with zero-knowledge proofs.
We now specify how to transform a protocol in the normal form given above
into a protocol which is in zero-knowledge. This reduction will assume as
primitive operations the ability to commit bits, and to give zero-knowledge
proofs about the bits one has committed. It also assumes that the commital
and zero-knowledge proof subprotocol may be simulated. Our protocol and
simulator are given in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. For simplicity, we use the notation
described above for naming the messages. That is, ao is shorthand for the
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first message given by P1 to V, q1 is shorthand for the first question that V
would have sent to P1, etc. We assume without loss of generality that each
string (e.g. ao) has a fixed length, as a function of lxi.
We wish to prove that our protocol transformation keeps the protocol a
proof system, in some weak sense, and provides zero-knowledge. We require
the following characteristics from our commital system with zero-knowledge
proofs:
1. The second prover, even if malicious, gets no information during
the commital and decommital protocols. More formally, the second
prover's view depends only on the input x, his strategy, and whatever
transpired in the preprocessing stage.
2. If P' commits a bit b, the verifier gets no knowledge (in the information
theoretic sense) about b, except with probability less than 1/Ix|c, for
any constant c, and lxi sufficiently large. The simulator can simulate
the commital of a bit without actually specifying any value for the bit.
This simulation will be statistically indistinguishable from an actual
bit commital.
3. The simulator can forge zero-knowledge proofs about forged bit com-
mitals. Specifically, if a set of bits, whose commital was simulated by
the simulator, there exists some setting such that the assertion about
them would be true, then the simulated zero-knowledge proof will be
statistically indistinguishable from an actual zero-knowledge proof of
the assertion. As a corollary, giving a zero-knowledge proof reveals
nothing about the committed bits (again in the information theoretic
sense) than the fact that the assertion is true.
4. If provers P1 , P2 fail to properly commit a set of bits, or commits a set
of bits and then attempt to prove a false assertion about these bits,
they will be detected with some constant probability p > 0.
A more concrete way of viewing this abstraction is to imagine that the provers
have envelopes in which they can place messages, and public notaries. At
some point in the protocol, the public notaries will look inside these envelopes
and certify that some true statement about them is indeed correct.
We use a very general description of our commital scheme because we
do not need to know any of its details for our proof. Note, however, that
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Protocol 2-Prover-Zero-Knowledge(Pi, P2, V)
Note: We assume that (P1, P2 , V) is in normal form, as described
above. In the the description below, ao, q1, a1 , q2, Q, A1 are gener-
ated according to the same distributions that would be generated
by (Pi, P2, V). The party which will generate each of these values
in the transformed protocol will have access to all the necessary
information that the original party had.
0: Before the protocol has begun, provers Pj and P2 agree on a ran-
dom prime p, whose length is equal to |xic for some fixed c. The
constant c is chosen so that |pl will be more than twice the max-
imum possible length of Q, A1 , or x. Fixing p, they also agree on
random encryption keys, K1 and K 2, (according to the encryption
scheme presented in the last chapter) and on the value of ao.
1: Pj sends p to verifier V', who verifies that it is prime. P1 commits
ao, K1 , K 2 to the verifier.
2: V' computes q1, and sends it to Pf.
3: Pj computes and commits a1.
4: V' computes q2, and sends it to P11.
5: P11 computes A1, Q, and sends K 1(Q), K 2(A1 ) to V', along with a
zero-knowledge proof that this is what V would have computed,
given the values of ao, ai, q1, q2, K 1, K 2. If V' is not convinced by
the proof, it aborts the protocol.
6: V' sends K1(Q) to P2. P2' aborts if he gets something which is
not a legitimate encryption(under key K1 ). Otherwise, P2 inverts
K1 to obtain Q, computes P 2's response to this question, A2, then
sends back K 2 (A 2 ). V' accepts iff K 2(A 1 ) = K 2 (A 2 ) (and hence iff
A1 = A2 ).




Simulator 2-Prover-Zero-Knowledge(P, P2, V)
1: The simulator generates and sends a prime p of the correct size to
the possibly malicious verifier, V. verifier. The simulator simulates
the commital of ao, K 1 , K 2 (note that it does not need to actually
generate any such values).
2: V computes some value, 41, and sends it to the simulator.
3: The simulator simulates the commital of a1 .
4: V computes some value, 41, and sends it to the simulator.
5: The simulator picks < Q > and < A1 > at random from Z,, and
sends them to V. It then simulates the proof that these values
would be K 1 (Q), K 2(A1 ) given the values of ao a, ,q1, 7 q2 7K 1, K2.
6: V sends some value, < Q > to the simulator (now simulating P2).
If < Q >f#< Q >, the simulator simulates P2 aborting the protocol.
Otherwise, it sends < A1 > to V.
Figure 6.6: Simulator for protocol 2-Prover- Zero-Knowledge.
these properties of bit-commital with zero-knowledge proofs have appeared
before: They are all achieved by our schemes based on oblivious transfer.
Hence, if we can implement oblivious transfer in the 2-prover model, we can
plug the commital protocols into our transformation. We will show how to
do this in the next section, and thus implement our transformation without
any assumptions.
We now show some key properties of our transformed protocols. Infor-
mally, we show that the probability of an honest verifier accepting an input
x in the transformed protocol is essentially the same as its probability of
accepting x in the original protocol. We also show that the transformed
protocol will be zero-knowledge.
First, we make the simple observation that getting the verifier to accept
some x E L in the transformed protocol is no more difficult than in the
original protocol.
Lemma 6.5 Let (P1 , P1, V) be a protocol in one-sided normal form with re-
spect to language L. Let (P,, P2, V') be the transformed protocol, 2-PROVER-
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE(P, P 2 , V). Then for all input x E L, (P1, P2, V') will
always accept.
Proof: There is a trivial mapping from conversations among P,, P2, V', to
conversations among P1, P2, V. Furthermore, a conversation in the trans-
formed protocol is accepting iff the induced conversation in the original
protocol is accepting. By the construction of the protocol, the values of
ao, qi, ai, q2 , Q, A will be generated according to the same distribution by
(P, P2, V') as they were by (P1 , P2, V). The lemma follows. I
Similarly, we can show that convincing the verifier to accept a string
x g L is as hard in the transformed protocol as in the original protocol.
Lemma 6.6 Let (P1 , P1, V) be a protocol in one-sided normal form with re-
spect to language L. Let (P,, P2, V') be the transformed protocol, 2-PROVER-
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE(P, P 2, V). There exists a constant c such that for lxI
sufficiently large, and x g L,
(Vi, P2 )accept(P, P2 , V',x) < 1 - |X|C-
Proof: First, let us assume that prover P1 , P2 never try to violate the pro-
tocol for commitment with zero-knowledge proof, always commit legal en-
cryption keys, and give genuinely prime numbers p. Under this assumption,
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we claim that there is a mapping from (P1 , P2) to (#', P2) such that
accept(f', P, V,x) ;> accept(P1,P 2,V',x).
Note that by the definition of our normal form, accept(P1, IP2, V', x) will be
bounded away from 1.
We specify P, P in terms of P1, P2. Conceptually, P# and P2 will run a
simulated conversation between P1, P2 and V' that will correspond to their
actual conversation with V.
1. On input x, during the preprocessing stage, provers P, P2 simulate
P1, P2 through Step 1 of the transformed protocol. At this stage, P1
will have committed a0 , K 1, K 2, and sent V' the value of p, hence these
values will be known to both P, and P2 . Pj then sends V the value of
a0.
2. On receiving V's first query, q1, Pj simulates P1 on receiving this query.
The simulated P1 will commit an answer, ai, which Pj' will echo back
to V. We note that at this point in the simulated protocol, V' would
inevitably send P2 the value of K 1 (Q), where Q is the query that V will
send to P2 . This follows because the computation of Q is deterministic,
and our assumption that P1 will not attempt to cheat during the de-
commital and zero-knowledge proof process. The state of P 2 after the
end of this stage of the protocol may be simulated by running P2 using
a simulated view of the commital/decommital protocols. This view can
be simulated by P' due to our assumptions about the commital scheme.
3. When V sends P2 its query, Q, PJ continues the simulation of P2,
sending it the valu of K1 (Q) (note that P2' knows the value of K1 , K 2).
When P2 outputs some answer, A, P2 sends V the value of K2 (A).
This is always possible, since if K 2 is a well-defined key, it defines a
permutation.
It is not hard to see that V will accept if V' would have accepted in the
simulated conversation, and hence the acceptance probability must be at least
as large in the real conversation as in the simulated one. By the definition
of one-sided normal form, there must be some c such that for lx| sufficiently
large, and x ( L, we have
(VP;,, 2')accept($',P$,Vx) < 1-|x|'.
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By the above argument, the upper bound of 1 - |x|-c holds when P1, P2 use
the restricted strategy.
Now we consider the general case, where the provers P1 and P2 may
attempt to violate the commitment protocols or give invalid values for
K 1, K 2, p. We call such cheating "foolish" cheating, since it guarantees that
the verifier will reject with probability at least some constant p > 0, by
the specification of our commitment protocols. We now show that foolish
cheating can not significantly decrease ones probability of detection. For no-
tational convenience, we denote by foolish(A1, P2, x) the event that P1, P2
cheat in a foolish fashion during the protocol, with verifier V' and input x.
We denote by F(P 1, P2 , x) the probability that foolish(#1, P2, x) occurs. We
can write the probability of V' accepting as
F(P1, P 2, x) -prob{V'acceptsIfoolish(P1, P 2 , x)}+
(1 - F(P1, P2, x)) -prob{V'accepts|,-ifoolish(#i, P 2, x)}.
As a consequence of the inequalities shown above, this probability is bounded
above by
F(Pi, P2 , x) - (1 - p) + (1 - F(Pi, P2 , x)) - (1 - Ix|-c) 1 - Ix|-,
for x sufficiently large. The lemma follows. I
A sensitive reader may object to our assumption that by simulating the
two provers, P1, P2, one can determine the values of the bits that P1 actually
commits. This ability holds in most scenarios one can think of, such as
the physical envelopes model. More importantly, it certainly holds in the
protocols based on oblivious transfer, using the implementation of oblivious
transfer discussed in the next section.
Finally, we show that the transformed protocol is indeed statistical zero-
knowledge , regardless of the strategy of a possibly malicious verifier.
Lemma 6.7 Let (P, P1 , V) be a protocol in one-sided normal form with re-
spect to language L. Let (P1, P2, V') be the transformed protocol, 2-PROVER-
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE(P, P2, V). Then for all V, the output of simulator 2-
PROVER-ZERO-KNOWLEDGE(P 1, P2, V) will be statistically indistinguishable
from the distribution on actual transcripts of (P', P2, V).
Proof: We essentially appeal to our assumption about the simulatability of
the commital protocols, and to the unbreakability of the encryption scheme.
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First, we note that up through Step 4 of the actual protocol, prover
P1 only commits bits. The simulator merely runs the commital simulator,
which we hypothesize is statistically indistinguishable from a run of the actual
commital scheme.
In Step 5 of the actual protocol, prover P' sends V the values of
K1 (Q), K 2(A1 ), along with a zero-knowledge proof that they are the proper
encryptions. At this point in the simulation, the simulator sends V two ran-
dom elements of Z,, along with a simulation of the zero-knowledge protocol.
To see that these two events are statistically indistinguishable, we first note
that K 1 (Q), K 2(A1 ) will be distributed independently and uniformly over Z,.
This follows immediately from the unforgeability properties of the encryp-
tion functions, and the fact that K1 K 2 are independently and uniformly dis-
tributed over all legal keys. By our hypothesis, the simulated zero-knowledge
proof will be indistinguishable from an actual proof, provided that there is
some setting of the committed variables for which the theorem is true. This
condition is trivially satisfied, since there exists some values of K1, K2 that
will map a given number to a desired destination point.
Thus, the simulated interaction of V with P' is indistinguishable from the
actual interaction. We must now show that the remaining part of the simula-
tion, namely the simulated interaction of V with P2, is also indistinguishable
from the actual interaction.
In Step 6 of the simulation, the verifier sends a message, < Q >, to the
simulated P2 . If < Q >=< Q >, the simulator sends back < A >, otherwise
it simulates P2' aborting the protocol. We argue that this behavior is indis-
tinguishable from the actual behavior of the protocol, by a case analysis on
the types of inputs that V can give to P2. In the actual protocol, V can send
P' either
1. The value of K1 (Q), which corresponds in the simulation to < Q >.
2. Some value which is not a valid encryption, using key K 1.
3. Some value which is not K1 (Q), but is a legitimate encryption, using
key K 1.
In the first case, where < Q >=< Q >, the simulation behaves exactly as
the actual protocol would (noting that < Q > corresponds to K1 (Q) and
< A > corresponds to K 2(A 1)). In the second case, the simulation again
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behaves exactly as the actual protocol would, since P2 would indeed abort
after seeing an illegal encryption. However, in the third case, the behavior
of the simulation and the actual protocol are distinguishable. Essentially,
the simulator does not have a third case - anything which isn't exactly the
expected question is treated as garbage.
However, this discrepancy in the two behaviors is insignificant, for the
same reason as with the CHAIN protocol. This is due to the unforgeability
property of the encryption system. If the verifier gets no information about
K 1, K 2, then no matter what strategy it uses, or how powerful it is, the
probability that any new message it generates corresponds to a legitimate
encryption is bounded above by 2-". By the properties of the envelope
scheme, V has only a negligible probability of getting any information about
K 1, K 2. Hence, the one case where the simulation breaks down happens with
only negligible probability, and so the simulation is indistinguishable from
the actual protocol. The lemma follows. I
6.5.3 Running our protocols in series.
The properties we have proved for our zero-knowledge protocol transforma-
tion do not quite prove our main theorem, since the transformed protocol is
not a proof system. However, as with our previous protocols, this deficiency
may be remedied by serially running the protocol sufficiently many times in
series. To simulate this protocol, it suffices to run the simulator many times
in series. The fact that the malicious verifier V has knowledge or previous
runs of the protocol is immaterial: The proof of Lemma 6.7 holds regardless
of the power or prior knowledge of V.
6.6 Achieving Oblivious Transfer in the
Multi-Prover Model.
6.6.1 Introduction.
In the previous section, we showed how to prove anything provable in zero-
knowledge, modulo the existence of suitable a scheme for committing bits
with zero-knowledge proofs of assertions about these bits. Naturally, we
would like to eliminate this assumption. Since we can base such commitment
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schemes on oblivious transfer, it suffices to exhibit a protocol for oblivious
transfer in the two-prover model.' This section gives a simple implementation
for oblivious transfer.
Our implementation of oblivious transfer will not be as ideal as we would
like. For instance, if the provers are allowed to exchange any information
after the conclusion of the protocol, the transfer will no longer be oblivious.
Thus, the protocol we give can only be used in certain restricted situations.
Fortunately, the use outlined in the previous section is one such situation.
It is in fact possible to implement oblivious transfer in a way which
is partially resistant to interprover communication. This was first done
in [BGKW], where we used the implementation to outline a robust zero-
knowledge transformation for two-prover protocols. However, both the pro-
tocol for oblivious transfer, and the construction of the transformed protocol
are somewhat complicated, and we do not go into this proof in this thesis.
6.6.2 Bit commital in the two-prover model.
In order to implement our oblivious transfer protocol, we first implement a
form of bit-commital. In this protocol, we assume that provers P1 and P2
possess some bit b, which they wish to commit in advance. At some later
time, either one of the provers may wish to decommit the bit. We assume
This protocol is easy to implement in the two-prover model, provided that:
1. The provers are allowed to communicate before the protocol begins.
2. No communication of any kind is allowed between the two provers from
the time of the commital to the time of the decommital. Our notion
of noncommunication is very strict here: The messages sent from the
verifier to prover P; cannot depend on its conversation with prover P1_ .
We present our commital and decommital protocols in Figures 6.7 and 6.8.
They are, like most of our workhorse protocols, based on the classic exclusive-
or trick. To weakly commit a bit, b, the provers randomly expand it as an
exclusive-or of three bits, b E b1 e b2. Clearly, allowing the verifier learn
the value of two of these bits, b;, bj, will give him no information about b.
Therefore, we simply have the verifier choose i, j at random, ask prover P1
6There are still a few technical details that will have to be addressed, as we will see.
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Protocol 2-Prover-Commit(b, k)
b = bo e b1 E b2.
1: The verifier uniformly picks q1, q2. He sends q1 to Prover 1, and
q2 to Prover 2. Prover 1 sends the verifier the value of b, and
Prover 2 sends the verifier the value of bq2 . The verifier rejects if
he is given inconsistent values.
Figure 6.7: Committing bits in the two-prover model.
Protocol 2-Prover-Decommit (bo,b 1, b2)
1: The prover sends the verifier the values of bob 1, b2 . The verifier
rejects if any of the bi's are inconsistent with the values he received
in the commital phase. Otherwise, the verifier reconstructs
b = bo E b1 e b2 .
Figure 6.8: Decommitting bits in the two-prover model.
for the value of b;, and ask prover P2 for the value of by. A prover decommits
b by sending the verifier bo, bi, b2 . If these bits disagree with either of the bits
learned by the verifier during the commital stage, he aborts.
To argue that this is'truly a commital protocol, we must show that the
provers cannot, without some risk of detection, cause the verifier to decommit
an incorrect value for a bit. For our argument, we can assume that the
provers flip all their coins (perhaps infinitely many) before the beginning of
the commital protocol, and then act deterministically based on their resulting
state.
Define b to be the answer that would be given by prover P after being
asked to reveal b;. If, for any i, b! # b2, the verifier will reject with prob-
ability at least -. If prover P, during the decommital stage, gives a value
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to each other, they0: Beforehand, when the two provers can talk
choose a sequence of bits bo, b1, b2, subject to
3-1 1
of bi that is different from bh, the verifier will reject with probability j.
Thus, the provers must act consistently, both with each other at the time of
commitment, and later on when they decommit.
Simulating the commital protocol is straightforward: One merely has
to give random, consistent answers. Simulating the decommital of a bit is
likewise very easy. After the commital phase, the value of at least one of the
three bits is unspecified. Therefore, the simulator can pick the unspecified
bits uniformly such that the total exclusive-or is equal to the value of the bit
the simulator wants to decommit. This simulation is easily seen to be perfect.
One might argue that the above protocols should be called "weak-commit'
and "weak-decommit," since they do not guarantee that cheating provers
will be caught with probability exponentially close to 1. However, we do not
need anything stronger for use in our interactive proofs, which only seek to
catch a cheating prover with some nonnegligible probability. We can then
run our interactive proofs many times in series to amplify their reliability.
6.6.3 Our transfer protocol.
We give our oblivious transfer protocol in Figure 6.9. Essentially, the provers
randomly break their bit b into two bits, bo and b1, such that b = bo D b1,
and commit these bits to the verifier. They then flip fair coins, r1 and r2,
with the verifier by the standard "flipping into the well" trick. Prover i then
reveals the value of br;.
We now want to claim that this protocol is some sense implements oblivi-
ous transfer. If the provers ever attempt to violate the commital or decommi-
tal protocols, they will be caught with nonnegligible probability. Therefore,
for our purposes, we need only the case where the provers do not cheat dur-
ing the commital/decommital process, but may try to cheat in other ways.
First, if either the provers or the verifier are honest, then r1,r 2 will be dis-
tributed at random, so we may always assume that this is the case. Then
no matter what strategy it uses, the verifier will get b iff r, # r2, which will
happen with probability 1. Otherwise, it will get no information about b, in
the information theoretic sense. If the verifier gives truly random values for
q1 and q2, then prover P will have no information about r 3 _, regardless of
what values they committed. Thus, immediately after the conclusion of the
protocol, neither prover will know whether the the verifier received bit b.
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Protocol OT(b)
0: During the preprocessing phase, the provers uniformly choose bits
bo, b1 ,p1, p2-
1: The provers and the verifier use protocol 2-PROVER-COMMIT to
commit bo, bi ,pi, P2 to the verifier.
2: The verifier uniformly chooses bits q1, q2, and for i E [1, 2], sends qi
to prover P. We define r; = p; e qj.
3: For i E [1,2], prover Pi uses protocol 2-PROVER-DECOMMIT to
decommit p;, b,. In addition, prover P1 sends the verifier the value
of b e bo e b1. If the verifier detects any cheating in the commital
or decommital protocols, then he aborts the protocol. If r1 = r2,
then the verifier reconstructs nothing. Otherwise, it reconstructs b
from the values bo, b1,bE bo E b1 .
Figure 6.9: Implementing oblivious transfer in the 2-prover model.
6.6.4 Simulating the oblivious transfer protocol.
We would like to plug in our oblivious transfer protocol into all the protocols
which we have already reduced to oblivious transfer. In order to ensure that
the zero-knowledge properties of these protocols are preserved, we must come
up with a simulator for our oblivious transfer protocol which is compatible
with the requirements placed on it by the higher-level simulators.
All of the higher-level simulators can be thought of as working in the
following manner: First, they randomly decide which of the bits being sent
will actually get through (the mask), and then they decide on the values of
the bits that are actually seen by the verifier. In the simulators described
thus far, the simulator could simply say, "...bit 47 did not get through
to the verifier, ... bit 48 was received with value 0,...." However, when we
implement oblivious transfer using a protocol, we must be able to simulate the
protocol with the three possible values (0,1, #) for a bit being sent through
to the verifier. This simulator is described in Figure 6.10.
Remark: Note that the simulator does not require the malicious verifier
to speak to the provers in a synchronous fashion. A malicious verifier may
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Simulator OT(b) /*bE{0,1,#1 *1
0: The simulator uniformly chooses bits bo,b 1 , ri. If b E {0, 1} it
computes r2 = 1 - ri, otherwise it sets r 2 = r1 .
1: The simulator fakes the commital of bo, 1 , P1,P2 (note that these
values do not have to be specified at this time. To do this, he
has each prover give random (though consistent) answers to the
verifier's queries.
2-3: The verifier will send sends bits q1, q2 to the simulated provers.
When simulated prover P bit qj, the simulator computes pi =
qi e ri. The simulator then simulates P decommitting pi, b,. If
b E {0, 1} the simulator has the simulated P1 send b E bo e b1 to
the verifier along with its decommitals. If b = #, the simulated P1
sends a uniformly distributed bit.
Figure 6.10: Simulating the oblivious transfer protocol.
go along further in the conversation with one prover than with another.
Indeed, the malicious verifier may, with one prover, continue on with another
portion of the larger protocol, while still in the middle of the oblivious transfer
protocol with the other prover.
This simulation is perfect, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.8 The distribution output by simulator OT(b), where b E {0, 1},
is the same as the distribution of protocol OT(b), conditioned on the verifier
receiving the bit. The distribution output by simulator OT(#) is the same
as the distribution of OT(b'), conditioned on the verifier not receiving the
bit, for ' equal to 0 or 1.
Proof: This protocol is finite, so in principle the lemma can be verifier by
an exhaustive case analysis. We give a more intuitive argument.
Recall that we say that the verifier receives a bit iff r1 # r 2. First note that
the distribution of the questions and answers in the conmital schemes are
identical in the simulated and actual protocols (i.e. the answers are random
subject to consistency). The commital scheme gives no information about
the committed bit, so the distribution of r1 , r 2 will be uniformly distributed.
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/* b E {0, 1, #} */l t r OT(b)
Since the commital step is simulated perfectly, the first query bit to a prover
will be identically distributed in the simulated verses actual protocol. Let
the first query message involve sending bit q, to prover P. Choosing qj, ri
according to the correct distribution, and then computing pi is the same
as choosing qj, pi according to the correct distribution, and then computing
r;. The decommital of pi, b,., is also perfectly simulated. The same argument
follows for the next query bit sent to a prover (note that the malicious verifier
does not have to send qi, q2 off at the same time, though doing so does not
give him any advantage).
The one remaining point of difference in the simulated verses real protocol
occurs when the verifier does not receive the bit. In the real protocol, prover
P1 sends the verifier b D bo e bi, and b, (he also sends b,2 , but in this case,
r1 = r 2). The simulator sends a uniformly distributed bit, which we denote
by b', along with b,,. However, since b1...i, is uniformly distributed, and the
verifier does not see it, the distributions of (b e bo e bi, b,.,) and (b', b,.) will
appear identical to the verifier. I
Now that we have implemented oblivious transfer, we can simply plug in
our favorite commitment with zero-knowledge proof scheme based on obliv-
ious transfer into our transformed zero-knowledge protocol. Whenever the
verifier and P' need to perform an oblivious transfer, they run OT. The ver-
ifier forgets all about the details of the conversation it has, save for remem-
bering whether it received the bit and the value of bits that were received.
6.6.5 When can we use the oblivious transfer proto-
col?
We need to understand exactly when our OT protocol can and cannot be
used in larger protocols. We must address the logistics of actually using the
protocol, and the problems with cheating on the part of the prover or verifier.
For our application, we initially use the second prover solely for imple-
menting the OT protocol. Logistically, this gives some slight trouble in
determining coordinating the second prover with the first prover and the
verifier. We cannot expect the second prover to know how many oblivious
transfers are to be executed. This is easily dealt with by having it set up to
make the maximum number of oblivious transfers that could be needed by
the protocol. It is a trivial exercise to pad our protocols with extra oblivious
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transfers so that they always use the maximum number possible.
Our OT protocol behaves ideally with respect to the verifier. Therefore,
any protocol which uses it in place of an ideal oblivious transfer protocol
will remain zero-knowledge. However, it remains to be shown that plugging
our OT protocol into a commitment scheme preserves the fact that it is a
commitment scheme. The OT protocol's security with respect to the provers
depends strongly on a lack of interprover communication. If either prover
can communicate with the other prover any details about its conversation
with the verifier, then the obliviousness argument given above breaks down.
This severely hampers the use of the oblivious transfer protocol, but for our
purposes it is still effective.
Let us consider our zero-knowledge protocol where we use a commitment
with zero-knowledge proof scheme based on oblivious transfer. Such a scheme
consists of a phase in which the verifier interacts with PI, and then sends
a message. While it is interacting with Pj, it only interacts with P2 in
order to execute the oblivious transfers necessary to run the commitment
protocols.
As far as P' is concerned, the OT protocol is ideal in this initial phase,
since prover P2' cannot possibly leak any information to Pj. However, we
cannot make the same argument about P2. As soon as the verifier sends its
message to P2, there is the possibility that this message was influenced by
P1' in order to help P2' subvert the OT protocol. Therefore we must, and do,
assume that P2 learns which bits the verifier received in all the OT protocols
up to that point.
This fact appears very ominous, but is in fact irrelevant to the security of
the commitment scheme. Everything that is going to be decommitted already
has been by this point. Therefore, it is irrelevant if P2 has information that
could be used to decommit a value of a bit different than the value actually
committed.
Will our commitment schemes have the required properties?
We can easily verify that commitment protocols using OT will obey all the
properties required for the zero-knowledge protocol transformation given in
the last section.
In protocol OT, the second prover's view consists solely of a set of random
queries from the verifier. These queries are made completely independent of
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anything else in the protocol. This fulfills the first condition.
Our commitment with zero-knowledge proof schemes that have been
based on oblivious transfer all guarantee that the verifier gets informa-
tion about a committed bit with only negligible property, and that the
commital/decommital/zero-knowledge proof protocols can all be simulated.
Thus, the second and third conditions are fulfilled.
Finally, the fourth condition is implied by the definition of our commital
schemes, and the fact that any attempts to subvert the OT protocol will
be detected with probability bounded away from 0. It should be noted that
even if the commitment protocol based on oblivious transfer allowed for only
a negligible chance of successful prover cheating, the resulting commitment
protocols can only guarantee a bounded chance of prover cheating. This is
because they could try to subvert the OT protocol. This will cause them
to get caught with nonneglible probability, but if they succeed even once,
one must assume that this will allow them to subvert the protocol at large.
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